ist eine einzige achterbahnfahrt..........

überbewerten. Es gab in den letzten Jahren auch Phasen , da waren sicher 90 % Long
und trotzem ist die Börse gestiegen.  

als 90 % short waren und es TROTZDEM fiel.

Leider war ich in letzter Zeit so eingespannt, dass ich nur sporadisch mitlesen konnte.  Nach wie vor profitiere ich sehr von den eingestellten Infos - heute kann auch ich mir endlich wieder die Zeit nehmen, ein paar Ansichten des Economist einzustellen, der hier etwas zu kurz kommt. In der aktuellen Ausgabe fand ich einiges sehr lesenswert, wie zum Beispiel den folgenden (Leit-)Artikel. Im Anschluss noch Interessantes zu Value-Profizeuren á la Buffet den Angst-Backed-Securities.  Beste Grüße, w.

__________________________________________________

Monetary policy

 Hazardous times

Aug 23rd 2007
From The Economist print edition

The Fed has a new problem: convincing investors it does not need to cut interest rates yet

 

LEND freely but at penal rates was Walter Bagehot's advice to central bankers in a liquidity crisis. Lend freely and reduce interest rates has been the panicky demand of many investors shocked by the speed with which a crisis among low-quality mortgage borrowers in America has ricocheted around the world. So far the central banks, led by America's Federal Reserve, have tried to have it both ways. The Fed has lent freely, not always at penal rates. Meanwhile, it has talked a cautious game: no firm promise that any interest rate will be cut, but the odd hint that all the options are open in monetary policy, especially when it comes to protecting the real economy from the turbulence on the markets.

 

From many investors' point of view, this has worked a treat. Stockmarkets, which seemed in a state of panic on August 16th, have recovered some of their poise. More importantly, the credit markets, especially the ones where banks lend to each other, look more relaxed. Yet much of this relief is based on a single expectation: that the Fed will cut interest rates soon, perhaps even before its next rate-setting meeting on September 18th. This looks doubly dangerous: a rate cut is not certain; it would also, quite possibly, be the wrong thing to do. Hence, the increasingly urgent need for the Fed's chairman, Ben Bernanke, to let down his new admirers gently.

 

The willingness of investors to pin their hopes on a rate cut is understandable: after all, that has been the response of the Fed to every financial panic since the stockmarket crash of 1987. The Fed has also craftily encouraged that belief, while not yet committing itself. On August 17th, in addition to cutting the discount rate which banks pay it for emergency lending, the Fed's rate-setters acknowledged that financial turmoil now posed a risk to America's economy. The tone was so different from the Fed's statement just ten days before, when inflation was its biggest concern, that markets automatically assumed a rate cut was imminent. But was that wise?

House of cards

 

Begin with the fact that both the Fed and the markets have an overwhelming long-term interest in risk being priced correctly. The new model of financing, in which debt is repackaged and risk is dispersed through a web of derivative contracts, has much merit. But it plainly has had an unhappy consequence: when a problem emerged (in this case, in subprime mortgages), it was harder to work out whom it was safe to do business with. Banks became wary of lending to each other. The outcome was frighteningly similar to a bank run, but one that affected the entire wholesale money market.

 

From this perspective, it certainly made sense for central banks to stop that run by supplying short-term money. Nobody wants a temporary cash shortage to turn into a solvency crisis, where otherwise valuable assets are sold cheaply into a market gripped by fear. Temporary loans to the banking system should grease the market's wheels and enable it to grind out its own solutions.

 

However, a shift in the longer-term stance of monetary policy, by lowering the benchmark price of money, is a very different proposition. A rate cut does not just increase the supply of cash; it directly influences people's calculations about risk. Cheaper money makes other assets look more attractive—an undesirable consequence at a moment when risk is being repriced after many years of lax lending. It is not surprising that some investors think the Fed is setting a floor under asset prices. But letting that belief pass unchallenged blesses reckless speculation and reinforces moral hazard.

Let them down gradually

Clearly, there may be limits to a policy of tough love. If, for instance, the banking system were indeed in danger, then the Fed should step in. More realistically, if the current credit crunch were to intensify, economic growth show signs of faltering and inflation disappear as a threat, the Fed would also have reason to cut rates. But Mr Bernanke should be driven by his remit to support economic stability, not by the whiplash from financial markets. That, arguably, was the mistake that Alan Greenspan made when the Fed lowered rates three times in 1998 as financial markets seized up in response to the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund.

This time, it is too soon to tell how deeply the financial crisis has affected the American economy. Some argue that it could benefit from some pain too. In fact, plenty of the normal mechanisms markets have for correcting themselves have yet to swing into action: there is plenty of cash still hoping to pour into financial markets when they become cheap enough, whether from oil-rich governments, vulture funds, canny investors such as Warren Buffett or cash-rich companies still churning out profits. Already, Bank of America has snapped up a $2 billion stake in Countrywide, a troubled mortgage lender. To cut rates too soon would imply that the financial system cannot work without bail-outs. That would be the worst legacy of all.

ergänzend zu 5066 von Stöffen:By Saskia Scholtes in New York
Published: August 27 2007 19:02 | Last updated: August 27 2007 19:02
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b6e7caf4-54c4-11dc-890c-0000779fd2ac.html
US consumers are defaulting on credit-card payments at a significantly higher rate than last year, raising the prospect of problems in the stricken US subprime mortgage market spreading to other types of consumer debt.
Credit-card companies were forced to write off 4.58 per cent of payments as uncollectable in the first half of 2007, almost 30 per cent higher year-on-year. Late payments also rose, and the quarterly payment rate – a measure of cardholders’ willingness and ability to repay their debt – fell for the first time in more than four years.

Analysts at Moody’s, the rating agency, said the trend could be related to the slowdown in the US property market and a fall in the number of borrowers rolling their mortgage debt into new and cheaper home loans.“The combination of higher interest rates and a softer real estate market diminished the attractiveness of mortgage refinancings in which many borrowers reduced their more expensive credit-card debt by drawing on the equity in their home,” Moody’s said.

But it is not clear that the borrowers defaulting on their credit cards are the same people defaulting on their subprime mortgages, it added. This is in part because underwriting standards in the credit-card sector have been more robust than in the mortgage industry. Also, many highly leveraged subprime borrowers, with little or no equity in their homes, may choose to default on a mortgage before risking being unable to charge everyday necessities to their credit card.

But Moody’s said the rate of losses remained well below the 6.29 per cent average seen in 2004, a year before the US enacted a new law that made filing for personal bankruptcy more onerous. The law led to a surge in individual filings and related credit card losses in 2005 as cash-strapped borrowers filed for bankruptcy before the rules came into effect.

Recent increases in credit card losses can in part be ascribed to a steady rise in personal bankruptcy filings since 2005. According to the Administrative Office of the US Courts, quarterly non-business bankruptcy filings have been rising since the first quarter of 2006.......

Distressed-debt funds

Cashing in on the crash

 

Aug 23rd 2007 | NEW YORK
From The Economist print edition

Tempting morsels for strong stomachs 

economist.com/images/20070825/3407FN2.jpg" style="max-width:560px" />

Is there a pair in Buffett's size?

THE past few years have been lean ones for those who feed off corporate carrion. Now, as credit markets creak, distressed-debt investors—known less kindly as vulture funds—are confident that their time has come at last.

 

Many can claim to have seen the rout coming. Private Equity Intelligence, a research firm, calculates that vulture funds raised $15.6 billion in the first seven months of this year, more than the $13.9 billion they garnered in all of 2006, itself a record. A further $30 billion is in the works, including a giant $20 billion fund being pieced together by Goldman Sachs.

 

Nothing gets vultures squawking louder with delight than a wave of forced selling. This week Thornburg, a property firm facing funding difficulties, sold an array of top-notch securities worth over $20 billion at a 5-10% discount. Highly leveraged, computer-driven “quant” funds are having to liquidate shares, bonds and anything else they can sell in order to meet margin calls from their prime brokers. As markets tighten, creditors will also be less willing to refinance wobbling companies. That could mean an imminent end to the bankruptcy drought.

While some hedge funds suffer, others are poised to snaffle up bargains. Citadel, Ellington and Marathon Asset Management, among others, have both the ready cash and the inclination. Citadel traditionally keeps more than a third of its assets in cash or liquid securities, allowing it to pounce when opportunities arise. It recently took over a chunk of Sowood Capital, a rival that buckled under bad bets.

 

If the past is any guide, spectacular returns beckon for some. John Mauldin, publisher of an investment newsletter, points out that during America's 1980s savings-and-loan crisis, bottom-fishers could net perfectly good mortgages for 15 cents on the dollar.

 

Two skills will be particularly useful: spotting the gems in the rubble, and timing. An investor who pays 90 cents on the dollar for debt that is almost certain to be repaid can make mouth-watering returns with minimal leverage. But after WorldCom's collapse, many would-be vultures swooped too early, tearing into the discounted bonds of cable and telecoms firms, only to see them tumble further.

 

Ironically, the very firms that helped to inflate the credit bubble are now among the keenest to profit from its bursting. Blackstone and TPG, two of the biggest sponsors of leveraged buy-outs, both have distressed-debt funds, and Blackstone has expanded its already big restructuring unit. Private-equity firms are even looking to buy debt in each other's deals at a discount, says Martin Fridson, an independent credit analyst.

 

Experience counts for more in busts than in booms. So no one was surprised when Wilbur Ross, who earned a fortune buying up failed steelmakers, made an “initial foray” into subprime mortgages this month, offering $50m to a bust lender. Warren Buffett is also sniffing around, armed with a cash pile approaching $50 billion. When the price is right, he told the Wall Street Journal this week, “I can spend money faster than Imelda Marcos.” Unlike the Philippines' former first lady, however, he will be looking for weather-beaten shoes in need of a shine.

<a target="advert" href="ad.doubleclick.net/jump/main.economist.com/...quot;><img src="ad.doubleclick.net/ad/main.economist.com/...rd=48984431?" border="0" alt="Click Here!" align="middle" hspace="2" vspace="2"></a>

Will this be enough? In a statement, the Fed's rate-setting committee left the markets in little doubt that it would cut its main policy rate if their ongoing ructions hurt spending and jobs. And Ben Bernanke, the Fed's chairman, was quoted by the head of the Senate Banking Committee as saying that he would use “all tools available” to quell the crisis. Elsewhere, Japan's central bank put off a rate rise it had long been itching to implement; and, despite hints to the contrary, the European Central Bank could still find itself in the same position when it meets on September 6th.

 

Stockmarkets have been reassured by all this. But the “locus of concern”, as the Fed's Jeffrey Lacker put it this week, remains the more obscure market for “asset-backed” commercial paper.

 

Some commercial paper is easy to understand: a big company sells an IOU, which it repays in, say, 90 days. This stuff got the American financial system into trouble in 1970, when Penn Central Railroad defaulted on $82m-worth. The recent problems stem from a different brand of paper, backed not by the good name of a big company, but by assets, such as mortgages or credit-card receivables. Mostly held off-balance-sheet by bank-sponsored “conduits”, this market has boomed in recent years. It now accounts for roughly half of the more than $2 trillion of commercial paper outstanding. But issuers have been caught out by a cashflow mismatch, says Louise Purtle of CreditSights, a research firm. Funding is short term but the proceeds are invested in longer-term assets, leaving issuers vulnerable when investors start to doubt the quality of those assets and want out.

economist.com/images/20070825/CFN851.gif" style="max-width:560px" alt=" " title="" />

That is what happened at the start of this week as money-market funds sold these IOUs, causing rates to spike as never before (see chart). This paper suffered from two main layers of mistrust. First investors are worried that the banks won't always be able to support the conduits.

 

The second worry, about the mortgage collateral, is particularly stark. Rating agencies badly misjudged default rates in subprime mortgages and are now having to downgrade reams of securities linked to them. With the credibility of ratings in tatters (there have even been calls for Warren Buffett to take over Moody's), investors have been left without a compass. For the time being, many would rather pull back than trust in their own analysis of credit risk. They are staying on the sidelines because they can't work out what securities are worth, not because they don't have the money to buy them.

 

Ratings may be in doubt, but they remain powerful. The Fed has been offering 85% of face value for AAA-rated paper presented at its discount window, even collateralised-debt obligations stuffed with subprime mortgages (as long as they are not—yet—impaired). Josh Rosner, a critic of the rating agencies, thinks it extraordinary that, despite their obvious flaws, they “continue essentially to regulate the behaviour of even the central bank”.

Home truths

 

Even if stability returns to markets, the repricing of risk is likely to continue. How far it goes will depend largely on the state of the mortgages that serve as collateral for many of the newfangled instruments that were, until recently, hawked with glee on Wall Street. The outlook is not good. Not only do subprime delinquencies continue to rise, but defaults on prime and Alt-A loans (those to good- or middling-quality borrowers) have started to climb too. Figures released this week showed foreclosures in July up by 9% compared with June, and by 93% over the year before.

 

It may be little comfort to overstretched mortgage-holders to know that the lenders are also sharing the pain. Accredited, a subprime lender, said this week it would stop taking loan applications and let more than half its workforce go. And Lehman Brothers became the first investment bank to close its subprime-lending arm, at the cost of 1,200 jobs.

 

Only the best borrowers—those taking out prime mortgages that conform to criteria set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored housing giants—can still get loans with any ease. The market for jumbo loans, which are safe but too large for Fannie or Freddie to guarantee, ground to a halt last week, although conditions have eased a bit since.

 

This contamination up the mortgage food chain was not unexpected. But Fed officials are said to have been taken aback by the speed with which large non-subprime lenders, such as Countrywide and Capital One, have been hit. Countrywide is America's biggest mortgage provider, and one of its best managed. But it was still forced to draw on bank credit lines after struggling to fund itself through the usual channels. On August 22nd a rescuer arrived: Bank of America said it would make a $2 billion equity investment in Countrywide.

 

A jam in the flow of credit to homebuyers threatens an already vulnerable economy. If consumers seek to pay down debt in response to falling house prices, spending will suffer, especially with unemployment creeping up. If the economy falters, that should relieve price pressures too. Oil prices dropped below $70 this week from a recent peak of around $78. Richard Berner at Morgan Stanley reckons that market turmoil will itself trim inflation since “it will make buyers hesitate and sellers worry that prices won't stick.”

 

Many now expect a cut in the Fed's benchmark rate from 5.25% at its next policy meeting on September 18th. Some think the Fed may act sooner. But it may yet disappoint them. “Financial-market volatility, in and of itself, does not require a change in the target federal funds rate,” said Mr Lacker this week. The Fed is anxious to calm the credit markets, so that the economy's funds are allocated in line with risk and reward. But even if it succeeds, risky assets are likely to hold much less appeal than they did. The central banker's task is to unscramble price signals distorted by panic, not to protect the markets from a signal that they do not like.

pay the price of popularity in global sell-off
-ja es schwappt jetzt auch in entferntere Länder....
www.ft.com/cms/s/2/...8477cc4-c820-11db-b0dc-000b5df10621.html
Kazkommertsbank’s (KKB) five-year CDS widened by 15bps-20bps today (21 August), despite the bank’s attempts to mollify debt investors yesterday during a 1H07 earnings call. The bank is one of several Kazakhstani financial institutions that have fallen victim to their own recent popularity as issuers.

“Banks in Kazakhstan have borrowed a lot from international lenders over the last year and a half and now the market is pricing in the perception that the debt could be difficult to refinance,” said one fund manager. “The bank bonds were beaten up pretty badly before the credit crunch, even though the banks are performing well and Kazakhstan’s economy is fine.”

Kazakhstani banks raised USD 18bn of international debt last year, doubling their external borrowing to just over USD 33bn by the end of 2006, according to a recent Moody’s Investor Services report. The country’s banks now hold USD 40bn of international debt, which is more than half of their overall funding, the rating agency said. .........Other top-tier banks like Bank TuranAlem (BTA) and Halyk Savings Bank (Halyk) have also been hit......KKB stressed on yesterday’s 1H earnings call that it has postponed plans to raise debt on international markets until conditions settle down. Management also reiterated that the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) has pledged to support the country’s banking system and help banks that experience liquidity problems..........

Es gab beim letzten Crash Bullen, die glaubhaft 110 % verloren haben sollen,
nach mehreren Dausend Prozent Gewinnen. Und jetzt gehts zu wie auf der Kirmes.
Angeblich Achterbahn oder so ähnlich. Dynamisch seitwärts. Los Turbulencias.
PS. Außer dem Austausch von defekten Glühbirnen bringt mich so schnell nichts mehr
aus der Fassung.  

Danke für den Kreditkartenlink. Ich bin erst jetzt dazu gekommen, den Artikel durchzulesen. Ziemlich heftig, wie mache Familien durch diese Karten in der Sch... stecken. Und interessant, wieviel Konsum darüber finanziert wurde/wird. Das können die nicht ewig durchhalten.

27. August 2007, 17:40 UhrImmobilienmarkt

Finanzkrise wird 2008 noch viel schlimmerDie Risiken des US-Immobilienmarktes wachsen in den nächsten Monaten rasant. Dies ist das Ergebnis von mehreren neuen Studien. Dadurch könnten nächstes Jahr weitere Banken erheblich in Schieflage geraten. Die Banken werden auf kräftige Finanzspritzen der Notenbanken angewiesen sein. Foto: AFPUngedeckte Immobilienkredite in den USA führten zur weltweiten Finanzkrise<!-- Start Ad-Tag --><!-- begin ad tag  (tile=4) --> <!-- End ad tag --><!-- End Ad-Tag -->Die US-Immobilienkrise wird sich voraussichtlich verschärfen. Nach neuen Studien wachsen die Risiken bei Hypothekenkrediten in den nächsten Monaten rasant. „Erst im ersten Halbjahr 2008 dürften die Kreditausfälle den Höhepunkt erreichen“, sagte der für den US-Markt zuständige Commerzbank-Volkswirt Patrick Franke WELT ONLINE. Dadurch drohten in vielen anderen Staaten weitere Banken in Schieflage zu geraten, warnte die Ratingagentur Moody’s.Weiterführende links

• Immobiliendaten drücken auf die Stimmung
• Sichere Geldanlagen in der Krise
• Schnelles Ende der SachsenLB besiegelt
• Entwarnung für deutsche Häuslebauer

Diese Einschätzung beruht auf Daten amerikanischer Kreditanalysehäuser, die das Magazin „Fortune“ jetzt veröffentlicht hat: Demnach werden 2008 Kredite über 850 Milliarden Dollar (625 Milliarden Euro) akut gefährdet sein, weil bei ihnen die übliche Niedrigzinsphase zu Anfang der Laufzeit ausläuft. In diesem Jahr betrug dieser Wert bislang nur 236 Milliarden Dollar. Weil viele Haus- und Wohnungskäufer die danach anfallenden Zinsraten nicht aufbringen können, platzen zahlreiche Darlehen. Eine Reihe von Banken und Fondsfirmen, die in die verbrieften Kredite investiert hatten, sind deshalb in Schieflage geraten. In Deutschland traf dies vor allem die Düsseldorfer IKB und die Leipziger SachsenLB. Diese konnte nur durch den Notverkauf am Wochenende gerettet werden.In Finanzkreisen wird auf eine interne Studie der Bank of America verwiesen, die ähnlich erschreckende Zahlen nennt. Die Kredite waren typischerweise 2005 zunächst mit einem Zins von vier Prozent gestartet. Im nächsten Jahr erhöht sich die Rate auf bis zu acht Prozent. „Dadurch wird die Ausfallrate deutlich ansteigen“, sagte Commerzbanker Franke. SchlagworteBanken US-Immobilienkrise Patrick Franke FinanzkriseMoody’s-Chefökonom Pierre Cailleteau erwartet zwar keine Finanzkrise: „Das internationale Bankensystem wird aber in den kommenden Monaten weitere Unterstützung durch Liquiditätsspritzen der Zentralbanken benötigen.“ In den vergangenen Wochen hatten die Europäische Zentralbank und die US-Notenbank den Geschäftsbanken bereits mit Kurzfristkrediten über mehr als 266 Milliarden Euro unter die Arme gegriffen. Aus der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht verlautet nun, die Behörde sei über die neuen Studien informiert. Es werde derzeit jedoch über den üblichen Kontrollrahmen hinaus nicht nach möglichen Risiken bei deutschen Banken geforscht. Die Aufsicht wolle nicht zusätzliche Panik schüren.

Mehr als die Hälfe aller Anleihen von US-Firmen haben ein Rating von BB oder schlechter, gelten also als "spekulativ" - oder weniger vornehm: als ÜBLER MÜLL ("deep junk"). Vor zehn Jahren waren es nur etwa 38 % (Grafik unten). Der Markt hält dieses höhere Risiko (noch) für beherrschbar, weil ja Derivate wie Credit Default Swaps angeblich gegen Ausfall schützen. Leider nur stehen auf der Stillhalterseite dieser "Ausfallversicherung" wackelige Hedgefonds. Einen Krisentest dieses hochgradig labilen Systems - das ähnlich spektakulär zusammenklappen könnte wie das Subprime-Kartenhaus - gab es bislang noch nicht. Er dürfte kommen, wenn sich die Housing-Krise in 2008 weiter zuspitzt (# 5087) und USA in eine Rezession zieht.

Für US-Aktien und den Dollar sind das ziemlich triste Perspektiven. Ich bleibe bei meinem Szenario, dass es nach einem Oktober-Abverkauf mit anschließender technischer Erholung bis zum Jahresende ab Anfang 2008 zu einem längerfristigen Bärenmarkt kommt, der den von 2000 bis 2002 noch in den Schatten stellen dürfte.

---

FT (GB) - LEX

Default rates

Published: August 27 2007 19:55

Dystopian visions of the future often portray humanity drowning in its own junk. The future is now. More than half the US issuers rated by Standard & Poor’s are currently graded as “speculative”. The proportion rated “B” or lower – well into junk territory – has jumped from one-fifth in 1997 to about one-third currently. The paradox is that the default rate for speculative grade bonds, globally, stands at a 25-year low.

Junk in charge

Extraordinary risk appetite and benign economic conditions have led lenders to take on more low-quality paper. Borrowers have been able to tap new funding at will. But the recent seizing-up of credit markets shows that many lenders are rediscovering the concept of risk. As refinancing becomes harder, the result is likely to be a sharp increase in defaults, particularly if the economy weakens significantly... (Fortsetzung nur für subscriber, zu denen ich nicht zähle - aber allein die Grafik spricht schon Bände - A.L.).

Noch schwerer vorstellbar ist das Ganze bei den Beteiligungsgesellschaften, die ebenfalls mit gigantischen Milliardenbeträgen herumfuchteln und auf die fremdfinanzierte Übernahme von Firmen spezialisiert sind. Wo sollten sie das Geld herbekommen, um die von ihnen kontrollierten Firmen zu entschulden - zumal im derzeitigen Umfeld? Und wie wäre es um ihr Geschäftsmodell (und jenes ihrer Banken) bestellt, wenn sie mit geringeren Verschuldungsgraden agierten?

Kommen wir zum Unternehmenssektor insgesamt und halten uns der Verfügbarkeit wegen an die US-Daten. Anders als gemeinhin vermutet, war bei den nichtfinanziellen US-Firmen das Verhältnis von Schulden zu BIP im ersten Quartal das höchste nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg gemessene. [siehe # 5088 + Grafik dort - A.L.] Selbst bei den nichtfinanziellen Kapitalgesellschaften, deren Marge laut volkswirtschaftlicher Gesamtrechnung bereits böse unter Druck steht, geht das Verhältnis von Schulden zu Brutto-Wertschöpfung wieder stramm in Richtung des Rekords in den frühen 2000ern zurück. Sie könnten natürlich darauf verzichten, eigene Aktien im Gegenwert von rund sieben Prozent ihrer Wertschöpfung zurückzukaufen. Nur hätte das mit ziemlicher Sicherheit eine Baisse zur Folge.

Bleiben die defizitären privaten US-Haushalte, die Schulden von insgesamt gut 13.000 Mrd. $ angehäuft haben. Wie können jene, um die es derzeit vor allem geht, nämlich die zweitklassigen Schuldner, ihre Hypothekenkredite auf ein angemessenes Niveau senken, ohne ihr Haus zu verkaufen - und damit den Preisdruck auf dem Immobilienmarkt und die negativen Vermögenseffekte noch zu vergrößern? Und was wäre, wenn die US-Verbraucher ihre Kreditaufnahme en gros einschränken würden? Schon dass ihre Schulden zuletzt nur noch um 941 Mrd. $ zum Vorjahr stiegen (statt 1240 Anfang 2006), hatte beinah eine Halbierung des BIP-Wachstums zur Folge. Und genau da liegt das Risiko, das die Märkte bislang noch gern verdrängen: dass die konsumsüchtigen US-Verbraucher den Kredit, den sie brauchen, nun gar nicht mehr in ausreichender Dosis kriegen. Sie stellen drei Viertel der Endnachfrage. Die Hoffnung, wonach die US-Firmen trotzdem brav einstellen, die Löhne erhöhen und investieren, ist da grotesk.

"Ich bleibe bei meinem Szenario, dass es nach einem Oktober-Abverkauf mit anschließender technischer Erholung bis zum Jahresende ab Anfang 2008 zu einem längerfristigen Bärenmarkt kommt, der den von 2000 bis 2002 noch in den Schatten stellen dürfte."

Ich fände es mal interessant, hier im Thread dieses Szenario zu diskutieren, um nach einem Crash (so er denn kommt) richtig reagieren zu können (Ich möchte wegen der Abgeltungssteuer langfristig investieren)

Was ALs Szenario betrifft bin ich skeptisch wegen folgender Anmerkungen:
- Ist durch einen Abschlag von sagen wir 20-25% die Kreditkrise noch nicht eingepreist?
- Die Rückführung aller Kredite würde zweifelsohne zu einer Weltwirtschaftskrise a la 1929 führen. Aber das ist doch gar nicht notwendig, weil die meisten Kredite in dieser Welt nicht notleidend sind.
- Vergleich mit Junk-Bond-Krise in den 80ern. Auf diese hatte langfristig keine Auswirkungen.
- Die USA bleiben trotz immenser Verschuldung die leistungsfähige Wirtschaft der Welt.
- Die Verschuldungskrise betrifft fast ausschließlich die USA/UK. Die Emerging Markets generieren ausreichend Wachstum, um die Probleme mittelfristig "zu heilen".

- Die FED hat genügend Munition, um das Rad noch Jahre laufen zu lassen und ist auch gewillt alles dafür zu tun.

(P.S. Der Smart Investor rechnet erst nach (!) 2010 mit einer Krise a la AL, weil erst dann das Wachstum die Probleme nicht mehr übertünchen kann)  

The name refers to "put options" - complex derivatives used by investors to minimise downside risk. The basic idea was that Greenspan's easy-money policies would always be employed to bail out the markets.That meant, throughout the 1990s, investors were able to pursue reckless strategies with other peoples' money because they knew Greenspan would be there to save them when things blew up.This posed what economists call a "moral hazard" - on a massive scale. In other words, by trying to stabilise share prices, Greenspan encouraged markets to generate the very volatility the Fed was trying to solve.

Stock markets have only recovered since the Fed cut its discount rate earlier this month - the price it charges for funds leant to banks in distress. And last week, Greenspan's successor, Ben Bernanke, said he could use "all of the tools at his disposal" to contain the sub-prime fall-out.

Since then, the question has no longer been if the Fed will cut its main funds rate - the equivalent of the UK's base rate - but whether it will do so before its next scheduled meeting on September 18.So the markets are now looking for a Bernanke put. No matter that US inflation remains well above the Fed's 2 per cent target, or that lower rates could push shares to dangerous new highs. Wall Street, and the rest of the world, assumes - requires - that the Fed rescues US stocks.........Should the Fed cut rates, though, just because the high-rolling financiers say it must? Should it heck! By doing so, by confirming the Bernanke put, the Fed will achieve nothing more than sowing the seeds of the next financial crisis. But, of course, that doesn't mean it won't. Expect a US rate cut soon..
www.telegraph.co.uk/money/...l=/money/2007/08/26/ccliam126.xml

By Dan Roberts, Business Editor, Sunday Telegraph
Last Updated: 12:50am BST 26/08/2007
www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/...08/26/ccom126.xml
Of all the mumbo-jumbo to pour out from the wacky world of alternative finance in recent years, nothing beats the hedge funds for sheer chutzpah.....Unfortunately, much of this absolute return stuff has turned out to be absolute tosh.The suspicion was always there. It seemed more than a coincidence that 10,000 hedge funds blossomed just at the moment the wider market was experiencing the longest boom in modern history. But the hedgies insisted they were doing something special to earn their extra fees: 'just wait until things get tough, then you'll see,' they said.Well it did get tough; and the tough got going. Along comes the first serious bout of market turbulence since many hedgies stuck their brass plates on the door, and the industry falls at the first hurdle. Hedge Fund Research, a Chicago consultancy that provides the most up-to-date performance data, estimates that every single major hedge fund strategy lost money during the three weeks of maximum turbulence. Similar number-crunching by Dow Jones found particular pain in the "Benchmark Equity Market Neutral" index and the "Hedge Fund Balanced Portfolio" index - just where you would hope balance and neutrality might provide some protection. In fact, if you compare the performance of HFR's overall hedge fund index since UK stock markets peaked in mid-June with the FTSE100, then British investors would have been better sticking their money in an index tracking fund.

Of course, pure short-selling strategies will have escaped intact. The snag is, there weren't very many of them, because the main way most hedge funds have managed to generate such good figures in recent years is to quietly increase their long bias and leverage the returns with lots of borrowed money. This is great when things are only going one way, but when things started going wrong, they went spectacularly wrong.Goldman Sachs was the first, revealing that the rocket scientists running its "quantitative" trading strategies had got their sums wrong. Not only were these computerised trading schemes first to hit trouble, but they triggered more pain by dumping assets in panicked forced selling. Since then, the focus has swung to London where the crisis in the commercial paper market has removed the cheap debt that was propping up strategies with as much as 70 times leverage.

Not everyone got it wrong. Far from it. Apologists point out that even the struggling hedge funds have bounced back since things were at their hairiest. But that's not the point. For every star who got it right, another will be nursing their wounds and struggling to survive. Why should we believe their promises that this is an exact science next time around?

Hedge funds have been making billions of pounds for managing money in this way. All the while, shares have proved more resilient than anyone hoped. Pension funds can buy exposure to the stock market for next to nothing. No wonder they want their money back.....The eye of the storm is a strange place. While the liquidity crisis continues to swirl furiously around the banking system, stock markets have fared surprisingly well. Trading volumes are exceptionally light, even for August, so we won't really know whether we're through the worst until the grown-ups return from the beach in September. But, so far, investors are consoling themselves with the hope that at least all this pain might hasten some interest rate cuts.

I think this would be a mistake, for the reasons my colleague Liam Halligan sets out in his column, but it is not the only way that companies are getting their own back on the hedge funds and private equity kings who have tormented them for so long. The credit crunch means that anyone who relies on using other people's money is in trouble; but those with lots of cash are the new kings.

You can see plenty of evidence of this opportunism. Companies are beating private equity bidders to the punch in some very keenly priced auctions.... The wilder excesses will take much longer to unwind, let alone stage a comeback. But normality is returning slowly, if only to the normal bits of business.

Wirtschaftszyklen sind äußerst dynamische Prozesse. Es gab bislang noch kein Top, an dem die "Experten" NICHT - von Charttechnik und ihrem eigenen Hype geblendet - "ewiges Wachstum" und das "Ende herkömmlicher Bewertungsmaßstäbe" beschworen hätten, wie zuletzt diesen Sommer. Die Kette reicht vom Eisenbahn-Radio-Boom 1929 über den Dot.com-Boom 2000 bis zum Kredit-/Verschuldungs-Boom 2007. Beginnt das scheinbar unerschütterliche Fundament jedoch zu wackeln, nährt die Baisse plötzlich die Baisse - in einer ähnlichen Dynamik, wie zuvor die Hausse die Hausse genährt hatte. Der Endpunkt einer solchen Entwicklung ist - ebenfalls fast immer - eine spiegelbildliche Übertreibung der Börsen "nach unten", wie wir sie zuletzt Anfang 2003 sahen. Motor der 2003-Baisse waren übrigens ebenfalls Zwangsverkäufe infolge von Illiquiditität - nicht nur bei Harakiri-Börsianern aus der Dot.com-Ära, deren beliehene Depots zwangsliquidiert wurden (mangelndes Kollateral), sondern auch bei großen Banken und Versicherungen wie der Commerzbank, Hypovereinsbank, Allianz und Münchener Rück. Bei der Commerzbank und Hypovereinsbank etwa erfolgten die Zwangsverkäufe, weil das Tier-1-Kapital unter die gesetzlich vorgeschriebenen Mindestquote von 6,5 % zu fallen drohte, weil die Aktienbestände beider Banken immer mehr an Wert verloren. [Das könnte sich in der nächsten Zeit mit den Bond-Portfolios der Banken und Versicherungen wiederholen, denen ebenfalls eine Downgrade-Lawine droht (# 5088).] So mussten Commerzbank und Hypovereinsbank (ebenso wie die mit ihnen über Kreuz beteiligte Allianz) - zum gleichen, denkbar ungünstigsten Zeitpunkt wie die Harakiri-Kleinanleger zu Tiefstkursen ihre Positionen verkaufen.

Dabei lag 2003 noch nicht mal eine wirklich schwere Krise vor (USA haben die "leichte" Rezession von 2001 sogar lange erfolgreich geleugnet) - außer eben bei einigen deutschen Banken. Es gab 20003 keine weltweite Illiquidität infolge eines großen, globalen Credit-Crunch, wie er sich jetzt in den ersten Zügen andeutet. Daher meine These, dass wir, FALLS der Derivate-Crash kommt, die Tiefs von 2003 noch unterbieten werden.

  www.nytimes.com/pages/business/index.html
Both the Bush administration and Democratic leaders in Congress agree that legions of homeowners could be overwhelmed in the next 18 months, as low teaser rates expire on more than two million adjustable-rate mortgages, causing monthly payments increase sharply.More ominously, falling real estate prices and a pullback among mortgage lenders are expected to make it more difficult for overstretched homebuyers to either refinance their way out of trouble or simply sell their houses.

“This is really just the beginning,” said Karen Weaver, global director for securitization research at Deutsche Bank. “There’s a big wave of defaults coming over the next 12 to 18 months.”From a political perspective, the wave would be crashing during the primary and general election campaigns next year.But the Bush administration and Congressional Democrats are ideologically divided about what Washington should do. Administration officials are reluctant to bail out people who bought homes they could not afford or simply gambled that easy credit and rising real estate prices would lead to quick profits.Democrats, though opposed to a broad bailout, are proposing an array of measures to help lower-income people renegotiate their loans and stay in their homes...........The proposals would expand the program of insuring home loans under the Federal Housing Administration, part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development; create a national fund for “affordable housing”; expand the ability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored finance companies, to buy renegotiated subprime mortgages; and give bankruptcy judges more power to order easier terms for borrowers.

The Bush administration, with the Treasury Department heading the efforts, is looking for more limited solutions. ....

bist du pleite, wenn du eine Milliarde Schulden hast, ist die Bank pleite!" Dieser Satz wurde in den Achtzigern dem brasilianischen Finanzminister zugeschrieben. Die USA zeigen, dass man offensichtlich prächtig danach leben kann. Sollte die Story stimmen, dass weltweit die Zentralbanken einen Teil ihrer Dollarreserven in dem gleichen Müll stecken haben wie diverse halbstaatliche und Geschäftsbanken auch, dann ist klar, dass sie ein vitales EIGENINTERESSE haben, den USA wieder aus der Scheisse herauszuhelfen, d.h., WELTWEIT bezahlen die Steuerzahler für den Mist. Daraus folgt einerseits, dass somit ein gigantischer Puffer geschaffen ist, andererseits aber auch, dass es umso heftiger scheppert, wenn der auch nicht mehr reicht. Ob, oder nicht ? - Keine Ahnung !
Die Zeitskala, innerhalb der dies alles passieren könnte wird allerdings m.E. vielfach falsch eingeschätzt: Der große Tsunami kommt nicht, wenn all die Hypotheken nun tatsächlich platzen, die bisher "nur" gefährdet sind. Er muss - wenn - schon vorher kommen, weil ja keiner gewillt ist, untätig darauf zu warten. Was das Risiko eines richtigen Crash verstärkt, ist, dass allen Beteilgten klar ist: Wenn er kommt, dann bleibts sehr lange im Keller - möglicherweise mehrere Jahrzehnte. Die Zentralbanken (Plural !) sitzen in der Klemme: Einerseits müssen sie spätestens zu Beginn des nächsten Jahres senken (und dies so nach und nach orakelnd in Aussicht stellen), um eben im Vorfeld die Hoffnung zu erzeugen, dass das Platzen vieler Hypotheken in Folge höherer Zinsen ausbleiben könne. Andererseits werden Aussichten auf Zinssenkungen namentlich in USA immmer mit automatisch steigenden Kursen verbunden - sollte das ausbleiben, könnten die Zinssenkungen genau die Panik auslösen, die sie vermeiden sollen.

1:1 glaube ich nicht ganz, irgendwo klang das auch schon mal an, dass nämlich
in Zeiten niedrigerer Einkommen zunehmend billigere Produkte nachgefragt werden.
In Berlin lässt sich diese Entwicklung exakt beobachten.
Guter Fach und Einzelhandel verschwindet, Hertie u.Andere müssen schließen, dafür entstehen überall Billigläden, (Kleidung, Schuhe, Elekto)
Jedenfalls sind die China werte in meinem Depot vergleichsweise Stabil.
Heute sorgt China Life für ´ne gewisse Relaxtheit.

   greetz C_Profit

Nicht Äpfel mit Birnen vergleichen: Hierzulande und auch in USA ist ein großer Teil der Billigläden und Ketten eine Ansammlung von Geiern, die Pleitebetriebe und Läden richtiggehend ausweiden und somit deren Produkte zu sagenhaften Preisen auf den Markt werfen können. Dabei handelt es sich keineswegs nur um Produkte, die irgendwo auf Lager liegen, sondern zu einem großen Teil um Produkte, die noch produziert werden, allerdings zu Preisen, die gerademal die variablen Kosten noch abdecken, aber kaum noch Deckungsbeitrag generieren. Eine solche Zwischenphase kann sich durchaus hinziehen - in dieser Phase kommt auch der "Billigkonkurrent" nicht unbedingt zum Zug, jedenfalls nicht in dem Maße.

China wird bei einer Rezession in USA nicht ganz 1:1 mit runtergezogen, wie Du richtig anmerkst (oben meinte ich ja auch nur "fast"), aber die Tatsache, dass der größte Teil der chinesischen Devisenreserven aus Dollar-Staatsanleihen besteht, ist schon ein Indiz dafür, wohin der Großteil der in China produzierten Waren geflossen ist. Außerdem dürfte auch Europa von der globalen Baisse erfasst werden, so dass auch die chinesischen Waren-Ströme in den Euro-Raum kleiner werden.

genau so ist es. Das wirklich gefährliche ist die restriktive Kreditvergabe. Man kann es aber auch nicht ändern, denn vorher hat man an alle "Erdbeerpflücker" die dicksten Kredite vergeben - und den Mist dann gebündelt, AAA drauf gedruckt und an einen noch Dümmeren weiter gereicht. Das "Greater Fools" Prinzip halt. Und es hat auch eine Zeit lang funktioniert.....
Nur, wenn man jetzt versucht die Wirtschaft weiter oben zu halten indem man wieder Kredite an alle "Erdbeerpflücker" vergibt, bleibt man selbst auf dem Mist sitzen. Und das will man auch nicht. Also gibt es keine Kredite mehr für die "Erdbeerpflücker" dieser Welt. Und damit geht der Konsum massivst in die Knie. Hinzu kommen rapide sinkende Preise für Häuser. Und wie lange Ben mit der Druckerpresse die Börse, losgelöst von der Realität, weiter oben halten kann, bleibt auch noch abzuwarten. Alles in allem eine gefährliche Mischung!
Die nächsten Monate versprechen spannend zu werden......


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