China hat die drohende Pleitewelle bei faulen Trusts (# 894) mit weiteren massiven Liquiditätsspritzen im Januar bislang verhindert. Dabei wurde allerdings weitaus mehr Geld in den Markt gepumpt als im gleichen Zeitraum in Japan und USA (Chart unten).
Jeder Versuch der Chinesen, die Wirtschaft und die Inflation zu bremsen, hat bislang zu weiteren Schieflagen im Schattenbanksystem geführt, denen die Regierung jeweils wohl oder übel mit neuen Geldspritzen beikommen musste. Doch die Lage spitzt sich zu.
Gesund ist das alles nicht, und vor allem nicht nachhaltig. Soros sieht in der chinesischen Schuldenblase Parallelen zur Lage in USA in 2008 erinnert - ein Vergleich, denn ich hier im Thread kürzlich ebenfalls schon einmal bemüht habe.
Quelle: Zerohedge
As Michael Pettis, Jim Chanos, Zero Hedge (numerous times), and now George Soros have explained. Simply put -
"There is an unresolved self-contradiction in China’s current policies: restarting the furnaces also reignites exponential debt growth, which cannot be sustained for much longer than a couple of years."
The "eerie resemblances" - as Soros previously noted - to the US in 2008 have profound consequences for China and the world - nowhere is that more dangerously exposed (just as in the US) than in the Chinese shadow banking sector as explained above.
Of course, the situation has become critical now as reform-imposed credit-crunch is rapidly spreading up the food chain proving that China has no painless way out and can only stoke the fire more in their already-burning house - as we noted here...
January's data was simply the final exclamation mark in a decade-long series in which China's prosperity has been simply the result of an exponentially increasing amount of loan and liquidity creation by the Chinese semi-national and government backstopped financial system.
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Here's the problem: one can't put the January lending surge aside, as it came at a time when for the second time in six months the PBOC tried to taper, only to be forced to not only bail out its money markets, but is on the verge of a bankruptcy tsunami involving its shadow banking products, the first of which it also bailed out despite repeated warnings this time it means business and would let it die.
In this context, the January number is precisely what it appears: the bank's logical response to a liquidity crunch as the Chinese regime finds itself in the same spot that the Fed has been in for the past 5 years - it must keep the monetary spice flowing, or else the party is over. And just like the Fed, and now the BOJ, so too does China not want to deal with the fall out if all it takes to created yet another quarter of increasingly subpar economic growth is another record of funny money conceived out of thin air.
The only problem is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to hide all the pieces of funny money, most of which result in bad and otherwise impaired loans, under the rug. And just to show the problem in its context, here is how China's banks created some 50% more in bank loans in January than the QE credit money created by both the Fed and the BOJ combined.
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