The GSC has profoundly shifted economic dynamics.
Refusing to acknowledge the real problems, major economies have over a period of two decades transferred debt from companies to consumers and finally onto public balance sheets. A huge amount of assets and risk now is held by central banks and governments, which are not designed for such long-term ownership. There are now no more balance sheets that can be leveraged to support the current levels of debt.Like many economically weaker EU members, Greece fudged the numbers to meet the qualifications for Euro-zone entry.
Membership of the Euro-zone reduced the ability of Greece to manage its economy. It lost the ability to use its currency, via devaluations, to improve competitiveness and stimulate exports. It also lost the ability to set interest rates, now set by the ECB. It also cannot print its own currency to fund sovereign borrowing. Greece also has low levels of domestic saving and is reliant on international capital flows.
The current episode exposed an underlying weak and unbalanced economy with few sustainable competitive advantages. It has also exposed poor political leadership and inadequate financial controls. The same could be said of a number of other countries.
No one, including the IMF, seriously believes that the austerity program announced by Greece will work. Argentina had debt to GDP of around 60% and a budget deficit of 6%. Adjustments necessary to halve both failed. After a long drawn out struggle between 1999 and 2001, Argentina was forced to reschedule its debt and have still not quite made their way back to normality. Many of the vulnerable countries in Europe are in a much worse position than Argentina in 1999.
Rapid economic growth or high inflation would improve Greece’s prospects for survival. Neither is a realistic option. The Euro-zone could continue to finance Greece, which would require extension of the current package, which is initially for 3 years.
Greece may not be able to avoid a debt restructuring. For the countries like, Ireland, Spain, Portugal as well the others, the savage austerity measures required are unlikely to be palatable and probably won’t work in any case.
In any debt rescheduling, lenders would take significant write downs, reducing Greece’s debt burden, giving it a chance to emerge as a sustainable economy. Previous sovereign defaults suggest that the losses to investors may be as high as 70-80% of the face value. The rating agencies have suggested a loss around 50%. This would equate to a loss of around $130 billion to $200 billion, making this the single largest sovereign default in history.
The real agenda of the bailout is to avoid foreign lenders taking large losses. The investors were imprudent in their willingness to lend excessively to countries like Greece assuming EU "implicit" support and are now seeking others to bail out them out of their folly. As Herbert Spencer, the English philosopher, observed: "the ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly is to fill the world with fools."
The real purpose of the bailout is to prepare for a possible series of sovereign debt restructurings in Europe. In an ideal world, banks and investors raise capital and write down their exposure to the troubled debtors over time allowing the restructuring to be relatively smooth, avoiding disruption to financial markets. It is not certain that this is achievable.
Contagion is already a reality. Highly indebted sovereign borrowers with immediate financing needs are facing higher costs and lower availability of funds. Scrutiny of their public finances is forcing them to undertake austerity programs to remain credible borrowers with access to markets
The risk of losses from a Greek or other sovereign defaults has affected financial institutions. Mirroring events at the start of the GFC, the close linkages between Euro-zone banks through cross border loans and investment to each other remain a serious potential problem. The connections and trading in instruments on the credit risk of banks and sovereigns (such as CDS contracts) may prove a major channel for financial contagion. A single sovereign default may affects banks, which in turn will affect other banks, resulting in renewed problems for the global financial system.
The stress is most evident in inter-bank funding rates that have risen sharply to their highest levels in a year. .......www.eurointelligence.com/...[backPid]=901&cHash=d782a6f7d9