Greece and the euro zone’s worst-case scenario
A German ‘yes’ vote may still not avert the worst
By Steve Goldstein, MarketWatch Sept. 28, 2011, 2:34 p.m. EDT
WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — Germans know a thing or too about kicking, whether it’s the seven times they’ve been to the World Cup soccer finals or the umpteen times they’ve kicked the can down the road on resolving the Greek debt crisis.
Reuters
Athens has said it will run out of cash in the middle of October if it doesn’t get the next €8 billion in loan funds from the EU and the IMF — even as it admits it’s struggling to meet the imposed austerity demands.
So on Thursday, the German parliament may again take cleats to the Greek problem by voting in favor of changes to the European Financial Stability Facility rescue fund. “In fact,” said Jennifer McKeown, senior European economist at Capital Economics, “it almost certainly will.”
But what if the German parliament didn’t? After all, this is the country where the Pirate Party recently scored well in an election. It’s where aid to Greece makes the front pages of the tabloids in a why-don’t-we-seize-some-islands kind of way. It’s where Greeks, not to mention the populaces of other Mediterranean nations, are characterized in the crudest stereotypes.
So, if Germany says nein ?
“It would be a bit of a disaster,” McKeown said. “When Slovakia didn’t agree to previous changes in the EFSF, they just didn’t contribute, but that’s not an option for Germany. There would have to be talks about how to readjust the EFSF so that it would suit [Germany].”
Of course, expanding the EFSF to a size of 440 billion euros is just one small step in winding down the euro-zone debt crisis. Greece, Ireland and Portugal at the moment rely on aid from the European Union and International Monetary Fund to fund their governments.
“If all those guys blew up, you can pay back bank bondholders and things of that nature [with the EFSF], but that’s fighting last year’s war,” said Jay Bryson, global economist for Wells Fargo. The new concerns are contagion to Spain and Italy, both highly indebted countries with paltry growth rates where bond yields have surged.
The facility is nowhere near enough to handle Spain, let alone the roughly €2 trillion of obligations Italy faces.
Which means Europe’s policy makers may stick to their muddle-along approach.
“That’s the irony — out of fear of contagion, the leaders in Brussels and Frankfurt have continuously tried to minimize and sweep it under the rug,” said Jeffrey Frankel, a professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Now, in Frankel’s view, the authorities have lost credibility along with all or most of their ammunition.
In Greece, which even on its own is a problem, the government says it will run out of cash in the middle of October if it doesn’t get the next €8 billion in loan funds from the European Union and the IMF. But Athens admits it’s struggling to meet austerity demands.
“The Greeks are running out of cash, and there is no money in sight,” said Carl Weinberg, chief economist at High Frequency Economics. “The Germans are not prepared to look the other way — that’s the deal breaker — and, as far as the IMF looking the other way, [that’s] impossible,” he said, alluding to the institution’s technical requirements.
If Greece stops paying, all sorts of problems start cropping up, for Germany in particular.
The European Central Bank would need more capital because of the roughly €100 billion in collateral in Greek paper it holds, not to mention the roughly €30 billion it’s purchased on the secondary market. The EFSF would start to call member countries to make good on the guarantees they have already made for the facility. In both cases, Germany foots 27% of the bill.
Plus, private-sector banks would be exposed in two ways: one, if they own Greek government debt directly, but also if they’ve underwritten protection on credit-default swaps. And even if an institution bought protection on Greek bonds, there’s the question of whether the counterparty could afford to pay out. Compounding the exposure issue would be the presence on the wrong side of a CDS or Greek bond trade of a bank’s hedge-fund clients.
“Suddenly the public-sector finances of Germany won’t look so hot,” said Weinberg. “And this will be repeated in varying degrees around Europe.”
And that has implications for U.S. lenders. Already, the three-month Libor interbank lending rate has creeped up by more than 10 basis points, or 0.1 percentage point, since the summer.
That doesn’t sound like much, certainly not in comparison to the roughly 200-basis-point spike when Lehman Brothers collapsed.
‘Everybody knows the cost to be paid, and [Germany has] the money.’
Mitchell Orenstein, Johns Hopkins University
“But that’s when the Fed is saying we’re going to be on hold basically forever,” said Bryson of Wells Fargo. “If Greece blows up, I don’t know if it would go up by [as much as the Lehman collapse], but I don’t know if I want to find out, either.”
And that’s why some expect Germany to get over its reluctance to assist Greece — not because of any grandiose pan-European sentiment but because of its own singular interest.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel is in a no-win situation, according to Mitchell Orenstein, a professor at Johns Hopkins’s School of Advanced International Studies.
“To get re-elected she has to not be the one holding the bag. But if she doesn’t hold the bag, then she will go down in history as the worst European leader of all time and lose anyway,” he said. “Her strategy, intelligently, is to wait and push off as long as possible. I think that’s what markets don’t get.
“I just think, at end of day, when it comes close, everybody in Germany will vote for this,” he added. “Everybody knows the cost to be paid, and [Germany has] the money.”
Yet even if Germany does foot the bill, there’s the question of whether the struggling euro-zone states are willing to play along.
“The solution in the long term for these countries is to leave the euro zone and devalue,” McKeown said.
That’s easier said than done. European Union rules don’t have a mechanism to kick out a euro-zone member, much less to accommodate a voluntarily exit, leaving some to dub the currency bloc a “Hotel California” — e.g., you can check out any time you like, but you can never leave. So the only way to quit might actually be to exit the EU altogether, going far beyond the status of such countries as Britain, Norway and Sweden that are members of the 27-nation grouping but don’t use the euro as their currencies.
Beyond forfeiting some of the trade and other benefits EU membership entails, the far more serious impact would be that the debt would still be present, just denominated in a foreign currency.
“The consequences could be catastrophic: The national deficit would double, banks would collapse, and the country would enter a recession period comparable to the one of a country in war,” said ex–Greek Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou, back when he had the job.
The flip side, of course, is if you’re going to pay down your debt at a severely reduced rate, it hardly matters what currency it’s denominated in.
Still, the risk would be that citizens and companies would flock to non-euro-zone banks to keep the value of their savings. Capital controls would have to be in place,” McKeown said. It wouldn’t be too much of a leap to imagine martial law being imposed.
But what’s the alternative? “It’s either that or decades of austerity and falling real wages to improve their position,” McKeown said. “How ever you look at it, it’s quite possible it would be the lesser of two evils.”
Steve Goldstein is MarketWatch's Washington bureau chief.
www.marketwatch.com/story/...scenario-2011-09-28?Link=obinsite
A German ‘yes’ vote may still not avert the worst
By Steve Goldstein, MarketWatch Sept. 28, 2011, 2:34 p.m. EDT
WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — Germans know a thing or too about kicking, whether it’s the seven times they’ve been to the World Cup soccer finals or the umpteen times they’ve kicked the can down the road on resolving the Greek debt crisis.
Reuters
Athens has said it will run out of cash in the middle of October if it doesn’t get the next €8 billion in loan funds from the EU and the IMF — even as it admits it’s struggling to meet the imposed austerity demands.
So on Thursday, the German parliament may again take cleats to the Greek problem by voting in favor of changes to the European Financial Stability Facility rescue fund. “In fact,” said Jennifer McKeown, senior European economist at Capital Economics, “it almost certainly will.”
But what if the German parliament didn’t? After all, this is the country where the Pirate Party recently scored well in an election. It’s where aid to Greece makes the front pages of the tabloids in a why-don’t-we-seize-some-islands kind of way. It’s where Greeks, not to mention the populaces of other Mediterranean nations, are characterized in the crudest stereotypes.
So, if Germany says nein ?
“It would be a bit of a disaster,” McKeown said. “When Slovakia didn’t agree to previous changes in the EFSF, they just didn’t contribute, but that’s not an option for Germany. There would have to be talks about how to readjust the EFSF so that it would suit [Germany].”
Of course, expanding the EFSF to a size of 440 billion euros is just one small step in winding down the euro-zone debt crisis. Greece, Ireland and Portugal at the moment rely on aid from the European Union and International Monetary Fund to fund their governments.
“If all those guys blew up, you can pay back bank bondholders and things of that nature [with the EFSF], but that’s fighting last year’s war,” said Jay Bryson, global economist for Wells Fargo. The new concerns are contagion to Spain and Italy, both highly indebted countries with paltry growth rates where bond yields have surged.
The facility is nowhere near enough to handle Spain, let alone the roughly €2 trillion of obligations Italy faces.
Which means Europe’s policy makers may stick to their muddle-along approach.
“That’s the irony — out of fear of contagion, the leaders in Brussels and Frankfurt have continuously tried to minimize and sweep it under the rug,” said Jeffrey Frankel, a professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Now, in Frankel’s view, the authorities have lost credibility along with all or most of their ammunition.
In Greece, which even on its own is a problem, the government says it will run out of cash in the middle of October if it doesn’t get the next €8 billion in loan funds from the European Union and the IMF. But Athens admits it’s struggling to meet austerity demands.
“The Greeks are running out of cash, and there is no money in sight,” said Carl Weinberg, chief economist at High Frequency Economics. “The Germans are not prepared to look the other way — that’s the deal breaker — and, as far as the IMF looking the other way, [that’s] impossible,” he said, alluding to the institution’s technical requirements.
If Greece stops paying, all sorts of problems start cropping up, for Germany in particular.
The European Central Bank would need more capital because of the roughly €100 billion in collateral in Greek paper it holds, not to mention the roughly €30 billion it’s purchased on the secondary market. The EFSF would start to call member countries to make good on the guarantees they have already made for the facility. In both cases, Germany foots 27% of the bill.
Plus, private-sector banks would be exposed in two ways: one, if they own Greek government debt directly, but also if they’ve underwritten protection on credit-default swaps. And even if an institution bought protection on Greek bonds, there’s the question of whether the counterparty could afford to pay out. Compounding the exposure issue would be the presence on the wrong side of a CDS or Greek bond trade of a bank’s hedge-fund clients.
“Suddenly the public-sector finances of Germany won’t look so hot,” said Weinberg. “And this will be repeated in varying degrees around Europe.”
And that has implications for U.S. lenders. Already, the three-month Libor interbank lending rate has creeped up by more than 10 basis points, or 0.1 percentage point, since the summer.
That doesn’t sound like much, certainly not in comparison to the roughly 200-basis-point spike when Lehman Brothers collapsed.
‘Everybody knows the cost to be paid, and [Germany has] the money.’
Mitchell Orenstein, Johns Hopkins University
“But that’s when the Fed is saying we’re going to be on hold basically forever,” said Bryson of Wells Fargo. “If Greece blows up, I don’t know if it would go up by [as much as the Lehman collapse], but I don’t know if I want to find out, either.”
And that’s why some expect Germany to get over its reluctance to assist Greece — not because of any grandiose pan-European sentiment but because of its own singular interest.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel is in a no-win situation, according to Mitchell Orenstein, a professor at Johns Hopkins’s School of Advanced International Studies.
“To get re-elected she has to not be the one holding the bag. But if she doesn’t hold the bag, then she will go down in history as the worst European leader of all time and lose anyway,” he said. “Her strategy, intelligently, is to wait and push off as long as possible. I think that’s what markets don’t get.
“I just think, at end of day, when it comes close, everybody in Germany will vote for this,” he added. “Everybody knows the cost to be paid, and [Germany has] the money.”
Yet even if Germany does foot the bill, there’s the question of whether the struggling euro-zone states are willing to play along.
“The solution in the long term for these countries is to leave the euro zone and devalue,” McKeown said.
That’s easier said than done. European Union rules don’t have a mechanism to kick out a euro-zone member, much less to accommodate a voluntarily exit, leaving some to dub the currency bloc a “Hotel California” — e.g., you can check out any time you like, but you can never leave. So the only way to quit might actually be to exit the EU altogether, going far beyond the status of such countries as Britain, Norway and Sweden that are members of the 27-nation grouping but don’t use the euro as their currencies.
Beyond forfeiting some of the trade and other benefits EU membership entails, the far more serious impact would be that the debt would still be present, just denominated in a foreign currency.
“The consequences could be catastrophic: The national deficit would double, banks would collapse, and the country would enter a recession period comparable to the one of a country in war,” said ex–Greek Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou, back when he had the job.
The flip side, of course, is if you’re going to pay down your debt at a severely reduced rate, it hardly matters what currency it’s denominated in.
Still, the risk would be that citizens and companies would flock to non-euro-zone banks to keep the value of their savings. Capital controls would have to be in place,” McKeown said. It wouldn’t be too much of a leap to imagine martial law being imposed.
But what’s the alternative? “It’s either that or decades of austerity and falling real wages to improve their position,” McKeown said. “How ever you look at it, it’s quite possible it would be the lesser of two evils.”
Steve Goldstein is MarketWatch's Washington bureau chief.
www.marketwatch.com/story/...scenario-2011-09-28?Link=obinsite