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www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc140519.htm
....Despite the devastating losses of half the market"s value in 2000-2002 and 2007-2009, investors experience no fear – no suffering as a result of present market extremes....That hope of succeeding rests on what economist J.K. Galbraith called "the extreme brevity of the financial memory."
Part of that brevity rests on ignoring the forest for the trees... It bears repeating that the average, run-of-the-mill bear market decline wipes out more than half of the preceding bull market advance, making the April 2010 S&P 500 level in the 1200"s a fairly pedestrian expectation for the index over the completion of the current market cycle.
A decline of that extent wouldn"t bring valuations close to historical norms, and certainly not to levels that would historically represent "undervaluation." But consider that a baseline expectation, and don"t be particularly surprised if the market loses closer to 38% - which is the average cyclical bear market loss during a secular bear market period. A market loss of about 50% would put historically reliable valuation metrics at their historical norms, though short-term rates near zero would seem inconsistent with a move to historically normal valuations with typical (~10% annual) expected total returns, absent other disruptions.
The simple fact is that the completion of the present market cycle might be better, or it might be worse than historic norms. We know that we don"t want to speculate here in any event, but neither a severe market loss nor a move to "undervaluation" is a requirement for us to encourage market exposure. For our part, we would expect to shift to a significantly constructive position on a meaningful retreat in valuations – even if to still-overvalued levels – coupled with an early improvement in key measures of market internals.....
....Despite the devastating losses of half the market"s value in 2000-2002 and 2007-2009, investors experience no fear – no suffering as a result of present market extremes....That hope of succeeding rests on what economist J.K. Galbraith called "the extreme brevity of the financial memory."
Part of that brevity rests on ignoring the forest for the trees... It bears repeating that the average, run-of-the-mill bear market decline wipes out more than half of the preceding bull market advance, making the April 2010 S&P 500 level in the 1200"s a fairly pedestrian expectation for the index over the completion of the current market cycle.
A decline of that extent wouldn"t bring valuations close to historical norms, and certainly not to levels that would historically represent "undervaluation." But consider that a baseline expectation, and don"t be particularly surprised if the market loses closer to 38% - which is the average cyclical bear market loss during a secular bear market period. A market loss of about 50% would put historically reliable valuation metrics at their historical norms, though short-term rates near zero would seem inconsistent with a move to historically normal valuations with typical (~10% annual) expected total returns, absent other disruptions.
The simple fact is that the completion of the present market cycle might be better, or it might be worse than historic norms. We know that we don"t want to speculate here in any event, but neither a severe market loss nor a move to "undervaluation" is a requirement for us to encourage market exposure. For our part, we would expect to shift to a significantly constructive position on a meaningful retreat in valuations – even if to still-overvalued levels – coupled with an early improvement in key measures of market internals.....
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