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Halter nachrangiger US-Bankanleihen könnten - nach einer fulminanten Kurs-Rallye von im Schnitt 18 % ab den März-Tiefs (teils bis über 100 %) demnächst das Nachsehen haben. Die meisten Banken in USA haben negatives Eigenkapital und müssen verstaatlicht werden. Die Aktien werden dann wertlos. Bonds-Halter von Washington Mutual gingen letztes Jahr ebenfalls leer aus.
Die im Text unten genannten Grafiken füge ich in Folgepostings an. Die Grafik unter diesem Text zeigt die Kursgewinne der Bank-Bonds seit März.
Banking
Bank Bond Run Can't Last
By Tom Graff
Street.com Contributor
5/29/2009 3:30 PM EDT
Green shoots may be springing up, but one really has to question how well financial bonds have been performing. In April and May, corporate bonds of all stripes have been performing well, but the performance of financials has been especially striking.
You are reading that right. Over the last two months, supposedly investment-grade subordinate financial bonds have returns almost 18% on average. Various sub notes from Capital One (COF) , Fifth Third (FITB) , PNC (PNC) , Lincoln National (LNC) , SunTrust (STI) and Regions Financial (RF) all have produced 50% or greater returns in May.
To be sure, these issues are still trading at large discounts to par value. Most of the issues mentioned above went from prices of $30-$40 to $60 vs. $100 par value in the last month. But that is beside the point. The fundamental picture surrounding banks remains very shaky. Investors in these firms are counting almost entirely on government support.
Consider the FDIC's Quarterly Banking Profile released on Wednesday. Mainstream media coverage has focused on the obvious: number of problem banks rise to 305, loan loss reserves up 64%, while the FDIC's insurance fund is down 25%. In reality though, this is all old news, not of much use to investors.
Look a little deeper, and you'll find more disturbing news. The FDIC reports insured banks have $7.7 trillion in loans and leases, broken down as such:
Banks' Loans and Leases
(in $billions) - FDIC
We can take this data and overlay the loss estimates the Fed used in its Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (a.k.a., the stress test):
Indicative Loss Rates Provided to Bank Holding Companies for SCAP
(cumulative two-year, in percent) - Federal Reserve
The Fed was careful to emphasize that "these estimates are not forecasts of expected losses." Regardless, it does provide a mainstream view of potential losses on loans.
Multiply these loan loss estimates and the assets as published by the FDIC. It paints an ugly picture:
Losses (Estimated and Actual) - Fed/FDIC
In the above chart, the blue bars represent the range of "baseline" loss estimates, and the red bars reflect the range of "adverse" estimates. Based on Fed estimates, banks in aggregate will lose between $345 billion and $809 billion. The green bar on the right represents the aggregate amount of losses for which banks have already accounted: $171 billion in loss reserves and $150 billion in charge-offs.
Even under the low end of the baseline scenario, banks in general are under reserves for potential losses. Now consider that these aggregate numbers actually represent a combination of some banks with more benign loan portfolios, better geographics and/or better loan types, and other banks with worse geographics and weaker loan types. So the banks that are weak look much worse than the aggregate.
Admittedly, odds are good that the Treasury will backstop any systemically important bank, but what form future bailouts take is unknown. Look no further than the treatment of Chrysler's debt holders. Normal rules of bankruptcy won't apply if taxpayer dollars are involved.
Plus, one has to question the definition of "systemically important." KeyCorp (KEY) has $98 billion in assets. Fifth Third has $119 billion. In its last quarterly filing before its failure, Washington Mutual had $310 billion in assets; WaMu subordinate bond holders were wiped out. Why are investors so sure that the same fate wouldn't befall Key or Fifth Third?
Bear in mind that subordinate bonds have an uneven risk/reward profile. In the event of bankruptcy, sub-note holders will likely get wiped out. But even if a bank's credit improves, the return on a sub-note is limited. With many of the weaker bank sub notes trading at $60 to $70 vs. $100 par, the upside is no more than 50%. The downside is -100%. I'd argue that if Fifth Third or KeyCorp or Regions survive into the next several years, there is much more upside in the common stock, but with the same downside: 100%.
Yesterday, news came that the government was backing away from the Legacy Loans Program portion of the PPIP. This is bad news on top of bad news: Not only are banks not going to enjoy any capital relief on their bad loans, but it's signaling that banks can't sell their assets at market-clearing prices and remain solvent.
The bottom line is that many banks are insolvent now and would have no access to capital markets without government interference. While the Treasury's programs are probably the right move for the economy overall, it doesn't guarantee bank securities will produce profits, especially for subordinate bond holders who face such a large downside.
Corporate Bond Performance, Quelle: Merrill Lynch/Bank of America
Nichts prinzipielles gegen die Meinung im Post, aber zur Verbreiterung der Wahrnehmung doch eine Anmerkung zu:
"Inzwischen sind die Charts allerdings schon wieder an der oberen Schmerzgrenze ihrer fundamentalen Bewertung angelangt. Der SP-500 z. B. , der aktuell Gewinne von insgesamt 60 Dollar verzeichnet, hätte beim Stand von 900 (= 900 Dollar) bereits ein KGV von 15 - was man in Anbetracht der stark kriselnden Weltwirtschaft samt akuter Pleite-Gefahren (GM, Banken) als teuer bzw. "recht ambitioniert" bezeichnen kann. An wirklichen, nachhaltigen Tiefs sind eher KGVs um 5 bis max. 10 typisch"
Wir haben aber jetzt kein "wirkliches, nachhaltiges Tief" mehr. Ich will gar nicht auf die KGVs an sich eingehen oder ob sie berechtigt sind (danach gucke ich eher nicht), sondern auf die Logik der Kritik im Post: wenn die Gewinne 60 Dollar sind (d.h. in Zukunft sein sollen), dann hätten wir in der Tat bei SPX=900 ein KGV von 15. Bei dem März-Tief von ca. 660 hatten wir dann aber ein KGV von 11, also knapp noch am Rand des erwähnten "vernünftigen" Ranges für Tiefs. Von März bis heute dürften sich die immanenten Gewinne ja nicht wirklich verändert haben.
Das zeigt die Tücke der ganzen KGV-Betrachtungen, die IMHO zwar strategische Orientierung geben können, aber meinem Eindruck nach fast überhaupt nichts darüber sagen, ob eine Aktie oder ein Index im nächsten halben Jahr höher oder tiefer stehen wird.
Eine andere Story wäre es, wenn sich ab jetzt in der Zukunft die Gewinne bzw. ihre realistische Erwartungen ändern (für mich vorzugsweise nach unten :-), zum Beispiel durch Wieder-Verschlechterung des wirtschaftlichen Horizontes (womit ich rechne). Dann würden die KGVs sich derart aufblähen, dass sie die Börse doch nach unten ziehen.
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