Gigantischer Shortseller-Bubble-Burst

eines Nasdaq-Wertes ist für nächste Woche vorgezeichnet - bei Internet Capital

Next week will be dramatically, because one of the greatest shortseller-bubbles in history will burst. The excellent fundamentals will be jump the prices, for example:

- P/E of 5 as a result of 72.5 million net income an a small market cap

- convertible debt only 27 million or less

- cash an marketable securites about 200 million

- a lot of private held companies = world-market-leader, for example: Starcite, Creditex, ICGCommerce or Metastorm

- incubator-model after year of difficulitis since 2005 in a super position: Since its inception, ICG has remained committed to building and developing companies that deliver improved efficiencies and cost savings to business. Over the past several years, the near-ubiquity of the Internet has driven significant changes in the way business processes are executed. More and more businesses are looking to streamline and automate business processes to take advantage of these efficiencies. This creates a compelling opportunity for companies that drive business productivity within firms and reduce transaction costs between firms. With years of experience in a volatile marketplace, ICG has developed an extraordinary level of expertise in emerging internet-based business models, specifically with respect to which models work best to develop profitable, sustainable companies. With this expertise, management acumen and a solid financial position, ICG is uniquely positioned to capitalize on the opportunities and maximize the long-term leadership potential of its partner companies. ICG acquires stakes in on-demand Internet software and services business and then infuses the strategic and operational support to help drive these partner companies to market-leading positions. The ICG business model leverages our financial resources and the expertise of our management team to apply processes for acquiring, managing and building successful companies. To drive long-term value, we target technologies, services and industry players working to streamline and automate business processes both within the enterprise and across the value supply chain –enhancing the way business is done. Specifically, the team targets the following business model attributes: Web-enabled software platform (ASP model)
Automates a complex workflow process, with focus on the “white space” between companies
Delivers comprehensive solution – software, content data and transaction capabilities (content a long term differentiator)
Recurring revenue streams/fixed cost model
Multi-year contracts
Potential to evolve into an ecosystem
Once a company is integrated into the ICG partner company network, the ICG team leverages its industry expertise to help position these companies to produce high-margin, recurring and predictable earnings.

heißer Luft von Libuda. Gigantischer Bubble burst bei Libuda?

Shortquezze aufmerksam machen, der seit einigen Tagen eingesetzt hat und heute (in der nachstehenden Tabelle noch nicht enthalten) bei 8,87 und nachbörslich bei 8,97 gelandet ist:

PRICES

Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close*
24-Jul-08 8.55 8.76 8.33 8.59 130,200 8.59
23-Jul-08 8.46 8.58 8.19 8.52 100,800 8.52
22-Jul-08 7.80 8.46 7.68 8.46 151,600 8.46
21-Jul-08 7.59 7.89 7.59 7.83 90,600 7.83
18-Jul-08 8.04 8.05 7.55 7.55 136,400 7.55
17-Jul-08 7.87 8.10 7.55 8.03 179,300 8.03
16-Jul-08 7.03 7.89 6.95 7.87 299,700 7.87
15-Jul-08 6.92 7.23 6.79 7.01 224,300 7.01
14-Jul-08 7.34 7.42 6.92 6.96 207,500 6.96

Ein Anstieg von 6,96 auf 8,87 (8,97) ist zwar noch nicht so abrupt, dass man das als Shortsquezze bezeichen kann, aber ein erster Anfang. Besser wäre es logischerweise gewesen, wenn datschi Euch am 13. Juli informiert hätte - aber so ist halt unser Datschi einmal und ihr seit um 27% Kursanstieg in nur 11 Tagen ärmer.

"I see IBM (IBM) and Fujitsu (FJTSY.PK) number one and two worldwide in BPM.... Other suppliers that are likely to have similar market share (to Software AG). ..include Oracle/BEA (ORCL), Microsoft (MSFT), TIBCO (TIBX), AT&T/Sterling Commerce (ATT), Autonomy [LSE:AU], SAP (SAP), ACI Worldwide (ACIW) and Sun (JAVA)... others including Metastorm (on the shelf as (MSTM)) are trying to work their way on to the leaderboard.


"Many--including the smaller suppliers--offer multiple BPM-related products because of acquisitions made over the last 36 months so a more useful ranking to determine market acceptance would be by product rather than vendor. Consider IBM with everything from Filenet to Notes or Oracle with everything from Fuego to the Plumtree portal to the Collaxa BPEL engine."


No current investment activity demonstrates the leader/chaser market share situation in BPM and the multiple brand through acquisition issue better than Metastorm, which filed its S-1 in May 2008. Naturally, MTSM is in no great rush to complete the offering, so I waited for a slow summer day to read its filings.

First the market share issue. BPM, for a variety of reasons, is different than most "emerging" software markets over the last two decades. In most other high flying software-market investment opportunities of the 1989-2008 timeframe, one company came out of a pack from a standing start, went public and then was acquired. There were two chances to cash in in almost all cases.

But BPM is different in that no startup has come out of the pack to go public.  Metastorm is the first to try. Pegasystems (PEGA) had been public since its bank-automation application phase, Fuego and a host of others had already been acquired, and the other smaller companies including Metastorm (with the possible exception of Lombardi and Savvion) cannot really be considered startups. They all have other functionality or technology heritages... in workflow (Handysoft), imaging (Global 360), KM (Appian), and so forth.

MTSM is throwing down the gauntlet to the other small players thinking about an IPO by publicizing its revenue streams. Its major problem is that unlike Ariba (ARBA) in 1999, Siebel and i2 (ITWO) in 1996, Arbor in 1995, and PeopleSoft earlier, Metastorm is not bringing its shares public competing in an undefined software market against a few equally small software suppliers. Instead it is aiming right at the major software suppliers in the information technology [IT] market.

With about $48 million in 2007 software revenue, Metastorm trails the leading suppliers. In addition, the S-1 numbers are probably not backcast for 2006/2007 acquisitions (because that is not required under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) so the growth rate is not quite as high as advertised. But Metastorm's growth still appears to outstrip the BPM market’s. Metastorm has a reasonable presence (30% of revenue) outside the United States, which is important given the current macroeconomic situation. Its products appear to be particularly popular in the government sector, which accounted for 26% of Metastorm’s business in 2007.

Another differentiator but possible sticking point is Metastorm's relationship to Microsoft. Most of its products are exclusive to or optimized for the Microsoft platform. That's good news unless Microsoft decides to more aggressively pursue this market opportunity.

As for the product acquisition trend, Metastorm is trying to redefine the already redefined BPM category as a market opportunity. Its S-1 says there is a unified market for enterprise architecture management [EAM], business process analysis [BPA] and BPM (as already redefined from workflow and integration middleware) in combination. I don't see it but even if I am wrong, such a redefinition is a tough challenge for a small player in a market and the challenge is compounded by the fact that all the major software-market players also offer products in all these categories. So even if Metastorm were successful in broadening the definition, its competitors are the same.

There is the further problem as discussed at my blog on IT Business Edge: the categories EAM, BPA and BPM actually do not cleanly fit together. Metastorm says:


"However, BPM software alone generally focuses on the automation, management and control of business processes and does not address all of the activities needed to improve processes. By itself, BPM software may not allow an organization to fully understand a given process and how it relates to the strategy, people, systems and data that the process impacts across an organization."


Although that might be true of some BPM products, it is certainly not the roadmap that all the leaders have laid out. Metastorm is no further down the road toward integrating these functions because it is also the amalgamation of acquisitions: heritage Metastorm was formed by the merger of Metastorm and the U.K.-based Sysgenics (in 1998), Commercequest (which is the result of the mergers of KMG, ANS, and others) and Metastorm in 2005, and the acquisition of Provision with its EAM and BPA offerings and Spotlight Data by Metastorm in 2007. It was Sysgenics that brought the eWork capability to the mix originally and well as the foothold in the EU. Understanding the revenue streams of these disparate products--and their relationships to their disparate competitors--is really the key to understanding the Metastorm IPO as an investment opportunity.

The wildcard issue with this IPO is Metastorm's ownership by Internet Capital Group (ICGE). Metastorm is not the typical IPO in that Metastorm itself is over 30% owned by ICGE, another public company. This raises the VMware (VMW)/EMC (EMC) conundrum I have discussed at Research 2.0 in an investment-opportunity environment--both marco and individually--that is probably not worth the time to figure out. But that is not to say that ICGE has the same kind of complete control over Metastorm that EMC has over VMware.

In summary, the Metastorm offering serves the purpose of legitimizing the market for those of you thinking about whether BPM is legitimately a separate software function worth investing in or just a part of the ERP suite (as I discussed here) or middleware investment opportunities. Other players not mentioned above that are nibbling around the edges of the opportunity include Adobe (ADBE),  Axway/Cyclone/Tumbleweed (part of the Sopra Group listed on Bourse), BMC/Remedy (BMC), Cordys, DST Systems (DST), EMC/Documentum, GXS, IDS/Scheer, Intalio, Mega, Red Hat/JBoss (RHT), Ultimus, Vignette (VIGN), Vitria and W4/Akazi. Of course, most of these companies either do not report BPM as a separate business segment because it is still a minor part of their revenue under SEC (or equivalent) regulations. or they do not report their revenue at all because they are private companies.

NOTE: I do not recognize “pure-play” as a separate market research segment and don’t think you should consider pureplay as a feature when looking at BPM (or any other software market) investment opportunity. There is no reason why a company that only offers BPM should have a better BPM product than one that offers multiple types of software.

die beim Börsengang in 2009 durchaus allein so viel wert sein können wie die momentane Marktkapitalisierung von ca. 340 Millionen, 230 Millionen bzw. nach dem Ipo von Metastorm 330 Millionen Cash und 65% an ICGCommerce, 32% an Starcite, 32% an Freeborders, 46% an Channelintelligence, 48% an Vcommerce, 35% an Whitefence, 30% an Commerce360, 80% an Investorforce, 9% an Anthem Venture, 5% an Emptoris sowie weitere kleinere Beteiligungen gibt es dann umsonst.



.

hatte ich vergessen dem letzten Posting beizufügen:

www.pr-usa.net/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=122376

Dass meine Prognosen von einem Milliarden-IPO keine Spinnereien sind, könnt Ihr nachvollziehen, wenn Ihr einmal auf die Internetseite geht:

www.freeborders.com

Seht Euch dort die Pressemitteilungen, was über Freeborders in der Presse stand und was über IT-Outsourcing from China in der Presse stand besonders genau an. Geht auch in die Archive von 2007, 2006 usw. zurück.

freeborders kommt nie an die Börse, hehehehehehe......

Warum die Lügen der bezahlten US-Lügner und ihre deutschen vermutlich nur Amateur-Lügner (die z.B auf Frust über die Postings von Libuda über fallende Ölpreise dann hier ein Kursziel von null posten, was ich für eine schlimme Entgleisung und gezielte Schädigung von Lesern halte, die sich mit dem Wert nicht intensiv beschäftigen konnten und derart kriminellen Lügen ausgesetzt sind) daneben liegen, zeigt das folgende Posting:

I can't understand the nonsense technic 47 (the greatest liar of all message-boards worldwide, who use a lot of ID's, now place2b2b) is posting (eine Anmerkung von mir; technic47 ist ein von Shortsellern bezahlter Basher, während Reiny ohne jegliche Argumnte in Tag hineinplaudert, ob das den Leser schadet oder falche Informationen liefert - scheissegal, das eigene Ego (ob das nun verkorkst ist oder nicht, könnt Ihr sicher selbst beurteilen) ist befriedigt. Today, Internet Capital has 225 million cash/securites (43 million cash, 2.2 million shares of Blackbboard, about 750,000 shares of ICE and 134 million shares of Blackboard), but the biggest value are the holding lot of private companies:

65% of ICGCommerce

www.icgcommerce.com

32% of Starcite

www.starcite.com

32% of Metastorm, which has made an S1-filing some weeks ago and the ipo will get in the next weeks

www.metastorm.com

32% of Freeborders

www.freeborders.com

46% of Channelintelligence

www.channelintelligence

35% of Whitefence

www.whitefence.com

48% of Vcommerce

www.vcommerce.com


5% of Emptoris, who will made an ipo in 2008, too.

www.emptoris.com

9% of Anthem Venture

www.anthemvp.com

30% of Commerce360, the last buy of Internet Capital

www.commcerce360

And additional some ownerships with smaller values.

My advice: Click all this addresses, and you will agree with me, that technic 47 (post here under the name place2b2b) is the worldwide greatest and most criminal liar of all message-boards worldwide.

wert. Wie die neuesten Zahlen von Ariba, einem Konkurrenten von ICGCommcerce zeigen, der seine Quartalsumsätze gegenüber dem Vorjahre von 75 auf 85 Millionen steigern konnte, brummt das Geschäft mit Outsourcing. ICGCommerce wächst mit einer jährlichen Wachstumsrate von 30% noch schneller als Ariba und war auch beim Gewinnen neuer Großkunden (Hertz, Goodyear, Chiquita und andere) in den letzten Monaten noch erfolgreicher als Ariba.

Compare ICGCommerce and Ariba     27-Jul-08 06:51 am     The valuation of Ariba is now 4.5-times-revenues. Revenues of ICGCommerce in 2008 will be about 72 million. By same valuation like Ariba the worth = 324 million. Worth of 65% of Internet Capital = 210 million.

ARIBA INC(NasdaqGM: ARBA)
After Hours: 16.5006 0.03 (0.19%) 4:18pm EThelp
Last Trade: 16.47
Trade Time: Jul 25
Change: 0.33 (1.96%)
Prev Close: 16.80
Open: 16.75
Bid: 15.60 x 300
Ask: N/A
1y Target Est: 17.43
Day's Range: 16.11 - 17.02
52wk Range: 8.26 - 17.25
Volume: 2,642,297
Avg Vol (3m): 1,928,870
Market Cap: 1.41B
P/E (ttm): N/A
EPS (ttm): -0.51
Div & Yield:

Damit stellen allein schon die 65%, die Internet Capital an ICGCommerce hält, mehr als 60% der Marktkapitalisierung von Internet Capital von zur Zeit nur ca. 340 Millionen dar. Nimmt man noch die 230 Millionen cash/Wertpapiere dazu, stellen die 440 Millionen mehr als 130% der momentanen Marktkapitalisierung dar. Und umsonst bekäme man noch die folgenden Beteiligungen hinzu: 32% an Starcite, 32% an Freeborders, 46% an Channelintelligence, 48% an Vcommerce, 35% an Whitefence, 30% an Commerce360, 80% an Investorforce, 9% an Anthem Venture, 5% an Emptoris und weitere kleinere Beteiligungen.