WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC. 7,75% PER.PFD CONV.SH.R DL1000 (A0M901)
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eine aktuelle schätzung eines jpm mitarbeiters (glaubwürdig, grins) aus einem ami bord:
Cash(JPM conceded ownership)……....4,572
Restricted Cash………………………………..........96
Investment securities……………………….......68
Cash Surrender Value of BOLI (50%....45
American savings Litigation……………...….55
Visa……………………………………………….…50
Investment in Subs (these are ???)……….0
Intercompany Issues………………………........179
WMI Investment cash……………..……….......274
WMI Other investments………………….......….58
Subtotal…………………………………………….............……5,397
Add First IRS Refund (30% per MOR)……..….780
Used lower end of range Second IRS Refund(40% per MOR)…...1,040
Subtotal……………………………………………….…............7,217
Less liabilities Senior Debt…………………………………….........4,132
Sub Debt……………………………………..........….1,666
Junior Sub Debt……………………........………….765
Accounts Payable……………………………….........…4
Payroll and other accruals………..………….493
Subtotal…………………………………………………............…7,060
Leftover to Preferreds…………………………...……………….157
dass würde bedeuten, die vorzüge kriegen 5%. (es sind zwar ein paar millionen nicht angeführt, aber zur diskussion gut genug. das skurile daran ist, danach würden die vorzüge die firma übernehmen. und die firma hat, was da nicht angeführt wird, etwa 20 mrd nol und 8 mrd capital tax losses, also verlustvorträge. dass könnte im endeffekt bedeuten, dass die vorzüge mehr als 100% kriegen. und die satmmaktien schauen wortlos zu, grins. tja, wer von euch daranglaubt, grüsst mir auch schön den osterhasen.
JPMorgan, FDIC Resolve with WaMu
Washington Mutual Inc.’s (WaMu) 18 month-long battle with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM) came to a resolution on Mar 12, whereby WaMu has agreed to accumulate about 6 billion as against the $20 billion to be collected from lawsuits, tax refunds and disputed cash deposits that were estimated by the shareholders of WaMu.
According to the terms of the resolution, fixed after the dispute between the WaMu, FDIC and JPMorgan, WaMu will receive the $4 billion of cash deposit that was held by JPMorgan when it bought Washington Mutual Bank for $1.9 billion in Sep 2008. The three entities will also share two tax refunds expected to be worth about $5.6 billion. In addition to turning over the $4 billion in deposits, JPMorgan has agreed to purchase Visa Inc. (NYSE: V) shares from WaMu for $50 million.
The matter caught fire when WaMu’s bank was taken over by JPMorgan. While WaMu wanted to seek for the $4 billion cash deposit to repay its creditors worth $8 billion, FDIC argued that it should take temporary custody of the cash because of losses caused by the failure of WaMu’s bank. On the other hand, JPMorgan alleged that it should have a right to the cash as it had bought the failed bank.
Following the resolution, the money granted to WaMu will be used to repay $7 billion in debt, mostly owed to bondholders who support the settlement, which leaves a paltry sum for the shareholders. However, the judge must approve the settlement, which will be filed by Mar 26 with the court as a part of the WaMu’s liquidation plan.
**cancelled** Court hearing, Omnibus, 10:30 AM (Del)
Acceptance of the Plan of Reorganization my comments in bold red, emphasis in bold black. this post is dedicated to diamondguru-one. welcome home As noted earlier, only the debtor may file a plan of reorganization during the first 120-day period after the petition is filed (or after entry of the order for relief, if an involuntary petition was filed). The court may grant extension of this exclusive period up to 18 months after the petition date. In addition, the debtor has 180 days after the petition date or entry of the order for relief to obtain acceptances of its plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121. The court may extend (up to 20 months) or reduce this acceptance exclusive period for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d). In practice, debtors typically seek extensions of both the plan filing and plan acceptance deadlines at the same time so that any order sought from the court allows the debtor two months to seek acceptances after filing a plan before any competing plan can be filed. If the exclusive period expires before the debtor has filed and obtained acceptance of a plan, other parties in interest in a case, such as the creditors' committee or a creditor, may file a plan. Such a plan may compete with a plan filed by another party in interest or by the debtor. equity commitee will file a plan when the current plan fails. earliest they are eligible to file is 61 days from march 26th. If a trustee is appointed, the trustee must file a plan, a report explaining why the trustee will not file a plan, or a recommendation for conversion or dismissal of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(5). A proponent of a plan is subject to the same requirements as the debtor with respect to disclosure and solicitation. In a chapter 11 case, a liquidating plan is permissible. Such a plan often allows the debtor in possession to liquidate the business under more economically advantageous circumstances than a chapter 7 liquidation. It also permits the creditors to take a more active role in fashioning the liquidation of the assets and the distribution of the proceeds than in a chapter 7 case. Section 1123(a) of the Bankruptcy Code lists the mandatory provisions of a chapter 11 plan, and section 1123(b) lists the discretionary provisions. Section 1123(a)(1) provides that a chapter 11 plan must designate classes of claims and interests for treatment under the reorganization. Generally, a plan will classify claim holders as secured creditors, unsecured creditors entitled to priority, general unsecured creditors, and equity security holders. if A > L, we are next in line. wmb bonds are not wmi's responsibility. our A is definitely > L Under section 1126(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, an entire class of claims is deemed to accept a plan if the plan is accepted by creditors that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims in the class. Under section 1129(a)(10), if there are impaired classes of claims, the court cannot confirm a plan unless it has been accepted by at least one class of non-insiders who hold impaired claims (i.e., claims that are not going to be paid completely or in which some legal, equitable, or contractual right is altered). wmb bondholders objection don't mean sh!t. they're not wmi's responsibility. that's why rosen said they're prepared to file with or without their support. Moreover, under section 1126(f), holders of unimpaired claims are deemed to have accepted the plan. Under section 1127(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the plan proponent may modify the plan at any time before confirmation, but the plan as modified must meet all the requirements of chapter 11. When there is a proposed modification after balloting has been conducted, and the court finds after a hearing that the proposed modification does not adversely affect the treatment of any creditor who has not accepted the modification in writing, the modification is deemed to have been accepted by all creditors who previously accepted the plan. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3019. If it is determined that the proposed modification does have an adverse effect on the claims of non-consenting creditors, then another balloting must take place. Because more than one plan may be submitted to the creditors for approval, every proposed plan and modification must be dated and identified with the name of the entity or entities submitting the plan or modification. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016(b). When competing plans are presented that meet the requirements for confirmation, the court must consider the preferences of the creditors and equity security holders in determining which plan to confirm. A > L. creditors will be paid in full. equity is next. Any party in interest may file an objection to confirmation of a plan. equity committee will surely do this AFTER weil submits their plan on march 26th. The Bankruptcy Code requires the court, after notice, to hold a hearing on confirmation of a plan. If no objection to confirmation has been timely filed, the Bankruptcy Code allows the court to determine whether the plan has been proposed in good faith and according to law. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3020(b)(2). Before confirmation can be granted, the court must be satisfied that there has been compliance with all the other requirements of confirmation set forth in section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, even in the absence of any objections. In order to confirm the plan, the court must find, among other things, that: (1) the plan is feasible; (2) it is proposed in good faith; and (3) the plan and the proponent of the plan are in compliance with the Bankruptcy Code. it is questionable if the debtor's plan, at its state from friday, is in good faith... Quote: -------------------------------------------------- Good Faith When examining good faith, the court attempts to ensure that the plan will fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the bankruptcy laws. The most commonly used standard requires the court to look at the plan in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the plan. Other factors that courts may apply are: •Whether the plan is proposed with honesty and good intentions such as shutting out equity when A > L? •Whether there is a basis for expecting that reorganization can be achieved •Whether there was fundamental fairness in dealing with the creditors Indications of Bad Faith Courts have found certain factors that indicate that a plan may have been proposed in bad faith, including, but not limited to: •Filing a bankruptcy case after losing a case in a non-bankruptcy court •A finding that creditors have been manipulated in an effort to meet the requirement that at least one class of creditors accept the plan •When a competitor of the debtor proposes a plan with the intent to eliminate competition usually it's creditor vs. creditor. but now it's debtor vs equity. equity = competition. debtor tries to elmininate equity... if weil continues with this plan. •Plans proposed as schemes for delay plan proposed wasn't to cause delay. but there was a delay •Plans proposed solely for tax considerations -------------------------------------------------- so how did we get our equity committee? prior to or during december, somebody proved to the us trustee that A will become > L... he agrees. weil/fdic/jpm submits their pre-drafted plan to us trustee in december for his review and notices equity is not there. meanwhile rosen maintains A < L the whole time. probably because he meant for jpm and fdic to be in the money... if the us trustee knew earlier that A > L he would have assigned an equity committee when the case first opened. if he didn't think A > L then he surely wouldn't have assigned an equity committee during the middle of a case. if you want to argue that A <= L, then jpm and fdic shouldn't ever get paid. therefore A is always > L. In order to satisfy the feasibility requirement, the court must find that confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation (unless the plan is a liquidating plan) or the need for further financial reorganization. and another thing... commons can never be wiped under the current proposal. all the assets sufficiently fill in the liabilities leaving commons determinable only by the market as long as wmi stays open. if L > A then commons will be wiped. our A > L if we can afford to give fdic and jpm money.... http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/...sics/chapter11.html#reorg
investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx
How you can excerise your rights as a WMI shareholder Take action 3/17/10: A group of shareholders is organizing to file a joinder to the Equity Committee's legal action to compel WMI to hold a shareholder's meeting. A joinder is "a joining of causes of action in a lawsuit" or "a joining of parties in a lawsuit". Individual shareholders can choose to be added to the joinder, and we hope to get thousands of shareholders to participate and show their support for the Equity Committee's efforts. When the details have been finalized, each shareholder will be able to submit a form from this web site indicating that they would like to have their name added to the joinder. We are hoping to have the necessary shareholder form available on this web site within the next day or so. A very quick response from shareholders will be needed because the timeline for filing the joinder is very short. Please monitor this page for additional information.
The news was bad, just shareholders try to spin it positively to comfort themselves and not sell. Remember before the hearing, everyone was saying how it will be the best news ever that the Judge will disallow the WMB bondholder claims and the reverse happened. The market is reflecting this. Any claims from WMB Bondholders will further slice the pie, now even the Hs are in danger of not getting anything.
The news wasn't bad, it was the interpretation of Judge Walrath disallowing the WMB bondholders that was not fully vetted. On the surface, it would be great if they were gone, because that means more money for equity. However, what Judge Walrath did yesterday was bad news for JPM and FDIC because if will force discovery, and testimony about the state of WMB at the time the pre-seizure WMB bondholders bought in. It puts JPM and FDIC on a precarious position. The problem is that no one considered the deeper issue here - except the one person who really matters; Judge Walrath. The MM's would have tanked equity regardless of yesterday's outcome, they do it everytime after a court hearing. Here is a good analysis from Mary at Y: "However, this decision is very bad for JPM , the FDIC, and the WMI bondholders (who are running the debtor's shop at the moment). Now comes a lot of discovery and testimony about the condition of the bank at the time that the securities were sold which will be very damaging, I suspect, to JPM and the FDIC. This also destroys the POR that JPM and the WMI bondholders had been hoping for. The WMI bondholders were looking to a quick payout and a bonanza from the excess. Now they are going to have to get their money the old-fashioned way...by earning it. There will be no payout for them unless and until the WMB bondholders are defeated. Same for JPM. In the meantime, the litigation against JPM and the FDIC will likely get support and the cash and assets of WMB at the time of the seizure are brought into the record. For example, the EC will be able to defeat any POR that does not recognize and distribute the assets that can be shown as belonging to WMI at the time of the seizure. So...on its surface this decision was neutral for equity at best but since it hurts our opponents it should be very helpful under the surface. The main thing that we have to worry about now is that the debtors might reach some sort of new settlement with JPM, the WMB bondholders, and the FDIC but, based on the court's decision, such a plan would still face an insurmountable barrier to approval in bankruptcy court unless it resolved other outstanding claims which seems unlikely, to put it mildly. This case has acquired a momentum of its own that none of the concerned parties can stop now. Finally, the new Dewey and Leboeuf law firm looks much more appropriate to represent the EC for the litigation that is now upcoming. They are twice the size of Venable and are much more litigation focused. The only bad thing from yesterday that I can see is that a quick settlement (including all parties including equity) now appears very unlikely. "
In his first public statement since the seizure of Washington Mutual, former chief executive Kerry Killinger plans to tell a congressional subcommittee that the bank could have survived and that regulators seized it precipitously, according to people familiar with his testimony.
Killinger’s testimony, and that of former WaMu President Steve Rotella, obtained in advance through interviews by the Puget Sound Business Journal, will paint a picture of a bank that was close to stabilizing its finances amid the financial turmoil of 2008.
Killinger plans to use charts and graphs at the April 13 hearing in Washington to show the Seattle-based bank’s improving financial condition at the time, and to argue against the “bargain purchase” of WaMu by JPMorgan Chase & Co. The New York bank paid $1.9 billion for WaMu’s $307 billion in assets.
The testimony is part of an inquiry into events leading up to WaMu’s seizure and sale in September 2008 in what has become known as the largest bank failure in U.S. history.
The official purpose of the hearing by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is to question executives about their decision to expand into risky mortgage lending, particularly in the last 10 years of the bank’s life.
But the hearing may also address the other big question that looms over WaMu’s downfall: Did regulators move in too soon?
According to people familiar with the prepared testimony, Killinger and Rotella will treat the question differently. Killinger is expected to say regulators should not have seized the bank.
It’s unclear if Rotella will echo that view at the hearing, but it currently isn’t part of his prepared remarks, according to people familiar with the testimony who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the ongoing investigation.
The hearing, which will include other high-ranking WaMu officials, also will highlight the competing narratives that have developed to explain the bank’s downfall. One line says WaMu had become hopelessly mired in subprime debt, posing a risk to depositors, and that federal regulators acted to prevent a messy and expensive failure. The other line says that despite deep exposure to subprime losses, the bank had largely stabilized its finances and qualified as “well capitalized” when regulators seized it.
Last year, a Business Journal investigation found that Washington Mutual was solvent when regulators seized it, that regulators undercut the bank’s own efforts to raise capital, and that the eventual buyer, JPMorgan Chase, had a plan in the works to buy the bank from the government months before regulators took over.
The testimony, followed by questions from U.S. senators, represents the first time any of the executives will talk publicly about their actions at the bank.
The hearing is particularly significant because Killinger and Rotella have remained out of the public eye since WaMu’s closure.
The hearing is part of the continuing attention WaMu’s collapse commands more than a year and a half after it was seized by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
In addition to the hearing, a nearly 600-page settlement in the complicated Chapter 11 bankruptcy of WaMu’s holding company was recently proposed. The move has sparked a new wave of legal wrangling over the billions of dollars of assets remaining after WaMu shut down.
What’s more, a long-anticipated report on WaMu by the Inspector General offices of the FDIC and the OTS is expected to be released soon, according to the Treasury Department.
“WaMu is a political nightmare,” said Stephen Klein, an attorney at Seattle-based law firm Graham & Dunn.
“The question in this case is, Did the FDIC seize the bank prematurely? It’ll be interesting to see politically how that’s handled.”
Killinger’s testimony is expected to be the most dramatic. He is expected to say that government officials turned their back on the century-old Seattle institution in the months before they seized it because WaMu was not part of an elite “club” of Wall Street bankers.
The former chief executive, who was ousted three weeks before WaMu was closed, plans to point to the Treasury Department’s refusal to place the bank on a list of financial institutions that were off limits to short-sellers during the summer before its closure, a move that would have helped support WaMu’s plummeting stock price at the time, according to people familiar with the testimony.
Killinger also was expected to discuss the changes in federal laws in the weeks following WaMu’s seizure that allowed the government to bail out other large financial institutions, these people said.
Both Killinger and Rotella plan to devote a large part of their testimony on efforts to reduce home-loan lending and exposure to risky mortgage loans starting in 2005 and until the bank was seized.
The bank’s foray into subprime and option ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) lending is the subject of an extensive shareholder lawsuit under way in federal court in Seattle. The lawsuit claims that WaMu executives allowed an out-of-control lending environment to flourish at branches across the country, according to court documents. All executives named in the case have filed motions to dismiss it.
Killinger plans to take responsibility for actions that occurred on his watch and also in the home-loan group, and to discuss WaMu’s purchase of California subprime lender Long Beach Mortgage in 1999, according to people familiar with his testimony. Many of WaMu’s bad loans originated at Long Beach.
Killinger, however, will assert that executives were turning the ship around. He is expected to illustrate that the bank had cut its home-loan originations from $384.2 billion in 2003 to $100.9 billion in 2007. Option ARM originations also dropped during that time, according to Killinger’s planned testimony. Its subprime portfolio, meanwhile, increased between 2003 and 2005, before executives began to cut back.
Rotella’s planned testimony also will focus on the bank’s efforts to rid itself of its risky mortgages.
But he also is expected to point out that many of the decisions to expand in that direction occurred before he joined as president in 2005, according to a person familiar with his testimony. Rotella, who was also chief operating officer, plans to point to efforts he made to diversify the bank’s portfolio and shed its exposure to the worsening real estate market, including shaking up the management of Long Beach Mortgage and selling about $140 billion of mortgage servicing rights.
Both executives are likely to face pointed questions, particularly because the bank’s subprime loan exposure continues to be blamed for the bank’s closure.
The subprime portfolio “was too big and too messy,” said Jim Bradshaw, who covered WaMu for more than 15 years at brokerage D.A. Davidson & Co.
WaMu shareholders can sue to force annual meeting
Stockholders in bankrupt Washington Mutual Inc. (WMI) have won a bankruptcy court's approval to seek to require the company to hold a shareholders meeting.
A committee of shareholders last month sought a court order that the company should hold such a meeting, at which they hope to elect a new board of directors and chart a new course in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Parker Folse, an attorney in the Seattle office of Susman Godrey, which represents the shareholder committee, said his colleagues at the Delaware hearing said the bankruptcy judge made an oral ruling Wednesday and asked the dueling parties to agree on the wording of an order she can sign.
"I do anticipate that there will be shareholders that will be filing suit in state court in Washington very soon in an effort to require the company to hold an annual meeting," Folse said.
Folse said he believes such a lawsuit would have to be brought by individual shareholders, not the equity committee that is an official participant in the bankruptcy proceedings. There was "significant interest on the part of shareholders in being heard," he added.
The shareholders argue the company's remaining administrators are in too much of a hurry to negotiate settlements of Washington Mutual's multipronged litigation against federal regulators and JPMorgan Chase, and care only about paying off creditors.
"Without any type of shareholder input in corporate governance since well before the bankruptcy, WMI (Washington Mutual Inc.) is attempting to settle its most significant outstanding claims while leaving shareholders with nothing," the equity committee argued. "Unless and until a board meeting is held to elect new directors, the equity committee harbors serious concerns that the global settlement may not reflect a fair and appropriate valuation of the underlying litigation."
That proposed "global settlement" of WMI's claims against JPMorgan and the FDIC, as outlined by WMI last month, would provide it more than $6 billion, including disputed deposits now at JPMorgan and a share of the bank's expected tax refunds. But that's a long way from covering WMI's debts.
WMI "very strenuously opposed the motion that was argued today — they very badly do not want there to be a shareholders meeting, and argued to the court that if a meeting occurred it would threaten the viability of the settlement," said Folse.
A spokesman for WMI was not immediately available for comment.
WMI called the shareholder committee's move an attempt to "seize control" and "implement new, imprudent 'swing for the fences' litigation strategies," according to court documents. It argued, among other things, that a lawsuit to force a shareholders meeting would be a "clear abuse" of the bankruptcy process.
It also requested 180 days to procure audited financial statements for 2008 and 2009 and to prepare a proxy statement for any shareholders meeting.
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2011662844_wamu22.html
NEW YORK, May 1 (Reuters) - Washington Mutual Inc (WAMUQ.PK) on Friday asked a U.S. bankruptcy court to let it probe whether JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N) had unlawfully damaged its former thrift unit's assets in order to buy it "on the cheap," at $1.9 billion, last September.
WaMu, the bankrupt holding company of what was Washington Mutual Bank, filed a motion in U.S. bankruptcy court in Delaware, charging that JPMorgan engaged in "sham negotiations" designed to get confidential information out of WaMu and gain an unfair advantage in buying its assets.
The request cited a federal lawsuit brought by WaMu stakeholders against JPMorgan in Texas in February. The suit claims that in the summer of 2008 JPMorgan leaked false and harmful information from WaMu's financial records, in an attempt to deflate its value and purchase WaMu's assets at a fire-sale price.
A JPMorgan spokeswoman said the firm does not comment on pending litigation.
WaMu's collapse was the largest U.S. bank failure in history. The bank was seized by U.S. regulators on Sept. 25 and its deposits immediately sold to JPMorgan.
The surviving holding company filed for bankruptcy protection in Delaware a day later, with $32.9 billion in assets, including several corporate entities, real estate assets and an insurance business.
WaMu said in court documents that if the claims in the Texas suit turn out to be true, JPMorgan could be held responsible for the "destruction" of the parent company and the "total losses suffered by its creditors and shareholders."
WaMu said it wanted to investigate whether the sale could be classified as a fraudulent transfer, so that WaMu's creditors could get their money back, or whether it could sue JPMorgan for other claims like unfair competition, breach of contract, and misappropriation of confidential information.
WaMu, once the largest U.S. savings and loan, claimed in court documents that JPMorgan had "long coveted" the bank's depositor base.
The request was the second legal action taken by WaMu against JPMorgan this week.
WaMu sued JPMorgan on Tuesday seeking the return of more than $4 billion in cash deposits it lost access to when its bank was sold last year. In that suit WaMu said that JPMorgan wrongfully claims it acquired the deposits as part of the takeover transaction, but that they should have been treated like any other deposit at the bank. [ID:nN28309126]
Also last month, WaMu sued the FDIC for more than $13 billion, arguing that JPMorgan paid too little for its bank business and that more money should be available for creditors.
A hearing on WaMu's request to investigate JPMorgan is set for May 20, according to court documents. (Reporting by Emily Chasan; Additional reporting by Elinor Comlay;
WaMu Shareholders Win Court Investigation of Biggest U.S. Bank Failure
Shareholders of Washington Mutual Inc. won court approval of a new investigation of the biggest U.S. bank failure.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Mary F. Walrath in Wilmington, Delaware, agreed that an examiner should be appointed to review WaMu’s assets, including the value of a potential lawsuit against JPMorgan and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. for their role in the 2008 collapse of Washington Mutual Bank.
Shareholders claim that lawsuit could be worth $30 billion, a figure disputed by the FDIC, WaMu and its creditors.
“An examiner is necessary both to reduce the cost of litigation and to ensure that all parties have a forum,” Walrath said.
WaMu, based in Seattle, dropped its opposition today to a new investigation, provided that it did not cause a long delay in its proposal to distribute more than $6 billion to creditors.
Walrath said the examiner should file a preliminary work plan by Aug. 6. She also said the examiner would immediately meet with the FDIC and other critics of a potential lawsuit to hear their arguments.
A preliminary report on the examiner’s findings should be presented to the court at its Sept. 7 hearing, Walrath said.
WaMu argued that an investigation should be limited and last no longer than 75 days. Shareholders proposed giving an examiner 120 days to file a preliminary report.
WaMu agreed not to sue JPMorgan and the FDIC as part of a settlement that splits almost $10 billion in cash and tax refunds. That agreement expires Aug. 30.
The case is In Re Washington Mutual Inc., 08-12229, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware (Wilmington).
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-20/...of-biggest-u-s-bank-failure.html
JPM WManalystpresentation von 09/25/2008.
Investors suing Washington Mutual Inc., the former owner of the biggest U.S. bank to fail, won certification as a class-action case of their suit alleging shoddy lending practices.
Shareholders who lost money on stock purchased from October 2005 to July 2008 can proceed with claims under a single lawsuit, U.S. District Judge Marsha Pechman in Seattle ruled Tuesday, according to court documents. The judge appointed the New York-based law firm Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann to lead the plaintiffs' case.
The lawsuit consolidates more than 20 cases filed against Washington Mutual that claim the bank secretly lowered lending standards, artificially inflated home-price appraisals and failed to disclose its deteriorating financial condition when the loans began to fail.
John Wolfe, an attorney representing Washington Mutual defendants, didn't immediately return a voice-mail message seeking comment.
The named plaintiffs in the case include Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board, the largest single-profession pension plan in Canada, and four other pension groups, according to court documents.
They seek to represent tens of thousands of shareholders who lost money on three types of preferred stock purchased between October 2005 and July 2008 and certain securities offered by the bank in 2006 and 2007.
The shareholders argued the case should be granted class-action status because their claims are typical of what other investors experienced and are based on common legal issues.
WaMu filed for bankruptcy Sept. 26, 2008, the day after its banking unit was taken over by regulators and sold to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion. Before it failed, Washington Mutual Bank had more than 2,200 branches and $188 billion in deposits.
Pechman ruled Sept. 28 that a separate federal shareholder lawsuit in Seattle claiming the bank misled purchasers of $10.8 billion in mortgage-backed securities could proceed.
Separately, WaMu said Wednesday the Internal Revenue Service has paid it $4.77 billion of an expected tax refund of up to $5.8 billion. A proposed agreement on dividing that money between WaMu, JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC requires approval by various parties to WaMu's bankruptcy case
.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2013154427_wamu14.html
Lets say you held Pref'ds pre. and you sold are you still eligible to sue or do you need shares in hand?
HOW A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WORKS
No, in a class action, you don't need to have held the shares until present.
If you read the detail, class action suits and articles about them specifically indicate the "class period" [a date between x and x]. Then they spell out that members of that "class" include people who PURCHASED shares during the class time period.
Years later, if the case gets settled in favor of the "class," they provide forms for you to complete, by mailing them to you or indicating a website where "class members" can go to access and download them.
The forms ask for specific info:
--Share buy dates--within the class period dates
--How many you shares bought and at what prices and on what dates.
Sending in that form and all the additional verification of identity and brokerage account info it requires is how you prove you're entitled to receive your portion of the settlement.
Then a year or two after you send in that form, you finally get your $0.03 per share, for example, or whatever's left after the attorneys take a significant cut for their fees.
messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_%28A_to_Z%29/Stocks_W/threadview
The Preferreds Will Be The Final Battleground
The debtors' have stopped their POR waterfall right above the preferreds. They have attempted recently to insert the Caymans and WMB bondholders as higher priorities above the preferreds but that will not fly in BK court.
In fact their attempt to insert the WMB bondholders above the preferreds indicates to me they know there is too much money in the estate to try and keep preferreds below face value so they used this transparent scheme to divert money from the preferreds.
I have felt for the last 12 months that the battle will come down between the EC and the debtors over how much the preferreds will get paid. If they are made whole and commons are in the money then the debtors are out and equity takes over the company and the litigation.WGM is out and the scumbag allaince of the FDIC, JPM and the vulture hedge funds come squarely into Susman's gunsights.
If the debtors can manage to pay anything less than face for the preferreds then the commons are cancelled and the debtors retain control of the reorganized company. If the commons get even a dime after the preferreds are paid then the EC wins.
Make no mistake about it. This is a high stakes battle not only in terms of financial reward/loss but also in terms of potential criminal charges against those who are currently committing bankruptcy fraud.
It is imperative for Susman and the EC to make sure the preferreds gat paid off 100% because if they do not I am afraid enough of the preferreds are in weak hands that they would approve the debtors POR to cancel commons if they offer even 40% of face.
I personally think that the EC is aware of this and are prepared to counter any attempt by the debtors to do an end run via the prefferred voting block.
messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_%28A_to_Z%29/Stocks_W/threadview
Wertung | Antworten | Thema | Verfasser | letzter Verfasser | letzter Beitrag | |
6 | 66 | Vorzugs-Aktionäre - Abstimmen gegen den Plan! | morseb | union | 10.05.13 11:51 | |
7 | Bessere Chancen! | KostolanyFAN | decon1401 | 01.03.12 22:29 | ||
1 | @morseb | C_P_ | C_P_ | 06.11.10 14:44 | ||
30 | Washington Mutual: WAMPQ und WAMKQ. | whiskyandcoke | whiskyandcoke | 29.10.10 10:08 |