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kann Spanien es alleine schaffen?die Schulden sind so enorm dass es ohne Haircuts gar nicht gehen wird. und die Länder Deutschland ,Frankreich ,Italien und USA sind so involviert,auch die Banken untereinander,dass ein Rettungsschirm kaum noch möglich ist,die Länder müssen sich um ihre eigenen Banken kümmern
....Spain and Italy will have to stand on their own, because when Greece goes, Ireland will most likely go, which will in turn set off a critical mass such that the nation who dictates monetary policy (Germany) will be taking care of its own self.
Nobody knows how flaky these numbers are, but the implications are plain:
There is insufficient growth to avoid serious austerity programs in any of these countries
Austerity programs will make growth even less likely
With the exception of Spain, most of the sovereign debt is held externally
Irish banks hold the equivalent of 40% (probably less now) of Irish GDP in other periphery debt instruments
With the exception of Greece and Ireland, a quarter of existing debt has to be refinanced in the next twelve months
Greece is just a situation of the irresponsibility found elsewhere only more so, and a lot of abuse is thrown between Greece and Germany. Ireland, however, acted like a hedge fund that made a business of collecting tail risks that they didn’t hedge. Thus, when Greece goes, Ireland—already distressed— goes. So why is it such a big deal if Ireland goes?
The following table shows you what banks domiciled in the US, France, Germany, and the UK are exposed to in terms of public and private debt, and also derivatives related to these exposures.
These exposures are just so big that they will require Germany, France, and the UK to forget about supporting sovereigns, as they will have to directly support banks domiciled in their countries. When these banks have to deal with these exposures, it causes even more stress because they are connected to each other in ways far beyond the issues of Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy.
The payoff and losses here are nonlinear, so nobody knows what will happen. But it is clear that the US, the UK, France, and Germany are even more interconnected to each other and will suffer losses based on these interconnections.
When you think about these exposures, you need to apply a significant haircut here, but there could be short-long exposures that cancel each other out. But any losses will probably be more than the usual 40% recovery assumption simply because the losses will be correlated and pretty simultaneous. It is impossible to know the short-long composition of the derivative exposures. However, the following seems reasonable to infer:
If Ireland goes, the UK stands to lose a lot, as will Germany.
If Italy defaults, France will be in deep trouble. Their fate is tied to Italy with nearly a half trillion in exposure. Germany and the US and the UK have significant exposure to Italy as well.
After Italy, the next biggest in terms of exposure is Spain.
If this is really about minimizing banker losses, policymakers need to address how to keep Ireland from defaulting in the event of a Hellenic default. Once this plan is in place, let Greece go. I’m not sure that you can firewall this stuff off in this way. Probably what is needed is a firewalling of banks by applying an orderly settlement of exposures with steep haircuts.
This isn’t the end of the world. This means serious financial losses at issue, and events risk is seriously underpriced. One more time: fundamentals do matter. Good ones allow you to stand on your own.
sämtliche Zahlentafeln hier:
www.zerohedge.com/article/...s-can-spain-avoid-default-its-own
....Spain and Italy will have to stand on their own, because when Greece goes, Ireland will most likely go, which will in turn set off a critical mass such that the nation who dictates monetary policy (Germany) will be taking care of its own self.
Nobody knows how flaky these numbers are, but the implications are plain:
There is insufficient growth to avoid serious austerity programs in any of these countries
Austerity programs will make growth even less likely
With the exception of Spain, most of the sovereign debt is held externally
Irish banks hold the equivalent of 40% (probably less now) of Irish GDP in other periphery debt instruments
With the exception of Greece and Ireland, a quarter of existing debt has to be refinanced in the next twelve months
Greece is just a situation of the irresponsibility found elsewhere only more so, and a lot of abuse is thrown between Greece and Germany. Ireland, however, acted like a hedge fund that made a business of collecting tail risks that they didn’t hedge. Thus, when Greece goes, Ireland—already distressed— goes. So why is it such a big deal if Ireland goes?
The following table shows you what banks domiciled in the US, France, Germany, and the UK are exposed to in terms of public and private debt, and also derivatives related to these exposures.
These exposures are just so big that they will require Germany, France, and the UK to forget about supporting sovereigns, as they will have to directly support banks domiciled in their countries. When these banks have to deal with these exposures, it causes even more stress because they are connected to each other in ways far beyond the issues of Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy.
The payoff and losses here are nonlinear, so nobody knows what will happen. But it is clear that the US, the UK, France, and Germany are even more interconnected to each other and will suffer losses based on these interconnections.
When you think about these exposures, you need to apply a significant haircut here, but there could be short-long exposures that cancel each other out. But any losses will probably be more than the usual 40% recovery assumption simply because the losses will be correlated and pretty simultaneous. It is impossible to know the short-long composition of the derivative exposures. However, the following seems reasonable to infer:
If Ireland goes, the UK stands to lose a lot, as will Germany.
If Italy defaults, France will be in deep trouble. Their fate is tied to Italy with nearly a half trillion in exposure. Germany and the US and the UK have significant exposure to Italy as well.
After Italy, the next biggest in terms of exposure is Spain.
If this is really about minimizing banker losses, policymakers need to address how to keep Ireland from defaulting in the event of a Hellenic default. Once this plan is in place, let Greece go. I’m not sure that you can firewall this stuff off in this way. Probably what is needed is a firewalling of banks by applying an orderly settlement of exposures with steep haircuts.
This isn’t the end of the world. This means serious financial losses at issue, and events risk is seriously underpriced. One more time: fundamentals do matter. Good ones allow you to stand on your own.
sämtliche Zahlentafeln hier:
www.zerohedge.com/article/...s-can-spain-avoid-default-its-own
