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Hello SteinFighters,
Great sentence in the Newsletter:
The CPU's lawyers wanted to speak with the SdK!!
I had already posted the message about the unlawful CPUs here yesterday in the afternoon.
https://www.ariva.de/forum/steinhoff-reinkarnation-582688?page=365
I saw that it has been taken over by someone called 'Jupirke' on the Dutch forum, very good ! And presco: they are also waking up in the Netherlands!
In any case, you can see from everything that those CPUs are just heavy on the stomach, it is not for nothing that the lawyers of the CPUs want information from the SdK.....stay tuned!
Again the post from yesterday:
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2021/123.html
Richter Bozalek: 2 July 2021
'
The 2021 and 2022 convertible bond previously issued by SFHG have been replaced by the 21/22 facility held by Steenbok Lux Finco 1 SARLunder which €2.0billion (2019: €1.8billion) is outstanding as at 30 September 2020. The 21/22 facility is secured by the SIHPL CPU, whereby SIHPL guarantees €1.6billion, and the SFHG 21/22 CPU, whereby the Company guarantees the principal amount of €1.7billion’.
'Conclusion
[137]
'For all these reasons I consider that in concluding the CPU, SIHPL gave financial assistance to Lux Finco 1 in breach of the provisions of sec 45 of the Act. In the circumstances, by virtue of sec 45(6) of the Act, the resolution of SIHPL’s board authorising the conclusion of SIHPL CPU is void as is the CPU itself and the applicants are entitled to a declaration to this effect'.
'[124]
Both in terms of South and English law, if a party guarantees a debt owed by a second party to a third party and the second party discharges its debt to the third party in full, then the guarantor is discharged from any liability to the third party under the guarantee. In [the English] Law of Guarantees[17], the following appears under the heading ‘Discharge of surety by discharge of the principal’
'Put differently, SIHPL’s payments would redeem Lux Finco 1’s debt.
SIHPL also contended that ‘in short, such terms operated to SIHPL’s benefit as a limitation on the quantum of its liability in respect of its restructured debt under the CPU’.
Once again the true position appears to be that the terms of the CPU operated to Lux Finco 1’s benefit as a limitation on the quantum of its liability in respect of its newly assumed debt under the Facilities Agreement'
[133] It must be borne in mind that it was always possible for SIHPL to receive the ‘forbearance’ which the Financial Creditors were extending to it. Quite why SIHPL needed to ‘restate’ its liability in terms of the 2014 Guarantee through the discharging of SFHG’s liabilities and ‘restating’ them in the form of obligations owed to Lux Finco 1, is unclear. The stated reasons, which include rendering the public tradeable debt private and to provide a better ‘reporting regime’, seem less than compelling.
The restructuring appears to have been designed to assist SFHG gain approval of its CVA both from creditors and from the Court (the Nominees). Trevo contends that the CPU was created in its present form (and is contended by SIHPL not to amount to the provision of fresh financial assistance) because SIHPL was aware at the time that it could not pass the solvency and liquidity test in compliance with sec 45 of the Act. It is notable in this regard that a legal opinion obtained by SIHPL from a firm of attorneys as required by the Lux Finco 1 21/22 Loan Agreement was expressly stated to exclude an opinion on sec 45 of the Act'.
'[134] It appears that at the time of concluding the SIHPL CPU, SIHPL’s directors would, at the least, have had difficulty in satisfying themselves, acting reasonably, that the company would satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately after replacing or amending the SIHPL Guarantee by way of the SIHPL CPU. In this regard it is noteworthy that SIHPL did not respond to the challenge put up by Trevo to produce financial statements for the relevant period should it dispute that it was in fact insolvent.
Be all this as it may, for the purposes of determining whether the CPU breaches sec 45 of the Act it is not necessary for the Court to find what SIHPL’s motives were in following the path they did.
[135] If, as SIHPL insists, it obtained a ‘better deal’ through the restructuring,sit would have had no difficulty in its directors passing a resolution to this effect and in its shareholders approving such a resolution at an annual or special general meeting. At the very least the directors and shareholderswould want to apply their minds to the question of whether the new entity, whose debt or obligations the company would now guarantee, presented any risks or advantages in comparison to the previous beneficiary of the guarantee. Here one bears in mind that Lux Finco 1 is a special purpose vehicle, presumably without any existing liabilities or assets.
The shareholders and directors would also wish to consider whether the terms of the CPU were fair and reasonable vis-à-vis the company. In this regard it is again disingenuous to suggest that the restructuring really merely replaced one debtor with another without any other terms and conditions being changed.The CPU is replete with provisions dealing with indemnity, recourse assets, cash pay outs, subordination of SIHPL’s rights etc, all of which required a determination of whether these terms and conditions were, as SIHPL’s directors contend in these papers, more favourable to SIHPL. If this were the case i.e. that such terms were more favourable to SIHPL, then the directors should have no difficulty in being party to a resolution to this effect and untroubled by the prospect of incurring personal liability by virtue of the provisions of sec 45(7).
[136] Returning to the issue of the true construction of the various agreements, the discharge of SFHG’s liabilities under the 2021 Bond would also have discharged SIHPL’s obligations under the SIHPL Guarantee, for otherwise the Bondholders would have double-benefitted but this would have left the Bondholders with only a claim against Lux Finco 1 in respect of the loan originally provided. Accordingly, the SIHPL Guarantee was replaced with the SIHPL CPU. However, this constituted new financial assistance by SIHPL to a company or corporation related or interrelated to it, namely, Lux Finco 1. I consider thus that the SIHPL CPU constitutes financial assistance to Lux Finco 1 inter alia inasmuch SIHPL came under a fresh debt to the Facility A1 Lenders (the Financial Creditors) on different terms and conditions to those applying in terms of the 2014 Guarantee.
Conclusion
[137]
For all these reasons I consider that in concluding the CPU, SIHPL gave financial assistance to Lux Finco 1 in breach of the provisions of sec 45 of the Act. In the circumstances, by virtue of sec 45(6) of the Act, the resolution of SIHPL’s board authorising the conclusion of SIHPL CPU is void as is the CPU itself and the applicants are entitled to a declaration to this effect.
Interdictory relief
[138] The applicants sought an interdict restraining SIHPL from making any payment pursuant to the SIHPL Guarantee, the SIHPL CPU or the compromise proposed by SIHPL in terms of sec 155 of the Companies Act and from providing any security in respect thereof. In terms of this judgment the SIHPL Guarantee stands and clearly no interdictory relief in relation to it can be granted. As far as the balance of the interdictory relief is concerned, the applicants made out no case that any payments pursuant to the SIHPL CPU were imminent. Insofar as any payments made based on the CPU might conceivably follow upon the acceptance of the sec 155 proposal, not only might that proposal be revisited following this judgment, but the sec 155 process has some way to go before it can be sanctioned by a Court. Before that stage is reached the applicants will have adequate opportunity to voice their opposition to any such proposal or interdict any prior payments which they regard as unlawful. Accordingly, the applicants have failed to make out any case for interdictory relief'.
My note: Warum der Sanierungsexpert? Translated, sorry....
Der Sanierungsexperte ist berechtigt, die Bücher, Unterlagen und sonstigen Datenträger des Schuldners einzusehen, die er für die ordnungsgemäße Erfüllung seiner Aufgabe als notwendig erachtet.
Der Schuldner bzw. dessen Geschäftsführer und gegebenenfalls die Gesellschafter und Aufsichtsräte sowie die Mitarbeiter des Schuldners sind verpflichtet, dem Sanierungsgutachter alle ( auch die CPU informatione) von ihnen verlangten Auskünfte in der dort festgelegten Weise zu erteilen.Sie werden den Restrukturierungsexperten von sich aus über Tatsachen und Umstände unterrichten, von denen sie wissen oder wissen müssen, dass sie für die ordnungsgemäße Wahrnehmung der Aufgaben des Restrukturierungsexperten von Bedeutung sind, und alle hierfür erforderlichen Mitwirkungsmaßnahmen ergreifen.
My Note: There you go, Louis and Wakkie! WHY?
MOST IMPORTANT: SNH HAS TO GIVE ALL THE INFORMATION TO THE 'HERSTRUCTURERINGSDESKUNDIGE' (even the financial documents they do not want to give to the SdK at this moment and all the information about the CPU's)!
https://www.navigator.nl/document/...a1f364fb18370250e6b13cf3e0da1fde
1.'Jeder Gläubiger, Gesellschafter oder der gesetzlich eingerichtete Betriebsrat oder die Arbeitnehmervertretung des vom Schuldner betriebenen Unternehmens kann bei Gericht die Bestellung eines Sanierungsexperten beantragen, der die Gläubiger und Gesellschafter eines Schuldners berät, oder a Anzahl von ihnen, in Übereinstimmung mit dieser Abteilung kann eine Vereinbarung anbieten. Auch der Schuldner kann einen solchen Antrag stellen. Im letzteren Fall gilt Artikel 370 Absatz 5 entsprechend. Wird dem Antrag stattgegeben, kann der Schuldner keinen Plan auf der Grundlage von Artikel 370 Absatz 1 anbieten, solange die Bestellung des Restrukturierungsexperten andauert. Er kann dem Sanierungsexperten jedoch einen Vergleich mit der Bitte übergeben, ihn den Gläubigern und stimmberechtigten Aktionären vorzulegen, woraufhin der Sanierungsexperte dieser Aufforderung in einer von ihm zu bestimmenden Weise und innerhalb einer Frist nachkommt von ihm bestimmt werden.'
Das Gericht wendet ein Verfahren und Bedingungen an, die klar, transparent und fair sind.'
'4.Das Gericht kann einen oder mehrere Sachverständige damit beauftragen, zu untersuchen, ob eine Situation im Sinne des vorstehenden Absatzes vorliegt. Artikel 378 Absatz 6 Sätze 1 und 4 sowie die Absätze 7 und 8 dieses Artikels gelten dann entsprechend'.
Dabei geht es um: Einsatz des Restrukturierungsexperten (HD) im Stakeholder-Management zugunsten der Deal-Sicherheit:
Es ist die Aufgabe des HD, eine erfolgreiche Homologation einer Vereinbarung wirksam zu erreichen (Art. 371 Fw.).
Eine hohe Ex-ante-Chance, dass die Parteien der Vereinbarung zustimmen (Deal-Sicherheit), erscheint daher wünschenswert.
Wie kann die HD die Risiken bei den geforderten Wertermittlungen begrenzen? Die Abschlusssicherheit wird grundsätzlich dann erhöht, wenn die beteiligten Parteien in den Prozess eingebunden werden und über wichtige Teile einer Vereinbarung informiert sind, auch hierzu Ideen einbringen können und in das Gesamtpaket eingebunden werden. etwas von ihrer eigenen Vision.
Ich habe es schon einmal gesagt:
Wird die Homologation der Vereinbarung abgelehnt, kann dies schwerwiegende Folgen für das Unternehmen haben. Gemäß Artikel 369 (Fw.) kann das Unternehmen keinen neuen Plan für einen Zeitraum von drei Jahren anbieten. Da das Unternehmen sich in einer schlechten Finanzlage befindet, muss schnell eine einvernehmliche Einigung erzielt werden, um eine Insolvenz zu vermeiden.
Nur Meine meinung...
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