Pfizer - zu Unrecht im Keller

Retrospektive, wann sich die Anleger wie verhalten haben. Da es eine der
Eigenarten menschlichen Tuns ist, sich unter bestimmten Bedingungen im-
mer wieder gleich oder ähnlich zu verhalten, kann man also legitimerwei-
se Schlüsse aus dem Verhalten in der Vergangenheit auf das Verhalten in
der Zukunft ziehen. Wenn ich das sage, ist das keine Vermutung oder Theo-
rie von mir, sondern es ist tausendfach bestätigt oder analysiert.

Der Wert oder Unwert von charttechnischem Handeln aber liegt darin, daß
eine kursrelevante Anzahl von Anlegern danach handelt und alleine schon
deshalb für die Bewahrheitung sorgt. Da gibt es kein Entrinnen.

Wenn Du meinen obigen Beitrag genau gelesen hast, lieber Anti, wirst Du
auch den vorletzten Absatz nicht übersehen haben, der da lautet:

"Ich räume ein, daß ich hier nur die Vergangenheit bewerte. Für die Ge-
genwart besagt das nicht viel. Es ist aber Sache des Unternehmens, sei-
nen Aktionären zu beweisen, daß sich das Blatt gewendet hat".

Du siehst, ich bin kein Kaffesatzleser und ich urteile sachgerecht und
angemessen. Mag sein, daß PFIZER unter dem Eindruck der FDA-Entschei-
dung steigen wird. Ein Quantensprung dürfte kaum anstehen, Was sind
schon zwei Medikamente. Zuvor, als die Rücknahme noch nicht anstand,
stand die Aktie ja auch nicht viel besser. Es bleibt dabei: der Beweis,
daß aus Pfizer eine Rakete wird, steht noch aus.
Nicht ich muß etwas beweisen, PFIZER muß es.

Postscriptum:
Da wir so fleißig am anhängen sind, setze ich noch einen Chart drauf:
den 10-jährigen absoluten (also NICHT logarithmischen). Auch er zeigt,
was ich schon sagte: PFIZER hat zwischen 1998 und heute entreichert.

Du vergleichst Äpfel mit Birnen. Pure Charttechnik bei PFIZER mit Aussa-
gen völlig anderer Art zu MEDION.
Naja, Du hattest einen schweren Tag...Schwamm drüber. ;-)

Mein Beitrag bei MEDION soll keine Durchhalteparole per se sein, sondern
ein Kritik an den Analysten, die immer nach demselben Strickmuster verfah-
ren, nämlich zum Ausstieg zu blasen, wenn ein Papier ganz am Boden liegt.
Das ganze vergangene Jahr über hat man den Untergang der Aktie mitver-
folgen können. Wer JETZT noch aussteigt ist eben ein Ignorant oder Ein-
faltspinsel. Deshalb auch Kritik an Anlegern.

Ich habe das Geschäftsmodell von MEDION mit keiner Silbe kommentiert.
Das kann aber nicht die simple Schlußfolgerung verhindern, daß die künf-
tigen Zahlen der AG alleine wegen des Basiseffekts besser ausfallen wer-
den. Ist das in irgendeiner Weise zu beanstanden?

Im übrigen haben gefallene Engel ihre Reize. Einer davon liegt im billigen
Preis. Deshalb sind Unfalltage wie der heute bei MEDION oft die Grundlage
fürs Geldverdienen an der Börse.

Wie sagte hier mal ein nicht ganz unbekannter Kolumnist?
Buy cheap, sell high. [;-)]

Diabetes treatment is a wide-open market. An estimated 180 million people currently suffer from diabetes worldwide, and that number continues to rise. According to the press release, more than half of all diabetes patients remain poorly treated. A drug that can be taken in dry powder form, thus making it substantially more convenient than the current subcutaneous insulin administration, seems like a home run.

Of course, there is plenty of time and work between an application's being accepted and actual revenues from an approved drug. And its approval, given the long study time already taken to date, may already be figured into the company's share price.

Looking at Pfizer's current multiples, though, I'm not sure where that would be.

ATTITUDE ADJUSTMENT.  Changes in financial policy, which basically translate into a change in corporate risk orientation, have figured importantly in the fall from AAA for some pretty significant companies, including Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, DuPont, and Federated Department Stores. For others, like Ford, GM, Eastman Kodak, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Sears, and AT&T, changes in the business environment were the key ingredient in their credit quality decline.

In some instances, a changing global marketplace undermined competitive positions. For others, it was changing technologies. And for a few, failure to maintain a competitive edge in their core businesses. Finally, in a couple of instances, the weakened credit profiles resulted simply from acquisition by another company.

The movement away from AAA ratings was part of a larger trend in the 1980s that included significant changes in the capital markets. Attitudes toward credit risk went from superconservatism to a more functional approach. The "shareholder revolution" of the early 1980s played a major role in reshaping these attitudes. Back then, new business strategies emerged, reflecting a need to add some life to businesses that were maturing.

THE RISE OF HIGH-YIELD.  Thus, debt capacity was viewed as a means to address business stagnation while keeping shareholders happy at the same time. Some took this notion a bit further, piling on huge amounts of debt for LBOs and hostile takeovers.

The result? In a short period of time, the credit profile of Corporate America transformed from a largely investment-grade universe to one that was dominated by high-yield issuers. In 1980, two-thirds of Standard & Poor's ratings were at the investment-grade level. By decade's end, two-thirds were high-yield. Moreover, in only two years since 1980 have upgrades outnumbered downgrades.

Corporate psychology may also have played a role in the credit quality decline -- if not as a direct cause, then at least as a contributing factor. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, senior management at many companies changed hands. Many companies up to that point were run by CEOs who grew up during difficult economic conditions and often felt debt-adverse.

Their replacements, in contrast, often had much less fear of the "evils" of debt and recognized that they had to satisfy a broader range of constituencies to achieve success.

UNEVEN OUTCOMES.  Nobody knows if the old-timers would have stayed the course as the shareholder revolution progressed. However, their more-cautious philosophy on debt and credit risk was certainly a critical factor in supporting the generally high ratings of the time period.

And some newcomers made their own impact on credit quality. Chief Executives Roberto Goizueta of Coca-Cola and James Dutt at Beatrice had a world view different from their predecessors', which played a major role in the direction of credit quality at those companies. Some companies that adopted this more aggressive posture did so intelligently and, over the long term, enhanced their respective business positions. Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble make good examples of this outcome.

However, the record shows that this wasn't the result in many other cases. More aggressive financial policies did little to help the fortunes of Beatrice, which was eventually dismantled, and Federated Department Stores, which ultimately filed for bankruptcy.

VOLATILE DAYS.  The early 1980s represented an end to an era that included a considerable amount of financial conservatism and, for some, a rather sleepy approach to business. Nonetheless, in reality the companies rated AAA at the end of this "age of innocence" would have some difficult decisions to make. They could stay put, which at that time meant possibly getting acquired or losing their competitive edge, or they could consider a new path, to grow to another level.

The 1980s represented a period of great change in business, and those senior executives who looked to historical business models to make their way in the world were in for a rude awakening.

The problem for many companies: The business models they used for previous success didn't always prepare them for the more volatile times ahead, which included corporate raiders, less-patient shareholders, changing technologies, and more intense global competition. Ford and GM would learn this lesson in the early 1980s, and IBM a decade later.

RARE CASE.  Companies that chose to venture down a new path also found that their new business strategies or models carried risk. The credo "there are no guarantees in life" certainly applies to AAA credit. Some of our former AAAs found new models, but in certain instances they had picked the wrong ones. Kodak's diversification efforts in the mid 1980s flopped, and one would be hard pressed to see the wisdom of Beatrice's acquisition strategy around that same time.

The 1980s also brought many LBOs, but the case of Federated Department Stores proved that not even a onetime AAA could avoid the pitfalls of too much debt. Consolidation in the energy business also took its toll on ratings, but many of these efforts were actually successful, and the overall impact on credit quality was relatively mild.

In the the ratings business, we generally say once you lose your AAA, you never go back. Sure, Kellogg returned to AAA after a downgrade, but such cases are rather rare. In truth, companies not only fail to spring back but also seldom stop their slide at the next-lowest category in the credit spectrum. Only a few companies from the group of AAAs in the early 1980s currently have ratings in the AA category.

STRONGER PROFILE.  In fact, this group probably has as many BBB category ratings as AAs. Two members of this class -- AT&T and Citizens Communications (formerly Citizens Utilities) -- are presently no longer investment grade. In addition, Sears will also likely fall out of investment grade within a few months. AT&T is likely to return to investment grade due to its acquisition by SBC, but it certainly wouldn't have achieved the comeback on its own power.

For some of these companies, operating challenges represent the major reason why the ratings have dropped since the early 1980s. For others, the key factor was ongoing changes in risk orientation. After all, financial policies are dynamic and subject to change at any time. While Procter & Gamble no longer has a AAA credit, this has little to do with any challenges to its business. In fact, its business profile is probably stronger today than it was 10 years ago. However, P&G has been very busy in the acquisition department, and financial strategies were the key consideration in the direction of the ratings.

Our rating distribution over the past two decades indicates that credit quality in Corporate America has clearly taken a turn for the worse. Part of this trend is the near extinction of the AAA category for U.S. industrial companies. While we have two exceptional companies from the early 1980s group that have remained at AAA, they represent a statistically insignificant part of the credit spectrum.

The bottom line remains that satisfying a broad range of constituencies has become a fact of life in Corporate America, and this will likely keep the AAA rating a rarity. Indeed, it seems that many companies today would prefer to aspire to ratings in the BBB to A range, which they feel give them sufficient flexibility to manage the interests of creditors and shareholders alike.  

Außerdem ist Pharma bei Investoren derzeit äußerst unbeliebt, was man als antizyklischen Kontraindikator betrachten kann (Pfizer - mit einem KGV von 12 - hat verglichen mit anderen US-Pharmakonzernen die stärkste Pipeline, ist am größten und hat die meiste Kohle für Übernahmen). Wenn in den USA das Schadensersatzrecht novelliert wird (erste Schritte sind schon vollzogen, keine Sammelklagen mehr), dürften Pharmawerte wieder in den Rang der Witwen- und Waisenpapiere aufsteigen. Immerhin sind sie recht konjunktursicher. Sollten die Indizes, insbesondere die Nasdaq, weiter Luft ablassen, womit ich rechne, könnte ich mir eine Rotation großer Fonds von Tech in Pharma vorstellen. Und bei US-Pharmawerten sind Pfizer und Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) die erste Wahl - wobei Pfizer mit einem KGV von 12 ein Turnaround ist (jetzt, nach der Celebrex-Entscheidung), während JNJ mit einem KGV von 22 schon recht teuer ist und entsprechend weniger Potenzial bietet.

Wie man investiert, ist immer auch eine Stimmungsfrage. Ich habe zurzeit keine große Lust auf Experimente. Zudem sind die Small Caps in den letzten zwei Jahren reichlich hochgelaufen, da ist nicht mehr viel zu holen (außer in Sonderfällen und bei etwas Glück).

Meine Pfizer-Investition ist im Vergleich dazu eher ein genau kalkuliertes Schachspiel. Die "Eröffnung" - die darauf setzte, dass Celebrex und Bextra am Markt bleiben - ist schon mal gut gelaufen. Nun kommt am 5. April 2005 die Analystenkonferenz, auf der die geplanten Entlassungen von 10 oder mehr Prozent der Belegschaft offiziell verkündet werden. Danach werden die Analysten neu zu rechnen anfangen (auch dies kann Teil einer Schachpartie sein); sie werden den Gewinn/Aktie von jetzt 2,12 Dollar auf 2,40 hochrechnen und Upgrades aussprechen ("Mittelspiel"). Unterdessen werden gute News aus der Pipeline kommen, z. B. das von Pfizer neu entwickelte Insulin zum Inhalieren, das Diabetikern das Spritzen erspart. Das Endspiel beginnt, wenn die Aktie sich wieder ihrem historischen KGV von 16 nähert. Das ergibt bei 2,40 Gewinn/Aktie ein Kursziel von 38,40 Dollar. Dort stand die Aktie im letzten April, und dort wird sie auch wieder hingehen.
Bis dahin warte ich geduldig ab, wobei mir 3 % Dividende die Wartezeit versüßen. Das klingt nach wenig, ist aber immerhin zwei Drittel dessen, was zurzeit Euro-Anleihen abwerfen (die bei Zinserhöhungen nominell stark abzuschmieren drohen).

Capito - oder da capo?  ;-))