MLP: Kann doch nicht sein, dass...

die hier z.B. sehen es:

WGZ Bank

Nach Ansicht der Analysten der WGZ Bank sind die von der MLP AG am Morgen vorgelegten Umsatzerlöse für die ersten drei Monate enttäuschend ausgefallen. So muss das Unternehmen im weiterenn Jahresverlauf auch noch unter Beweis stellen, dass die anviserten Planzahlen erreicht werden können. Die zuletzt erfolgte negative Berichterstattung weist zudem noch auf erhebliche Mängel in der Kommunikation und Transparenz des Unternehmens hin. Vor diesem Hintergrund haben die Experten nochmals ihr Anlagerating "reduzieren" für die Aktie des Finanzdienstleisters bekräftigt.(dw)


Recherchiert doch bitte mal zu den folgenden Punkten (und noch einige mehr):

- Umsatzeinbruch
- Stagnation in der Anzahl der Neuabschlüsse bei MLP-Leben seit 1999
- Fluktuation der Mitarbeiter
- Stimmung bei MLP
- Verschuldung von Mitarbeitern und Geschäftsstellenleitern
- Reaktion der Kunden
- Kapitalerhöhung (=Kapitalverschiebung vom Aktionär bzw. Mitarbeiter zum Vorstand)


Übrigens: Wie die Anzahl der Postings zu den euphorischen Stimmen im Gegensatz zu vorsichtigen Stimmen zeigt, scheinen viele aus den vergangenen 2 Jahren nichts gelernt zu haben...


Gruß, blindfish :-)

www.ftd.de/kapital
Das Kapital: MLP braucht einen neuen Prüfer

Halb voll oder halb leer? Aus den Quartalszahlen von MLP lässt sich jedenfalls nicht herauslesen, ob die angekündigten 30 Prozent Gewinnwachstum 2002 zu schaffen sind.

Zwar lag der Nettogewinn nur knapp unter dem Konsens. Aber der Umsatz blieb weit hinter den Erwartungen zurück. Magere 20,6 Prozent haben die Heidelberger geliefert, statt der erhofften 30 Prozent. MLP verdient im Frühjahr traditionell schlecht, deshalb sind die Zahlen nicht überzubewerten. Aber seit dem Kursrutsch bemüht sich die Firma um Transparenz. Der Quartalsbericht ist im Jahresvergleich von zwei auf elf Seiten gewachsen; da kann man zur Abwechslung was mit ihm anfangen.

Die zuletzt viel zitierten Rückversicherungserträge sind um gut fünf Prozent geschrumpft. Das deutet auf Schwächen im Neugeschäft hin, und zwar nicht nur bei der Absicherung von Berufsunfähigkeit. Die gute Nachricht ist, dass der Einbruch die Manipulationsvorwürfe zu entkräften scheint. Gleichzeitig werden aber jene Investoren bestätigt, die an der Nachhaltigkeit des Wachstums zweifeln. Denn MLP ist diesmal glimpflich davongekommen. Das Auslaufen großer Rückversicherungsverträge ließ die entsprechenden Kosten ähnlich stark wie die Erträge schrumpfen. Nächstes Mal könnte der Rückgang auf den Gewinn durchschlagen.

Die Expansion außerhalb des deutschen Sprachraums läuft nur schleppend, die teils noch recht jungen Auslandstöchter machten zuletzt 1,5 Mio. Euro Verlust. In Deutschland selbst scheint die Suche nach neuen Kunden für den Marktführer kostspieliger zu werden. Die Zahl der Berater und Büros stieg proportional deutlich schneller als die der Kunden.

Die Aktie bleibt teuer. Demnächst droht bekanntlich eine kräftige Verwässerung. Die Gründerfamilien wollen ihre Anteile an den vier MLP-Töchtern in 29,4 Millionen Aktien der Mutter tauschen. Die teuren Töchter haben Potenzial, aber verdienen vorläufig kaum. Der aktuelle Kurs entspricht einem recht durchgeknallten KGV von 46 nach dem Tausch. Das unterstellt noch immer gut 15 Prozent Gewinnwachstum pro Jahr bis 2010. Dabei dürften gerade die Hoffnungsträger wie Bank und Vermögensverwaltung unter dem Imageschaden der letzten Tage leiden.

Selber schuld. Zu einer Sonderprüfung kann sich MLP noch immer nicht durchringen. Dafür sollen unabhängige Experten bei der Hauptversammlung das Wesen von Rückversicherungen erklären. Das wird nicht reichen. Die Vorwürfe waren kein Sturm im Wasserglas, sondern angesichts der komplizierten Bilanzen durchaus nachvollziehbar. So teuer wie die Aktie weiter ist, gleicht die MLP-Geschichte einem fragilen Gefäß in einem Sturm. Wenn es demnächst zerbricht, ist das indes nur der Sturheit der Heidelberger zuzuschreiben. Falls sie nichts zu verbergen haben, sollten sie spätestens jetzt - nach 16 Jahren - den Prüfer wechseln.

The company has thus far enjoyed an excellent standing amongst among the financial community as one of Germany’s purest growth companies.

The shares have an outstanding long-term track record. This out performance however peaked in the fall of the year 2000. Since then the shares have declined by more than 75%.


Negatives:

Before we present the bear case on MLP AG, we fully acknowledge that MLP has to our knowledge not violated any accounting standards or “cooked” the books. However, we believe that analysts are slowly gaining a better understanding of how MLP has managed its stellar earnings performance for a long time.

Below we have outlined some of the major negatives according to our research:

Auditors:

Maybe we should start with the company’s auditors, in our view a mild negative. According to our sources MLP is the largest single audit client of Rölfs WP Partner AG, a national accounting firm also specializing in corporate finance and consulting. Rölfs WP Partner AG came to our attention originally as the auditors of one of Germany’s most controversial financial services groups, the Securenta AG (Goettinger Gruppe). Both MLP and Securenta AG feature similar corporate structures ranging from asset management, banking/financial products distribution, insurance and so forth. For a closer view, please use the search engine “google.de” and look up Securenta AG.


Accounting Review by Deloitte/Touche and KPMG:

The company has asked Deloitte & Touche and KPMG to check its accounting procedures regarding re-insurance claims. This verification assignment, however, obfuscates the business risk and valuation issues.

Let us repeat, there is no double booking, the accounts do not appear cooked. Nor does the German financial magazine claim this. However, the practice of heavy re-insurance sales seriously impacts stated earnings. These earnings may be misleading since they may not reflect a true and fair view of MLP’s financial position. More importantly, the liberal use of permissible, albeit questionable accounting procedures, is first and foremost a valuation and business problem. KPMG and Deloitte Touche have certainly not been asked to pass judgment on these two critical issues and how they relate to heavy upfront policy sales to re-insurers. Maybe they should.

We believe MLP’s earnings are significantly overstated. Critical figures are nowhere to be found (more on this later). Verifying the legality of the accounting procedures completely misses the point.


Dilution:

The company’s key operating units are significantly owned by the company’s two largest single shareholders, Dr. Termuehlen and Manfred Lautenschläger: The company plans to swap subsidiary minority stakes for 29.5 million new shares increasing the shares outstanding to 108.7 million. This 37% dilution merits a closer look.

We estimate that these minorities contribute approximately 9% of group profits while increasing shares outstanding by 37%. More tellingly perhaps, we calculate that these minorities are valued north of 150 times current year “earnings”, a rather ambitious and earnings dilutive transaction. There is already a shareholder lawsuit questioning this integration, while the Small Shareholder Federation of Germany (SDK) seems to be mounting a serious attack against the company. After all, executives and employees will own approximately 50% of the outstanding shares after this transaction.


Earnings management:

We believe the company uses liberal accounting practices, albeit apparently within the legal accounting confines, to manage its earnings. Principally we believe this occurs in the life insurance activities.

Young and fast growing insurance companies frequently have to pay their sales people high commissions on insurance or other financial product sales. In order to fund these high up-front costs, which far exceed premium income during the early stages of a life insurance policy, some policies are sold off to re-insurance companies for their net present value minus a markdown. This allows the young and fast growing insurance company to reduce its negative cash flow while growing sales. The cash value of the policies sold to the re-insurer is booked as revenue and the resulting cash can be used to pay off the selling agents. Ideally, the sell-offs to the re-insurers are managed in a way that the company is cash flow neutral and therefore does not forfeit the attractive future stream on the vast majority of its life insurance plans. Clearly, after effectively selling the policy to the re-insurer, the re-insurer is now legally entitled to receive the premium income on those policies. However, the insurance company continues to process and service the policies.

Clearly, this practice is not unusual and is indeed widely practiced. MLP, however, appears to have taken this practice to an extreme level. Last year, reinsurance proceeds came to a staggering €240 million versus consolidated premium income of €446 million.

It appears that MLP is forfeiting substantial and valuable future premium income by selling a large part of its policies (almost a form of factoring) to re-insurers. This would not be so bad if the company were not paying substantial taxes (€51.7 million in 2001) and dividends (€39.6 million in 2001) on these “net present value” transactions. If the business were ever to slow down or decline, payments to the re-insurers could quickly exceed the insurer’s premium income, therefore leading to a cash squeeze.

None of the major quoted, high growth life insurance companies appear to be employing this practice nearly as aggressively as MLP. Also note that life insurance policies are a great business as life expectancy increases. Policy holders pay in much longer than generally expected when many of these policies were originally configured. Given the positive fundamentals of this business, life insurance policies are rarely reinsured. Why would anyone give up 60% of their future, highly attractive cashflow stream for a heavily discounted net present value?

Our calculations indicate a net profit decline of over 50% for 2001 if the company did not sell off vast portions of its new life insurance policies to re-insurers.


Re-insurers be aware:

Re-insurers, especially Cologne Re (MLP’s largest re-insurer) should be alarmed if MLP provides anything less than formidably convincing answers to the questions raised by analysts and journalists. Cologne Re is, not surprisingly, represented on MLP’s supervisory board. Somewhat disconcertingly, however, Cologne Re has omitted its dividend for this year and postponed its annual investor and analyst conference from May 16th until July 11th without citing reasons. Surprisingly, Mr. Strenger a senior banker from Deutsche Bank, resigned from the supervisory board only two days before the originally scheduled analyst/investor conference. If an insurance company’s business were to contract, or in MLP’s case possibly stagnate or decline, the financial consequences for the insurer would be alarming.


Off-balance sheet liabilities nowhere to be found

The company states in its annual report that it consciously uses off balance sheet methodologies to reduce risks. This however makes little sense. As we know from Enron and many other companies, these off balance sheet liabilities are real and have to be settled one day. At least shareholders are entitled to know how big they are. Unfortunately MLP’s annual report does not spell out these total liabilities from this “factoring” practice neither in its main text nor in its footnotes.

The same is also true about agent commissions. We understand these are paid over six years. While we think it makes sense to pay sales people over longer periods of time, we would like to see the total commissions payable to sales people, at least in the footnotes. Unfortunately, we could also not identify these future liabilities anywhere in MLP’s annual report.


Alarming new business tendencies and absence of recent financials appear to confirm our bear case:

As we mentioned, the company was unwilling to provide us with the accounts of its insurance subsidiary, MLP Lebensversicherungs AG. We then went to the courthouse to obtain the relevant financial statements. Unfortunately, the 2001 annual report had not yet been filed, a fact we find surprising given that MLP’s consolidated accounts are available. However, the 2000 report disclosed some rather alarming figures relating to new business. In 1999, the company registered 69,126 new insurance policies. In 2000, new policies declined to 50,567 or a decline of 27%. In 1999, €79 million in gross premiums were sold to re-insurers versus premium income of €169 million. In 2000, policies sold to re-insurers increased by 63% while premium income increased proportionately.


Employee share purchases and share financing:

The company appears to be generating profits by selling shares to employees. Serious questions need to be answered as to how these sales are funded.

Employees own approximately 9.5% of the outstanding shares of MLP AG (directly and indirectly as 18% owners of the life insurance subsidiary). The share value of these holdings, using an undiluted market capitalization and the present share price, equals to approximately €350 million. A close review of MLP’s consolidated and subsidiary accounts suggests that at least some of the proceeds of these sales are shown as other income while the cost of the shares were booked at par value.

Equally important, some of these share purchases appear fully financed by MLP’s own bank with no interest charged. Given that the share price has declined by more than 75% from its peak valuation already, we wonder what effect these employee loans may have on its lowly capitalized bank and a group with a mere consolidated shareholder equity of €225 million.


Valuation anomalies:

We have compared MLP to the first and foremost global insurer, AIG, and the European life insurance sector to give some basic valuation comparisons:

MLP AG AIG Sector (Europe)
MCAP*: €5.38 bn €190 bn not applicable
Price/Book Value: 23.9x 3.3x 1.9x
MCAP/premium income: 12.1x 4.5x 1.42
PE 2002: 38x 19x 13.2

(Source: Bloomberg, Thomson Financial, IBES)
*For the purpose of this valuation we are using the fully diluted shares outstanding of 108.7 million, which we fully expect to be outstanding after the AGM next week.

The most striking anomaly is the Price/Book Value multiple of 23.9 times. Most analysts argue that MLP’s Return on Equity and earnings growth justify even higher valuations. Another staggering figure is the company’s return on equity (43%) and operating profit margins which are about five times the industry average, especially surprising for a relatively novice insurance company by German insurance industry standards. Cost ratios are particularly intriguing since MLP spends a fortune on its own insurance industry “university” and corporate overheads. Nor is the ratio between support and sales (1/2) staff particularly impressive.

More disturbingly perhaps, each of MLP’s 2560 financial consultants is valued at €2.1 million, a staggering figure. These so-called employees are really independent operators and are not part of the company’s regular pay roll. Moreover, MLP claims 453,000 customers, primarily in the insurance area. Assuming €446 million in premium income and dividing the latter figure by the former, results in monthly premium income per customer of a rather unimpressive 82 Euros.

What if earnings and earnings growth are not what they seem, and what if, as a consequence, restated ROE’s decline to German insurance standards of about 8%?

Holt Value Systems, the leading Cash-flow Return on Investment (CFROI) valuation tool, developed by Nobel laureate Professor Modigliani, arrives at a Best Value of €15 per MLP share using the aforementioned assumptions. Even accepting MLP’s published figures and earnings guidance produces a Best Value of only €30 Euros per MLP share according to Holt.

Quite interesting, we also find the CEO’s statement that he will grow earnings per share at least 30% per annum this decade and that he will earn €2 billion by the year 2010. How can anyone make such a far-reaching statement and retain any credibility with professional institutional investors?

Could MLP in fact be massaging rather than generating their earnings?


Conclusion:

• It appears that MLP has generated material profits from “factoring” substantial future life insurance premiums to re-insurers.
• Furthermore, material profits appear to be derived from share sales to employees as well.
• The company’s premier re-insurer appears to be in some trouble, while the auditor is barely known outside Germany meanwhile auditing a highly controversial sibling of MLP’s. That same auditor provides consulting and corporate finance services as well.
• The company’s CEO makes far-reaching earnings predictions, the likes of which we have never heard from other multi-billion-market cap insurance company CEOs.
• Valuations are stratospheric and only getting worse through a massive earnings dilutive acquisition of minority stakes benefiting the largest shareholder and employees.
• Moreover, we fear that there are significant, high-risk share loans by MLP’s bank to employees.
• Material off-balance sheet liabilities are nowhere to be found.
• There could be a substantial oversupply of shares when employees are finally able to cash in their chips.
• If this company provides anything less than 100% answers to the issues raised by analysts and the media, its reputation may be tainted and its business operations negatively impacted.
• We are completely unable to issue earnings estimates in this case since the company neither provides complete and up-to-date subsidiary accounts nor critical off balance sheet information.
• Therefore, we believe that any major dent in MLP’s growth story could quickly unravel this overvalued company.
• Shareholder societies are alarmed, lawsuits are filed, top-notch investigative journalists have picked up on the story. Much ado about nothing? We don’t think so.
• At 23.9 times shareholder equity, there is no room for error.

Capital is very risk averse. So are we.

Vote with your feet.

Our recommendation: Strong Sell





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Fragen, die das Rückversicherungsgeschäft transparenter machen sollten, wurden häufig nicht, unvollständig oder aber oberflächlich beantwortet. Letzte Zweifel konnten daher nicht beseitigt werden, zumal die Großaktionäre den von der SdK mit diesem Ziel gestellten Antrag auf eine Sonderprüfung in Bezug auf die Vorgänge abgelehnt haben.

Ebenso ist es dem Management nicht gelungen, den Vorwurf einer unanständigen Bereicherung der Großaktionäre durch die Einbringung von Tochtergesellschaften in die MLP AG zu beseitigen. Zur Erinnerung: Durch die bereits durchgeführte Kapitalerhöhung, über deren Rechtmäßigkeit noch endgültig zu entscheiden ist, wird das aktuelle Ergebnis der MLP AG pro Aktie um mehr als 30 Prozent verwässert, so dass das KGV dementsprechend steigt und der Kurs aller Voraussicht nach dementsprechend sinken wird. Durch diese Einbringung erlangen die Großaktionäre und deren Familien einen finanziellen Vorteil, der trotz des stark gesunkenen Börsenwerts der MLP immer noch 1,3 Mrd. Euro beträgt. Fragen, die sich auf die Bewertung der Töchter bezogen, wurden gleichfalls in der erwähnten Manier behandelt.

Einen Höhepunkt erreichte die Hauptversammlung dadurch, dass der Versammlungsleiter Manfred Lautenschläger, der mit der Leitung der Hauptversammlung allem Anschein nach überfordert war, Vertretern von Aktionären das Recht entzog, überhaupt weitere Fragen zu stellen. Ein für eine im DAX notierte Gesellschaft weitgehend einmaliger Vorgang. Aus dem Kreise der beteiligten Aktionärsvereinigungen werden daher aller Voraussicht nach gegen Beschlüsse der Hauptversammlung Anfechtungsklagen erhoben werden, um die dringend notwendige Transparenz für den Kapitalmarkt herzustellen. Sie fordern das Management der MLP AG auf, sich endlich ihrer Verantwortung für alle Aktionäre bewusst zu werden, und die dringend erforderliche Transparenz herzustellen. Nur so kann es gelingen, den angeschlagenen Ruf der MLP wieder herzustellen.

Die Aktie von MLP bricht derzeit erneut um 8,01 Prozent auf 42,60 Euro ein. Damit nähert man sich dem erst vor kurzem erreichten Allzeit-Tief von 40,75 Euro, welches das Ergebnis fragwürdiger Bilanzierungsmethoden ist. Ende 2000, lange bevor der Heidelberger Finanzdienstleister in den DAX aufgenommen wurde, war der MLP-Anteilsschein über 150 Euro wert...

Doch damit nicht genug.

Am 19. Oktober wurde an der Universität Mannheim der Manfred Lautenschläger-Hörsaal eingeweiht. Er trägt seinen Namen nach dem MLP-Gründer und aktuellen Aufsichtsratschef Manfred Lautenschläger.

Warum? Im Rahmen des Renovierungsprojektes „Renaissance des Barockschlosses“ hatte Lautenschläger als erster und größter Spender 750.000 DM gespendet. Auch das Unternehmen MLP reihte sich unter die Mäzene. Das Geld floss in die Renovierung eines Teils des Schlosses, in dem die Uni Mannheim untergebracht ist.

Als Kronzeuge ungeeignet

Der Lautenschläger-Hörsaal ist mit 244 Plätzen der größte der betriebswirtschaftlichen Fakultät, deren Dekan noch im vergangenen Jahr Peter Albrecht hieß.

Die Empörung Albrechts darüber, dass der Name MLP in den vergangenen Wochen Schaden erlitten hat, ist verständlich. Er leidet darunter als Aktionär wie als Mitarbeiter der Uni Mannheim.

Als Kronzeuge für ein Unternehmen, das erklärt hat, es wolle den Aktionären angesichts der erhobenen Vorwürfe künftig größtmögliche Transparenz bieten, ist Albrecht jedoch nicht geeignet.

Kleines 1x1

Zumal Albrecht, der den Kritikern vorwarf, grundlegende handwerkliche Regeln verletzt zu haben, in seiner Rede vor der Hauptversammlung auf konkrete Zahlen in der MLP-Bilanz gar nicht einging, sondern, Zitat: „das kleine Versicherungs- bzw. Rückversichernugs-1x1“ erörterte.

Dabei steht längst außer Frage, dass die Bilanzierungspraxis MLPs grundsätzlich üblich ist. Gefragt wäre jedoch eine Sonderprüfung des gesamten Zahlenwerks. Sie muss belegen, dass die Bilanz insgesamt ein „den tatsächlichen Verhältnissen entsprechendes Bild der Vermögens-, Finanz- und Ertragslage der Kapitalgesellschaft“ vermittelt.

Quelle: SZ