Rakuten wesentlich besser als Rocket

- und daher habe ich mir nach dem Einstieg bei Alibaba, die inzwischem mehr als 20% gut gemacht haben, auch einige Rakutens gekauft.

Look Out Amazon, Here Comes...Rakuten?
Japanese e-commerce firm Rakuten announced on Tuesday it is acquiring Ebates for $1 billion.

The acquisition, which Rakuten hinted at last week, is part of the Japanese company’s push to grow its base beyond its domestic market and hopefully, become a global player. Having made some $1.2 billion acquisitions to date along these lines, this is Rakuten’s most ambitious move to date.

However, investors are dubious that the company can absorb yet another foreign acquisition, much less one the size of Ebates, despite Rakuten’s strong cash position.
Then there is the ever-present Amazon, which dominates the e-commerce market in the U.S. Few believe it will falter in the face of Chinese giant Alibaba, much less a Rakuten-Ebates combo.

Rakuten Goes Forth

Not surprisingly, Rakuten says it is undaunted. For starters, it has assembled a very interesting mix of acquisitions. There is messaging app Viber, which it purchased for $900 million in February, the Canadian ebook offering Kobo, Spanish video service Wuaki.tv, Viki, a digital content platform and Buy.com.
Now it has picked up Ebates.

www.forbes.com/sites/erikamorphy/2014/09/...ere-comes-rakuten/

1. The “Mobile Ecosystem” Effect: Rakuten Mobile is increasingly acting as a powerful engine for Rakuten Ichiba. Data shows that customers who switch to Rakuten Mobile increase their spending on Rakuten Ichiba by an average of 50%. The growing penetration of mobile subscribers within the ecosystem is driving marketplace revenue.

2. AI-Driven Revenue Growth: Rakuten is rolling out AI tools—such as “AI Shop Manager” and “Rakuten AI Super Agent”—to merchants across its platform. AI-powered search and personalized banner advertising on Ichiba have already delivered double-digit growth in the advertising segment (+15.6% year-over-year). By 2030, AI is expected to shorten the path to purchase and sustainably increase the average order value (AOV).

3. Merchant Fees and Advertising Revenue: In addition to transaction commissions (2–5%), Rakuten Ichiba’s revenue model relies significantly on merchant subscriptions and advertising budgets. As the group’s advertising revenue continues to grow rapidly, this highly profitable income stream is set to become increasingly important by 2030.

      2019§$1.65 (est) Strong earnings power in E-Commerce; initial investments in mobile infrastructure.
      2018§$1.56 (est) Solid margins within the traditional ecosystem (Rakuten Ichiba, credit cards). 2017 $1.31 (est.) Continuous growth of the core ecosystem in Japan.
      2016§$1.12 (est.) Stable earnings performance prior to entering the telecommunications business.
(Note: Estimates for 2019–2022 are based on historical IFRS/non-GAAP reconciliations from Macrotrends, accounting for depreciation and amortization.)

Strategic Milestones During the Reporting Period

• 2016 – 2019 (The Stable Ecosystem): Rakuten generated reliable cash flows, primarily through its marketplace (Rakuten Ichiba) and its expanding FinTech division (credit cards, online banking).
• 2020 – 2023 (The Mobile Network Challenge): The development of a fourth mobile network in Japan placed significant downward pressure on the group’s EBITDA. Losses amounting to billions overshadowed the otherwise highly profitable e-commerce and FinTech segments.
• 2024 – 2026 (The Turnaround): In 2025, the FinTech segment achieved record profits. In the first half of 2026, the company reported a record EBITDA of 115.3 billion yen for the second quarter (+11.7% year-on-year). A key factor was that the mobile division (Rakuten Mobile) posted a positive quarterly EBITDA for the first time ever during the first half of 2026.

Fiscal Year Amortization (Software, Licenses & PPA)
2025: ¥15.2 (projected on a full-year basis)
2024: ¥16.8
2023: ¥13.6
2022: ¥11.8
2021: ¥10.6
2020: ¥9.5
2019: ¥9.8
2018: ¥11.0

Note regarding 2026: In the first half of the year (H1/2026), the proportional amortization of intangible assets amounted to approximately ¥6.0 billion. Consequently, the projected full-year figure for 2026 remains stable, falling within the range of ¥12 billion to ¥13 billion.

Strategic insights into the figures:
• The 2024 peak: Amortization reached its high point in 2024 at 16.8 billion yen. This was closely linked to the completion and full-scale implementation of the IT infrastructure and core systems for the digital ecosystem (FinTech and mobile services).
• Significant stability: In stark contrast to tangible fixed assets—which surged from ¥31 billion to over ¥240 billion due to the expansion of the mobile network—software amortization remained controlled throughout the decade, generally fluctuating within a moderate range of 10 to 17 billion yen.

For the period from 2018 to 2026, the capital expenditures (CapEx) of the Rakuten Group reflect the massive financial commitment required to build a proprietary, cloud-native mobile network (Rakuten Mobile) in Japan.

Following a period of historic highs around 2022, the investment curve trended downward as part of a cost-reduction phase, before rising slightly again in 2026 to accelerate network expansion.
Overview of CapEx trends (in billions of JPY)
      Year§Total CapEx (Group / Mobile) Strategic focus & context
2018: 90–100 billion JPY Focus on e-commerce & FinTech; initial preparations for entry into the MNO (mobile network operator) market.
2019: 150 billion JPY Start of construction for the proprietary mobile network; acquisition of spectrum licenses.
2020: 320 billion JPY Commercial launch of Rakuten Mobile; rapid rollout of LTE base stations. 2021: 380 billion JPY Aggressive network expansion to reduce costly roaming charges from KDDI.
                              §
      2022§393 billion JPY Peak capital expenditure (CapEx); reaching over 98% population coverage.
      2023§307 billion JPY Beginning of strict cost discipline; optimized hardware procurement via Rakuten Symphony.
      2024§191 billion JPY Continued cost-cutting measures; significant reduction in mobile network investments.
      2025§157 billion JPY Low point of the spending phase; mobile division achieves positive EBITDA for the first time.
2026 (planned) 200–254 billion JPY Strategic rebound; increase in the mobile network budget to 200 billion JPY.

Key Phases of the Investment Strategy
• 2018–2019 (Preparation Phase): Rakuten transformed from a pure-play internet and FinTech service provider into a telecommunications group. Expenditures rose moderately as the company acquired infrastructure and spectrum licenses.
• 2020–2022 (Peak Years): Building the world’s first fully virtualized Open-RAN mobile network consumed vast amounts of capital. To minimize reliance on competitor KDDI (for roaming) as quickly as possible, Rakuten significantly accelerated its network rollout. This resulted in an all-time high for capital expenditure (CapEx) in 2022, reaching nearly 400 billion JPY.
• 2023–2025 (Cost Discipline & Consolidation): Having achieved comprehensive baseline coverage, management drastically scaled back investments. The strategy paid off: losses narrowed, and Rakuten Mobile reported positive EBITDA for the full year 2025—a first for the division.
• 2026 (Capacity Expansion & AI): For the 2026 fiscal year, Rakuten has increased its mobile-specific CapEx budget back to 200 billion JPY (with total group-wide CapEx estimated by analysts at approximately 254 billion JPY). This renewed increase is driven by accelerated subscriber growth—surpassing 10.7 million customers by mid-2026—which necessitates targeted upgrades to 5G capacity (including within Tokyo’s subway and rail networks) as well as the expansion of the 700 MHz band ("Platinum Band").

The following forecast paints a highly optimistic picture of the Open RAN market, standing in stark contrast to the more conservative expectations of Stefan Pongratz (Dell'Oro Group). While Dell'Oro has taken a more cautious stance in recent years—citing delays among major mobile network operators and slower momentum in rural areas—this forecast predicts massive growth, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 26.8% through 2033.

Key figures from the optimistic market forecast (2025–2033)
         •§Market value in 2025: $6.5 billion
         •§Expected value in 2026: $8.6 billion
         •§Projected value in 2033: $45.1 billion
         •§Dominant region: North America (41.1% revenue share in 2025)

Why market perspectives diverge so significantly
The fundamental difference between optimistic and cautious forecasts lies in the assessment of two key drivers:

        1.§The role of major contracts: Optimistic analysts often view landmark deals—such as AT&T’s Open RAN commitment to Ericsson—as the catalyst for a global chain reaction. Skeptics, by contrast, see these as isolated large-scale projects that merely replace traditional proprietary contracts, without immediately opening the market to smaller, third-party vendors.

        2.§Maturity of interoperability: Open RAN promises the ability to freely combine hardware and software from different manufacturers. Optimists believe in rapid standardization driven by the O-RAN ALLIANCE. More conservative analysts, however, emphasize the technical hurdles involved in system integration and the hidden costs for mobile network operators.

As Rakuten nears the completion of its base stations and proprietary Open RAN network in metropolitan areas by the end of 2026, the pressure for capital expenditure (CAPEX) will decrease significantly from 2027 onwards. From this point, the operating leverage of the mobile segment will take full effect: as the number of subscribers grows, the additional revenue will flow directly into margins, without the need for further multi-billion-yen investments in physical cell towers.

Phase 2: The Harvest & Growth Phase (2029 – 2030)
The Rakuten Group’s long-term corporate objective is to achieve an operating profit of 1 trillion yen. Between 2029 and 2030, the FinTech ecosystem (Rakuten Bank, Rakuten Card, and Rakuten Securities)—supported by a profitable e-commerce core and a now-stabilized mobile division—is expected to prove itself as a reliable generator of cash. During these years, investments will be directed primarily toward AI infrastructure and data-driven advertising solutions (DPI data), rather than traditional mobile network infrastructure and civil engineering.

Following the successful reorganization of its fintech business in October 2026—in which Rakuten Card and Rakuten Securities were consolidated as subsidiaries directly under Rakuten Bank—the company has defined clear medium-term growth and profit targets.

The projected earnings (ordinary profit) for the 2027–2030 period are as follows:

Profit Forecasts 2027–2030

• Fiscal Year 2027: Immediately following the restructuring, Rakuten Bank is expected to generate an ordinary profit of approximately 200 billion yen (approx. 1.25 billion USD). Analysts forecast a significant increase in revenue to around 246 billion yen for 2027, driven by deeper integration within the ecosystem.

• Fiscal Years 2028–2029: During this period, financial and marketing-related synergies will take full effect. By March 2028, additional synergy gains of approximately 25 billion yen—stemming solely from the financial consolidation—are already factored in. Earnings are expected to rise progressively throughout these years.

• Target Year 2030: By the fiscal year ending in March 2030, Rakuten Bank has set a firm goal to double its ordinary profit to over 400 billion yen (approx. 2.5 billion USD).

Key Profit Drivers of the Reorganization

• Capital Efficiency & Fund Circulation: The substantial deposits held by Rakuten Bank (across more than 18 million accounts) are being utilized directly to meet the funding requirements of the credit card business (Rakuten Card) and trading activities (Rakuten Securities).

• Synergy effects: By 2030, the group expects to realize recurring annual synergies totaling 85 billion yen, driven by reduced marketing costs and extensive cross-selling across its platforms.

• Interest rate environment: The bank also stands to benefit significantly from the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) shift toward a more restrictive interest rate policy, which structurally boosts net interest income.

In my view, the $1.25 billion profit for Rakuten Bank in 2027—mentioned in the previous post—justifies a price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of 16, especially given that Rakuten Bank’s profit is already projected to reach $2.5 billion by 2030.

Based on a P/E ratio of 16, a profit of $1.25 billion in 2027 would imply a valuation of $20 billion—of which the Rakuten Group’s 72% stake would account for $14.4 billion.

This $14.4 billion figure alone is more than 50% higher than the current total valuation of the entire Rakuten Group.

Current market data also support my thesis regarding the glaring valuation discrepancy:

Rakuten Group Market Segmentation: The entire Rakuten Group, Inc. (TSE: 4755) is currently valued at a market capitalization of approximately 8.5 to 8.8 billion USD.

Rakuten Bank Standalone Valuation: Rakuten Bank, Ltd. (TSE: 5838)—which is already publicly traded separately—currently has a market capitalization of around 15.3 billion USD (approx. 2.36 trillion JPY).

Even without accounting for projected earnings growth by 2027, the Rakuten Group’s 72% stake in Rakuten Bank (based on a 15.3 billion USD valuation) is already worth approximately 11 billion USD.

This bank stake alone is about 25% higher than the current total market value of the entire Rakuten Group (8.8 billion USD).

If Rakuten Bank achieves a profit of 1.25 billion USD in 2027 and is valued at a price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of 16 (resulting in a total valuation of 20 billion USD), the value of this 72% stake would rise to the 14.4 billion USD figure you mentioned. This would exceed the current value of the parent company by more than 60%.

Furthermore, the claim that operating losses and the mountain of debt incurred from building out Rakuten Mobile are weighing on the company—and that the market is effectively subtracting a "negative value" from the profitable FinTech arm—is far too simplistic. After all, there is also the value of the e-commerce business; for Rakuten Mobile to have a "negative value," it would first have to wipe out the value of the profitable e-commerce segment, as well as the value of holdings in companies like ASTS, Cabify, etc.—a notion that is clearly absurd.

In the banking and financial sector, balance-sheet equity ratios of 2–3% are common, whereas Rakuten Bank’s regulatory core capital ratio (capital adequacy ratio) is solid at over 11%.

Rakuten Bank maintains a solid regulatory capital adequacy ratio of over 11%. This figure is well above the capital levels typically seen in the banking and financial sector, which often hover around 2–3% of total assets.

Relevance of the metric

• Robust risk buffers: A capital adequacy ratio exceeding 11% means that the bank possesses a substantial financial cushion relative to its risk-weighted assets, enabling it to absorb potential loan defaults or market losses.

• Compliance with regulatory requirements: The institution exceeds international minimum standards (such as those under Basel III) and is considered to have a very stable foundation.

• Comparison with the traditional sector: While the unweighted capital ratio (leverage ratio) at many large, traditional banks is often quite low, Rakuten Bank’s risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio demonstrates significantly stronger capitalization in relation to the actual risks taken.

For the non-fintech segment (comprising core e-commerce operations like Rakuten Ichiba and the capital-intensive mobile network Rakuten Mobile), management primarily uses the following metric to monitor financial strength:

• Leverage ratio (Net Debt / EBITDA): The key metric for the non-fintech segment is the ratio of net financial debt to EBITDA.

• Current figure: This ratio has been successfully reduced from historical highs (over 11x in 2024) to 5.6x.

• Target: Rakuten plans to maintain this leverage for its non-fintech business at approximately 6.0x
through the end of 2026, with a firm commitment to reducing it to below 5.0x by 2027.

In this light, I consider rants about Rakuten’s high debt levels to be nothing more than foolish chatter.

The speed at which Rakuten is reducing its leverage ratio (net financial debt/EBITDA) in its non-fintech segment is the decisive factor in reassuring the capital market. Leverage fell sharply from 11.7x in December 2024 to 5.6x in March 2026, before settling at 6.2x in June 2026. This demonstrates that the fundamental turnaround in profitability—driven primarily by the reduction of losses at Rakuten Mobile—is taking hold faster than many critics anticipated.

Achieving the target of approximately 6.0x by the end of 2026, and the firm commitment to reach a level below 5.0x by 2027, depends significantly on the interplay between EBITDA growth and strict investment discipline.

Key drivers of rapid deleveraging:

• EBITDA growth in mobile services: Reaching profitability (or significantly limiting losses) at Rakuten Mobile serves as the most powerful lever for the denominator of this ratio.

• Fintech ecosystem as a cash catalyst: The strong performance of Rakuten Bank and Rakuten Card bolsters the group’s liquidity and facilitates a strategic reorganization aimed at freeing up capital.

• Plateau in 2026: The slight increase from 5.6x to 6.2x in 2026 reflects planned bursts of capital expenditure (Capex) in the mobile sector, ahead of the final push to bring the ratio below 5.0x in 2027.

AST SpaceMobile Advances Brazil Expansion with Anatel’s Approval for S-band Spectrum and Secondary Use of the 700 MHz Band, Agreements with Four Regional Operators and Planned Ground Infrastructure

Oct 26, 2026

AST SpaceMobile, Inc. (“AST SpaceMobile”) (NASDAQ: ASTS), the company building the first and only space-based cellular broadband network accessible directly by everyday smartphones, designed for both commercial and government applications, today announced significant progress toward bringing space-based cellular broadband to Brazil, Latin America’s largest economy.

www.aol.com/articles/...ances-brazil-expansion-113000000.html

The scenario I described in previous posts suggests that the capital market may be overlooking key dynamics in its assessment of Rakuten. The pace of deleveraging within the non-fintech segment is the core argument for the company’s turnaround.

Below is a concise analysis of the financial trajectory:
Leverage Ratio Trend (Net Financial Debt/EBITDA)
    Period§Leverage Ratio Status / Trend
December 2024: 11.7x Historical peak due to high levels of investment
March 2026: 5.6x Drastic decline driven by an operational turnaround
June 2026: 6.2x Temporary plateau due to planned spikes in capital expenditure (Capex)
End of 2026 (Target): ~6.0x Projected target for the full year
Target 2027: < 5.0x Firmly committed target level for the capital market

The three levers for accelerated deleveraging:
• EBITDA growth at Rakuten Mobile: Reducing losses in the mobile business has the most significant positive impact on the denominator (EBITDA) of the ratio.
• Fintech as a liquidity anchor: The strong performance of Rakuten Bank and Rakuten Card secures group-wide liquidity and frees up capital.
• Controlled investments: The slight uptick in the summer of 2026 does not represent a reversal in the trend; rather, it reflects planned bursts of capital expenditure (Capex) ahead of the final deleveraging phase in 2027.

Despite the current weakness in the share price, most analysts (14 analysts covering the stock) rate the security, on average, as "outperform" or "buy."

Price target: The median analyst price target for the next 12 months ranges from 890.40 to 911.00 JPY—representing an expected upside potential of over 40% from current levels

Anthropic and Rakuten are working closely together to integrate generative AI technologies deeply into the business processes and software development operations of the Japanese e-commerce and technology giant.

This partnership focuses primarily on two key areas:

1. AI-powered software development (Claude Code)
Rakuten is leveraging Claude Code and Claude Managed Agents to fundamentally transform its programming and development processes. The results of this collaboration demonstrate a massive increase in efficiency:
• Time-to-market reduced by 79%: The development time for new software projects has dropped from an average of 24 days to just 5 days.
• Minimization of critical errors: Through AI-driven reviews, critical programming errors have decreased by 97%, with a 99.9% accuracy rate for complex code modifications.
• Autonomous coding: In test projects—such as the refactoring of vLLM codebases spanning millions of lines—the AI ​​demonstrated the ability to restructure complex code entirely autonomously and reliably over a period of 7 hours.

2. Integration into “Rakuten AI for Business”

Rakuten Mobile has officially integrated Claude models into its “Rakuten AI for Business” platform.
• Expansion alongside OpenAI: The Claude models complement existing features (such as those from ChatGPT) to provide enterprise clients with an even more versatile range of AI options.
• Focus on data analysis: Claude is primarily used to analyze complex internal data and present trends in an accessible format. This enables employees—even those without deep expertise in data science—to make well-informed business decisions in areas such as sales, planning, and administration.
• Medical research: Subsidiaries such as Rakuten Medical are also utilizing advanced models (including Claude Fable) to analyze clinical datasets and generate new research hypotheses.

Ich habe die letzten Wochen noch einmal permanent verbilligt.

What’s Driving Rakuten Symphony’s Growth?

October 26, 2026

www.bing.com/videos/riverview/...00E&churl=&FORM=VIRE

Rakuten's 72.35% Rakuten Bank holding includes 181 million non-voting shares

Rakuten Group's 72.35% holding in Rakuten Bank includes 181,470,943 non-voting Class A shares, and an agreement with the bank requires its consent before they convert to common stock unless the group's votes stay at 50% or less.

tokyobrief.com/articles/...includes-non-voting-class-a-shares

(-) Capital Expenditures (CapEx) (¥260.0) (¥210.0) (¥185.0) (¥170.0)
(-) Debt Service & Net Financial Expenses (¥90.0) (¥80.0) (¥70.0) (¥60.0)
(-) Changes in Working Capital & Taxes (¥51.0) (¥55.0) (¥60.0) (¥65.0)
Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) ¥50.0 ¥180.0 ¥295.0 ¥420.0

Crucial Strategic Risk & Valuation Metrics

Operating Leverage Drop-Through
With the physical Open RAN cellular network infrastructure essentially finalized, the marginal cost of supporting every new mobile user approaches zero. Consequently, a larger percentage of incremental revenue from subscriptions drops completely down to the bottom line, expanding the overall operating cash flow yield.

Deleveraging and Interest Reduction
Historically, Rakuten heavily diluted equity and relied on expensive fundraising to cover cellular losses. After redeeming a large volume of U.S. dollar-denominated perpetual subordinated bonds and yen senior bonds in mid-2026 via a ¥200 billion asset sale, the net interest burden on the cash flow model is expected to slide steadily downward.

Net Operating Loss (NOL) Tax Shield
Due to steep network investment losses accumulated over the past half-decade, Rakuten carries a massive pool of Net Operating Losses. This serves as a corporate tax shield, meaning statutory cash tax outflows will remain low even as pre-tax income accelerates.

AST SpaceMobile: New Glenn Gives Hope, Manufacturing Should Follow (Rating Upgrade)

Oct 27, 2026

Summary
• AST SpaceMobile is upgraded to strong buy, with a $140/share fair value, despite recent stock weakness and execution delays.
• Manufacturing issues delayed satellite launches, but intermittent US service is still targeted for end-2026, with full coverage dependent on launch cadence.
• SpaceX’s spectrum acquisition is viewed as an overreaction; ASTS remains well-positioned with strong MNO partnerships and limited direct competition.
• ASTS maintains a solid financial position, and New Glenn launch progress could accelerate constellation deployment, supporting the long-term bullish thesis.
seekingalpha.com/article/...ring-should-follow-rating-upgrade

CY2024
            Accounts§Deposits
As of the end of December 16,483 thousand 12,071.8 billion yen
As of the end of November 16,379 thousand 11,122.7 billion yen
As of the end of October 16,288 thousand 11,220.3 billion yen
As of the end of September 16,195 thousand 11,119.0 billion yen
As of the end of August 16,108 thousand 11,075.3 billion yen
As of the end of July 16,011 thousand 11,041.0 billion yen
As of the end of June 15,870 thousand 10,943.9 billion yen
As of the end of May 15,688 thousand 10,569.9 billion yen
As of the end of April 15,358 thousand 10,609.1 billion yen
As of the end of March 15,236 thousand 10,540.2 billion yen
As of the end of February 15,087 thousand 10,331.4 billion yen
As of the end of January 14,926 thousand 10,212.2 billion yen
CY2023
            Accounts§Deposits
As of the end of December 14,758 thousand 10,319.7 billion yen
As of the end of November 14,609 thousand 9,575.1 billion yen
As of the end of October 14,486 thousand 9,433.6 billion yen
As of the end of September 14,374 thousand 9,550.0 billion yen
As of the end of August 14,251 thousand 9,492.5 billion yen
As of the end of July 14,148 thousand 9,500.0 billion yen
As of the end of June 14,047 thousand 9,488.0 billion yen
As of the end of May 13,944 thousand 9,111.4 billion yen
As of the end of April 13,842 thousand 9,053.5 billion yen
As of the end of March 13,739 thousand 9,129.8 billion yen
As of the end of February 13,623 thousand 8,882.3 billion yen
As of the end of January 13,513 thousand 8,834.7 billion yen
CY2022
            Accounts§Deposits
As of the end of December 13,389 thousand 8,846.9 billion yen
As of the end of November 13,257 thousand 8,523.2 billion yen
As of the end of October 13,139 thousand 8,340.4 billion yen
As of the end of September 13,030 thousand 8,394.7 billion yen
As of the end of August 12,896 thousand 8,217.0 billion yen
As of the end of July 12,788 thousand 8,225.6 billion yen
As of the end of June 12,682 thousand 8,134.7 billion yen
As of the end of May 12,569 thousand 7,834.8 billion yen
As of the end of April 12,446 thousand 7,842.1 billion yen
As of the end of March 12,310 thousand 7,765.3 billion yen
As of the end of February 12,147 thousand 7,618.8 billion yen
As of the end of January 12,010 thousand 7,494.2 billion yen
CY2021
            Accounts§Deposits
As of the end of December 11,820 thousand 7,512.6 billion yen
As of the end of November 11,652 thousand 6,825.6 billion yen
As of the end of October 11,515 thousand 6,648.1 billion yen
As of the end of September 11,382 thousand 6,499.3 billion yen
As of the end of August 11,237 thousand 6,377.3 billion yen
As of the end of July 11,114 thousand 6,202.0 billion yen
As of the end of June 10,985 thousand 6,071.3 billion yen
As of the end of May 10,844 thousand 5,952.3 billion yen
As of the end of April 10,679 thousand 5,848.9 billion yen
As of the end of March 10,521 thousand 5,765.5 billion yen
As of the end of February 10,295 thousand 5,458.0 billion yen
As of the end of January 10,074 thousand 5,181.4 billion yen
CY2020
            Accounts§Deposits
As of the end of December 9,905 thousand 5,111.1 billion yen
As of the end of November 9,739 thousand 4,757.0 billion yen
As of the end of October 9,580 thousand 4,656.8 billion yen
As of the end of September 9,450 thousand 4,439.5 billion yen
As of the end of August 9,323 thousand 4,395.7 billion yen
As of the end of July 9,191 thousand 4,262.2 billion yen
As of the end of June 9,057 thousand 4,012.9 billion yen
As of the end of May 8,932 thousand 3,907.7 billion yen
As of the end of April 8,789 thousand 3,760.8 billion yen
As of the end of March 8,687 thousand 3,575.6 billion yen
As of the end of February 8,522 thousand 3,574.7 billion yen
As of the end of January 8,388 thousand 3,485.6 billion yen
CY2019
            Accounts§Deposits
As of the end of December 8,254 thousand 3,494.8 billion yen
As of the end of November 8,138 thousand 3,401.8 billion yen
As of the end of October 8,014 thousand 3,149.9 billion yen
As of the end of September 7,880 thousand 3,130.5 billion yen
As of the end of August 7,780 thousand 2,996.1 billion yen
As of the end of July 7,694 thousand 3,073.4 billion yen
As of the end of June 7,606 thousand 3,027.8 billion yen
As of the end of May 7,510 thousand 2,926.8 billion yen
As of the end of April 7,414 thousand 2,962.6 billion yen
As of the end of March 7,324 thousand 2,808.2 billion yen
As of the end of February 7,221 thousand 2,754.3 billion yen
As of the end of January 7,119 thousand 2,734.4 billion yen
CY2018
            Accounts§Deposits
As of the end of December 7,025 thousand 2,664.5 billion yen
As of the end of November 6,946 thousand 2,530.9 billion yen
As of the end of October 6,864 thousand 2,463.4 billion yen
As of the end of September 6,784 thousand 2,411.6 billion yen
As of the end of August 6,716 thousand 2,378.6 billion yen
As of the end of July 6,652 thousand 2,361.2 billion yen
As of the end of June 6,593 thousand 2,284.1 billion yen
As of the end of May 6,537 thousand 2,259.6 billion yen
As of the end of April 6,474 thousand 2,163.2 billion yen
As of the end of March 6,420 thousand 2,127.7 billion yen
As of the end of February 6,350 thousand 2,222.7 billion yen
As of the end of January 6,288 thousand 2,143.3 billion yen

Financial Reports For the nine months ended September 30, 2026

Rakuten Securities announces its consolidated financial reports for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 (J-GAAP).

Results for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 (January 1, 2026 to September 30, 2026)
Consolidated Operating Results* (Millions of yen, rounded down)

Operating revenue Net operating revenue Operating income Ordinary income Net income to parent

Nine months ended September 30, 2026
165,978 148,226 55,093 55,203 28,581

Nine months ended
September 30, 2025
112,338 104,362 29,519 29,331 14,357

Japan's Rakuten Mobile to Enter iPad Market, Launching Four Series Including New mini on November 6

2026-10-29

Rakuten Mobile announced on October 29 that it will begin selling Apple's iPad lineup on November 6. The Japanese carrier will offer four series: the new iPad mini (A20 Pro), along with the iPad (A16), iPad Pro (M5), and iPad Air (M4). Sales will be handled through its official website, its Rakuten Ichiba store, and Rakuten Mobile shops, with online orders opening at 8 a.m. and physical stores accepting orders from opening time. This marks the first time the company has carried iPads, and it will pitch cellular-capable models bundled with its own rate plans.

For Rakuten Mobile, expanding its device lineup is a weapon in the competition to win mobile contracts. It has become standard strategy for mobile carriers to pitch devices together with rate plans, and adding tablets could help drive growth in data usage. On the other hand, iPads are sold through a wide network including electronics retailers and Apple's own stores, making price comparisons easy. The focus will be on how far Rakuten Mobile can differentiate itself through point rewards and bundles with its own plans.

finance.biggo.com/news/9b8db01a-7701-448a-9678-e4bfb8e243e3

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