schreibt NYT heute und hält das sogar für wahrscheinlich,allerdings meint man auch die Anleihegeber sollten einiges an der Bürde tragen.In einem Argentinien-Default würden die Investoren mehr als die Hälfte ihres Geldes verlieren,eine Alternative die für Griechenland nicht denkbar und nicht wahrscheinlich ist.Aber auch ein sogenannter Haircut könnte schlimme Folgen für die Eurozone und ihre betroffenen Banken haben,die die meisten griechischen Staatsanleihen halten.
Mr.Weinberg, chief economist of High Frequency Economics in Valhalla, N.Y.schlägt vor ,alle Bonds die bis 2019 fällig sind ,in einen Pool zu tun und mit 25jährigen Bond zu finanzieren.Angenommen sie werden mit 4,5% verzinst ,würde das die Greichen um 60% entlasten.Lediglich diejenigen ,die jetzt Bonds mit 8% Zinsen gekauft haben,hätten einen Verlust hinzunehmen.Daniel Gros, director of the Center for European Policy Studies hat einen ahnlichen Vorschlag.Er schlägt vor die Fälligkeit der Anleihen um 5 Jahre zu verlängern,so dass eine 5jährige Anleihe mit 6% Zinsen zu einer 10jährigen würde mit 6% Zinsen.
Only a few weeks ago, the idea that Greece might restructure its debt seemed like the nuclear option. Now restructuring — a polite alternative to outright “default” — is not only thinkable, but even likely. And one way or another, many economists say, bondholders are expected to bear some of the burden.
In a full-fledged, Argentina-style default, investors would lose over half their money — an option that may be too severe for Greece to contemplate seriously. But even a so-called haircut, in which creditors absorb a relatively modest reduction in the face value of Greek bonds, could have dire consequences for the euro zone and the region’s beleaguered banks, which hold most of Greece’s bonds.
The milder option would spread out Greece’s payments to creditors, who would have to accept a decline in the present value of their investments — an option that is starting to look like the best of an array of bad choices.
“Only a multiyear restructuring of the bond obligations, coupled with substantial deficit reduction, can achieve a permanent adjustment of Greece’s fiscal obligations without actually defaulting on the paper and giving all stakeholders a haircut,” Carl B. Weinberg, chief economist of High Frequency Economics in Valhalla, N.Y., said via e-mail on Sunday.
Mr. Weinberg has proposed converting all Greek bonds due until 2019 into a pool that would be refinanced with 25-year bonds. Assuming a 4.5 percent interest rate, this plan would cut Greek financing requirements by some 60 percent, or 140 billion euros ($187 billion), he estimated. Because 10-year Greek debt is now yielding more than 8 percent, those who have purchased Greek bonds recently would take a significant loss.
Daniel Gros, director of the Center for European Policy Studies, a research organization in Brussels, has proposed a similar plan.He favors simply extending the maturity of existing notes by five years, at the same interest rate. So, a five-year bond paying 6 percent annual interest would become a 10-year bond, still paying 6 percent interest.
Both plans would relieve Greece of the pressure of continually trying to raise money in increasingly unfriendly capital markets to refinance maturing debt. Instead, Greece could concentrate on reducing its deficit, which stands at 13.6 percent of gross domestic product, according to the latest upward revision. It would gain time to restore its economic competitiveness.
With some kind of debt rescheduling, investors would continue to collect interest, and would receive all their principal back in the end. They would have to wait longer, however, with the effect of reducing the current value of their holdings.
Such a plan might appeal to policy makers worried about the effect of default on countries like Spain and Portugal, whose finances are also troubled, and on the European banks that have just been bailed out.
For bondholders to trade in their holdings for longer-term debt, Greece and its backers would need to convince creditors that restructuring offered them the best chance to get their money back. .......
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/business/global/....html?ref=global