Der USA Bären-Thread

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Der USA Bären-Thread Anti Lemming
Anti Lemming:

Der USA Bären-Thread

431
20.02.07 18:45
#1
Dies ist ein Thread für mittelfristig orientierte Bären (keine Daytrader), die im Laufe dieses Jahres mit einem stärkeren Rückgang der US-Indizes rechnen - u. a. auf Grund folgender Fundamental-Faktoren:





1.  Zunehmende Probleme im US-Housing-Markt wegen Überkapazitäten, fallender Preise,
    rückläufiger Verkaufszahlen und fauler Hypotheken, vor allem im Subprime-Sektor

2.  Auf Grund dessen mögliche Banken-, Junkbond- und/oder Hedgefonds-Krise
    (HSBC warnte bereits)

3.  Überschuldung der USA im Inland (negative Sparquote, Haushaltsdefizit)
    und im Ausland (Handelsdefizit)

4.  Möglicher weiterer Wertverlust des Dollars zum Euro (zurzeit bereits über 1,30)

5.  Anziehende Inflation wegen Überschuldung und unkontrollierten Geldmengenwachstums

6.  Weitere Zinserhöhungen der Fed zur Inflationsbekämpfung

7.  Rückgang des US-Konsumentenvertrauens und weniger Konsum wegen der
    Liquiditätsrückgänge und drückender Housing-Schulden

8.  Rückabwicklung von Yen-Carry-Trades, weil Japan die Zinsen erhöht
    -> Ende der "globalen Hyperliquidität"

9.  Probleme im Irak, wachsende Kriegsgefahr in Iran/Nahost, Ölpreis-Anstieg

10. Terrorgefahr

11. Überbewertung der US-Aktien (das DOW-JONES KGV für 2006 liegt bei 24,25,
    das des SP-500 bei 19)

12. Aktien-Hausse der letzten vier Jahre verlief ohne nennenswerte Korrekturen
    (untypisch)





Dieser Thread soll meinen inzwischen leider teilweise gelöschten Doomsday-Bären-Thread ersetzen. Außerdem möchte ich in diesem Eingangsposting deutlich machen, dass der Fokus auf USA liegt (der DAX spielt nur am Rande eine Rolle, da die wirtschaftliche Lage hier zu Lande besser ist).

Ich wünsch mir in diesem Thread eine faire, offene und vor allem sachliche Diskussion, möglichst wenig persönliche Querelen, Beleidigungen und sinnlose Hahnenkämpfe. Wer notorisch stört und Unfrieden stiftet oder rassistische Sprüche ablässt, kommt auf die Ignore-Liste (was weitere Postings hier verhindert).
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Der USA Bären-Thread Anti Lemming
Anti Lemming:

Dieser MW-Artikel wird an Dummheit nur noch

 
26.08.16 14:25

übertroffen vom Foto, das Yellen als schießwütigen Cowboy zeigt:

www.marketwatch.com/story/...ty-the-fools-fighting-the-fed-2016-08-26

...While recent Fed speakers, including Esther George yesterday, seem itchy to get on with a rate hike, investors will have none of it.

Financial markets since February have been pricing in a dovish Fed and a stronger economy (a Goldilocks scenario). But they are getting it all wrong, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

BAML’s chief investment strategist Michael Hartnett says the risk of a hawkish Fed and a solid economy is rising, and that investors aren’t positioned for that double whammy at all.

BAML thinks we’re heading for the scenario described in the top right corner

If, or when, such a scenario plays out it would trigger “renewed animal spirits and proof of ‘quantitative success’”, according to Hartnett.

“Prepare for that by adding to US$, value, banks/cyclicals, EAFE equities and reducing duration,” he says.

----------------------

Gründe, warum ich diese "Denke" (oben blau) für deplatziert halte, habe ich bereits in # 599 gepostet (am Ende, bitte "Gesamten Beitrag anzeigen" anklicken).

Der USA Bären-Thread Anti Lemming
Anti Lemming:

Irreführende "Im-Voraus"-Tipps wie in # 641

 
26.08.16 14:39
erscheinen bei Marketwatch häufig.

So hat MW u. a. mehrfach im Vorfeld vor "schwachen Stellenzahlen" gewarnt, während die einige Stunden später veröffentlichten tatsächlichen Zahlen (die MW höchstwahrscheinlich bereits kannte) sehr gut und deutlich über Erwartung warnen.

Bei den Stellenzahlen war es ganz klar eine Bären-Falle.

Der heute Meinungsartikel (# 641), an den Börsen sei nun ein Goldilocks-Szenario (ähnlich 2004 bis 2007, mit steigenden Aktienmärkten bei anziehenden Zinsen) zu erwarten, könnte sich als Bullen-Falle erweisen. Schon der reißerische Titel sollte skeptisch machen: "Buy these stocks and pity the fools fighting the Fed."

Liest man sich hingegen die MW-Meldungen von Sommer 2009 durch, als es tatsächlich (wie wir heute rückblickend wissen) interessante Kaufkurse gab, so stößt man auf laufende Doom-Warnungen vor einer Zweiten Großen Depression.

Man sollte daher den obigen Titel besser so lesen: "Pity the fools who trust in Marketwatch preannouncements."
Der USA Bären-Thread Stöffen
Stöffen:

Nochmals James Grant

2
26.08.16 14:41
Herausgeber des Investmentbulletins "Interest Rate Observer", aktuell im Interview mit der FuW:

>>>>> Janet Yellen ist sehr abwägend und risikoscheu. Ihre Forschungen haben sich auf den Arbeitsmarkt konzentriert, weshalb sie wohl sehr mitfühlend ist. Ihre Überzeugungen decken sich mit den meisten Ökonomen, die an Interventionismus glauben: geringes Vertrauen in Märkte und wenig Respekt vor dem Preismechanismus. Obwohl das Fed zu einer normalen Geldpolitik zurückkehren will, wird es deshalb immer eine Entschuldigung haben, um mit der nächsten Zinserhöhung zu warten. Wie oft hat es schon gesagt, es werde bei der nächsten Gelegenheit, im nächsten Quartal oder im nächsten Jahr handeln? Daher glaube ich nicht, dass es zu einem weiteren Zinsschritt kommt.<<<<<

www.fuw.ch/article/das-wird-ein-sehr-boeses-ende-nehmen/
Bubbles are normal and non-bubble times are depressions!
Der USA Bären-Thread Anti Lemming
Anti Lemming:

US-BIP-Wachstum bleibt im 2. Q. mit 1,1 % schwach

 
26.08.16 14:56
Im Mittel gab es jedoch wenig Veränderungen gegenüber dem Vorquartal, so dass Yellen nicht unbedingt "dovish" darauf reagieren muss.

Ich rechne - auch aufgrund des Kontraindikator-Signals in # 641 - eher mit
überraschend "hawkischen" Hinweisen, evtl. sogar mit einem definitiven Hinweis auf einen September-Hike. Immerhin gab es letzte Woche drei hawkische Kommentare in Folge von Fed-Mitgliedern aus der zweiten Reihe. Dass die Fed in der Hinsicht ebenfalls Bären-Fallen aufstellt, glaube ich weniger.

Womöglich wird Yellen dahingehend dovishe Zugeständnisse machen, dass sie USA eher rosig darstellt, Europa/Japan hingegen eher schwach - und dass "deshalb" weiterhin "Vorsicht geboten" sei, d.h. die Datenlage beobachtet werden müsse.

www.marketwatch.com/story/second-quarter-gdp-still-weak-11-2016-08-26

The U.S. economy grew at a lackluster 1.1% pace in the second quarter, a touch slower than previously reported.

The big news: corporate profits fell again. Adjusted pretax earnings dropped 1.2% to mark the fifth decline in the past six quarters, the Commerce Department. Unless profits turn up again, the economy is unlikely to grow much faster.

By and large, the government’s second recalculation of gross domestic product in the April to June period showed few major changes [also kein dovisher "Handlungsbedarf für Yellen"]. Imports rose instead of falling, consumer spending was even better than initially reported and government outlays fell more sharply. Business investment remained weak....
Der USA Bären-Thread Anti Lemming
Anti Lemming:

# 643 zeigt auch sehr gut, wie schräg

3
26.08.16 15:02

das Bild von Marketwatch ist, Yellen als schießwütigen Cowboy hinzustellen. Eher ist Yellen eine alternde Saloon-Matrone, die barmherzig den erschöpfenden Pferden Wasser gibt.

(Verkleinert auf 62%) vergrößern
Der USA Bären-Thread 935527
Der USA Bären-Thread gogol
gogol:

aber im Colt sind nur Platzpatronen

 
26.08.16 15:06
auf unserem Planeten gibt es nur Propheten
Der USA Bären-Thread Anti Lemming
Anti Lemming:

Man darf auch nicht vergessen, dass im

 
26.08.16 15:11
"zentralplan-gesteuerten Aktien-Markt" auch Rücksetzer "amtlich" vorgegeben werden, zumal diese zurzeit saisonal gut passen würden.

In ähnlicher Weise, wie China nicht fortlaufend positive Zahlen veröffentlicht (wäre unglaubwürdig), sondern auch mal einen Absacker zulässt. Sorgfältig gewichtet, versteht sich.

Da Wall-Street mit Sicherheit im Voraus Kunde davon erlangt [Goldman schreibt vermutlich sogar an Yellens Rede-Manuskript mit ;-)] , würde sich Yellen damit auch bei den "Bänkern" keine Feinde machen.

Nur für Retail-Investoren, die stets kalt erwischt werden (oft auch "mit System", siehe # 642), gilt: "Ob long, ob short, das Geld ist fort."
Der USA Bären-Thread Keno77
Keno77:

The full text of the speech of Mr. Yellen

 
26.08.16 16:15

The Federal Reserve's Monetary Policy Toolkit: Past, Present, and Future


The Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession posed daunting new challenges for central banks around the world and spurred innovations in the design, implementation, and communication of monetary policy. With the U.S. economy now nearing the Federal Reserve's statutory goals of maximum employment and price stability, this conference provides a timely opportunity to consider how the lessons we learned are likely to influence the conduct of monetary policy in the future.

The theme of the conference, "Designing Resilient Monetary Policy Frameworks for the Future," encompasses many aspects of monetary policy, from the nitty-gritty details of implementing policy in financial markets to broader questions about how policy affects the economy. Within the operational realm, key choices include the selection of policy instruments, the specific markets in which the central bank participates, and the size and structure of the central bank's balance sheet. These topics are of great importance to the Federal Reserve. As noted in the minutes of last month's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, we are studying many issues related to policy implementation, research which ultimately will inform the FOMC's views on how to most effectively conduct monetary policy in the years ahead. I expect that the work discussed at this conference will make valuable contributions to the understanding of many of these important issues.

My focus today will be the policy tools that are needed to ensure that we have a resilient monetary policy framework. In particular, I will focus on whether our existing tools are adequate to respond to future economic downturns. As I will argue, one lesson from the crisis is that our pre-crisis toolkit was inadequate to address the range of economic circumstances that we faced. Looking ahead, we will likely need to retain many of the monetary policy tools that were developed to promote recovery from the crisis. In addition, policymakers inside and outside the Fed may wish at some point to consider additional options to secure a strong and resilient economy. But before I turn to these longer-run issues, I would like to offer a few remarks on the near-term outlook for the U.S. economy and the potential implications for monetary policy.

Current Economic Situation and Outlook
U.S. economic activity continues to expand, led by solid growth in household spending. But business investment remains soft and subdued foreign demand and the appreciation of the dollar since mid-2014 continue to restrain exports. While economic growth has not been rapid, it has been sufficient to generate further improvement in the labor market. Smoothing through the monthly ups and downs, job gains averaged 190,000 per month over the past three months. Although the unemployment rate has remained fairly steady this year, near 5 percent, broader measures of labor utilization have improved. Inflation has continued to run below the FOMC's objective of 2 percent, reflecting in part the transitory effects of earlier declines in energy and import prices.

Looking ahead, the FOMC expects moderate growth in real gross domestic product (GDP), additional strengthening in the labor market, and inflation rising to 2 percent over the next few years. Based on this economic outlook, the FOMC continues to anticipate that gradual increases in the federal funds rate will be appropriate over time to achieve and sustain employment and inflation near our statutory objectives. Indeed, in light of the continued solid performance of the labor market and our outlook for economic activity and inflation, I believe the case for an increase in the federal funds rate has strengthened in recent months. Of course, our decisions always depend on the degree to which incoming data continues to confirm the Committee's outlook.

And, as ever, the economic outlook is uncertain, and so monetary policy is not on a preset course. Our ability to predict how the federal funds rate will evolve over time is quite limited because monetary policy will need to respond to whatever disturbances may buffet the economy. In addition, the level of short-term interest rates consistent with the dual mandate varies over time in response to shifts in underlying economic conditions that are often evident only in hindsight. For these reasons, the range of reasonably likely outcomes for the federal funds rate is quite wide--a point illustrated by figure 1 in your handout. The line in the center is the median path for the federal funds rate based on the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections in June.1 The shaded region, which is based on the historical accuracy of private and government forecasters, shows a 70 percent probability that the federal funds rate will be between 0 and 3-1/4 percent at the end of next year and between 0 and 4-1/2 percent at the end of 2018.2 The reason for the wide range is that the economy is frequently buffeted by shocks and thus rarely evolves as predicted. When shocks occur and the economic outlook changes, monetary policy needs to adjust. What we do know, however, is that we want a policy toolkit that will allow us to respond to a wide range of possible conditions.

The Pre-Crisis Toolkit
Prior to the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve's monetary policy toolkit was simple but effective in the circumstances that then prevailed. Our main tool consisted of open market operations to manage the amount of reserve balances available to the banking sector.3 These operations, in turn, influenced the interest rate in the federal funds market, where banks experiencing reserve shortfalls could borrow from banks with excess reserves. Before the onset of the crisis, the volume of reserves was generally small--only about $45 billion or so.4Thus, even small open market operations could have a significant effect on the federal funds rate. Changes in the federal funds rate would then be transmitted to other short-term interest rates, affecting longer-term interest rates and overall financial conditions and hence inflation and economic activity. This simple, light-touch system allowed the Federal Reserve to operate with a relatively small balance sheet--less than $1 trillion before the crisis--the size of which was largely determined by the need to supply enough U.S. currency to meet demand.5

The global financial crisis revealed two main shortcomings of this simple toolkit. The first was an inability to control the federal funds rate once reserves were no longer relatively scarce. Starting in late 2007, faced with acute financial market distress, the Federal Reserve created programs to keep credit flowing to households and businesses.6 The loans extended under those programs helped stabilize the financial system. But the additional reserves created by these programs, if left unchecked, would have pushed down the federal funds rate, driving it well below the FOMC's target. To prevent such an outcome, the Federal Reserve took several steps to offset (or sterilize) the effect of its liquidity and credit operations on reserves.7 By the fall of 2008, however, the reserve effects of our liquidity and credit programs threatened to become too large to sterilize via asset sales and other existing tools. Without sufficient sterilization capacity, the quantity of reserves increased to a point that the Federal Reserve had difficulty maintaining effective control over the federal funds rate.

Of course, by the end of 2008, stabilizing the federal funds rate at a level materially above zero was not an immediate concern because the economy clearly needed very low short-term interest rates. Faced with a steep rise in unemployment and declining inflation, the FOMC lowered its target for the federal funds rate to near zero, a reduction of roughly 5 percentage points over the previous year and a half. Nonetheless, a variety of policy benchmarks would, at least in hindsight, have called for pushing the federal funds rate well below zero during the economic downturn.8 That doing so was impossible highlights the second serious limitation of our pre-crisis policy toolkit: its inability to generate substantially more accommodation than could be provided by a near-zero federal funds rate.

Our Expanded Toolkit
To address the challenges posed by the financial crisis and the subsequent severe recession and slow recovery, the Federal Reserve significantly expanded its monetary policy toolkit. In 2006, the Congress had approved plans to allow the Fed, beginning in 2011, to pay interest on banks' reserve balances.9 In the fall of 2008, the Congress moved up the effective date of this authority to October 2008. That authority was essential. Paying interest on reserve balances enables the Fed to break the strong link between the quantity of reserves and the level of the federal funds rate and, in turn, allows the Federal Reserve to control short-term interest rates when reserves are plentiful. In particular, once economic conditions warrant a higher level for market interest rates, the Federal Reserve could raise the interest rate paid on excess reserves--the IOER rate. A higher IOER rate encourages banks to raise the interest rates they charge, putting upward pressure on market interest rates regardless of the level of reserves in the banking sector.

While adjusting the IOER rate is an effective way to move market interest rates when reserves are plentiful, federal funds have generally traded below this rate. This relative softness of the federal funds rate reflects, in part, the fact that only depository institutions can earn the IOER rate. To put a more effective floor under short-term interest rates, the Federal Reserve created supplementary tools to be used as needed. For instance, the overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) facility is available to a variety of counterparties, including eligible money market funds, government-sponsored enterprises, broker-dealers, and depository institutions. Through it, eligible counterparties may invest funds overnight with the Federal Reserve at a rate determined by the FOMC. Similar to the payment of IOER, the ON RRP facility discourages participating institutions from lending at a rate substantially below that offered by the Fed.10

Our current toolkit proved effective last December. In an environment of superabundant reserves, the FOMC raised the effective federal funds rate--that is, the weighted average rate on federal funds transactions among participants in that market--by the desired amount, and we have since maintained the federal funds rate in its target range.

Two other major additions to the Fed's toolkit were large-scale asset purchases and increasingly explicit forward guidance.11 Both were used to provide additional monetary policy accommodation after short-term interest rates fell close to zero. Our purchases of Treasury and mortgage-related securities in the open market pushed down longer-term borrowing rates for millions of American families and businesses. Extended forward rate guidance--announcing that we intended to keep short-term interest rates lower for longer than might have otherwise been expected--also put significant downward pressure on longer-term borrowing rates, as did guidance regarding the size and scope of our asset purchases.

In light of the slowness of the economic recovery, some have questioned the effectiveness of asset purchases and extended forward rate guidance. But this criticism fails to consider the unusual headwinds the economy faced after the crisis. Those headwinds included substantial household and business deleveraging, unfavorable demand shocks from abroad, a period of contractionary fiscal policy, and unusually tight credit, especially for housing. Studies have found that our asset purchases and extended forward rate guidance put appreciable downward pressure on long-term interest rates and, as a result, helped spur growth in demand for goods and services, lower the unemployment rate, and prevent inflation from falling further below our 2 percent objective.12

Two of the Fed's most important new tools--our authority to pay interest on excess reserves and our asset purchases--interacted importantly. Without IOER authority, the Federal Reserve would have been reluctant to buy as many assets as it did because of the longer-run implications for controlling the stance of monetary policy. While we were buying assets aggressively to help bring the U.S. economy out of a severe recession, we also had to keep in mind whether and how we would be able to remove monetary policy accommodation when appropriate. That issue was particularly relevant because we fund our asset purchases through the creation of reserves, and those additional reserves would have made it ever more difficult for the pre-crisis toolkit to raise short-term interest rates when needed.

The FOMC considered removing accommodation by first reducing our asset holdings (including through asset sales) and raising the federal funds rate only after our balance sheet had contracted substantially. But we decided against this approach because our ability to predict the effects of changes in the balance sheet on the economy is less than that associated with changes in the federal funds rate. Excessive inflationary pressures could arise if assets were sold too slowly. Conversely, financial markets and the economy could potentially be destabilized if assets were sold too aggressively. Indeed, the so-called taper tantrum of 2013 illustrates the difficulty of predicting financial market reactions to announcements about the balance sheet. Given the uncertainty and potential costs associated with large-scale asset sales, the FOMC instead decided to begin removing monetary policy accommodation primarily by adjusting short-term interest rates rather than by actively managing its asset holdings.13 That strategy--raising short-term interest rates once the recovery was sufficiently advanced while maintaining a relatively large balance sheet and plentiful bank reserves--depended on our ability to pay interest on excess reserves.

Where Do We Go from Here?
What does the future hold for the Fed's toolkit? For starters, our ability to use interest on reserves is likely to play a key role for years to come. In part, this reflects the outlook for our balance sheet over the next few years. As the FOMC has noted in its recent statements, at some point after the process of raising the federal funds rate is well under way, we will cease or phase out reinvesting repayments of principal from our securities holdings. Once we stop reinvestment, it should take several years for our asset holdings--and the bank reserves used to finance them--to passively decline to a more normal level. But even after the volume of reserves falls substantially, IOER will still be important as a contingency tool, because we may need to purchase assets during future recessions to supplement conventional interest rate reductions.14 Forecasts now show the federal funds rate settling at about 3 percent in the longer run.15 In contrast, the federal funds rate averaged more than 7 percent between 1965 and 2000. Thus, we expect to have less scope for interest rate cuts than we have had historically.

In part, current expectations for a low future federal funds rate reflect the FOMC's success in stabilizing inflation at around 2 percent--a rate much lower than rates that prevailed during the 1970s and 1980s. Another key factor is the marked decline over the past decade, both here and abroad, in the long-run neutral real rate of interest--that is, the inflation-adjusted short-term interest rate consistent with keeping output at its potential on average over time.16 Several developments could have contributed to this apparent decline, including slower growth in the working-age populations of many countries, smaller productivity gains in the advanced economies, a decreased propensity to spend in the wake of the financial crises around the world since the late 1990s, and perhaps a paucity of attractive capital projects worldwide.17 Although these factors may help explain why bond yields have fallen to such low levels here and abroad, our understanding of the forces driving long-run trends in interest rates is nevertheless limited, and thus all predictions in this area are highly uncertain.18

Would an average federal funds rate of about 3 percent impair the Fed's ability to fight recessions? Based on the FOMC's behavior in past recessions, one might think that such a low interest rate could substantially impair policy effectiveness. As shown in the first column of the table in the handout, during the past nine recessions, the FOMC cut the federal funds rate by amounts ranging from about 3 percentage points to more than 10 percentage points. On average, the FOMC reduced rates by about 5-1/2 percentage points, which seems to suggest that the FOMC would face a shortfall of about 2-1/2 percentage points for dealing with an average-sized recession. But this simple comparison exaggerates the limitations on policy created by the zero lower bound. As shown in the second column, the federal funds rate at the start of the past seven recessions was appreciably above the level consistent with the economy operating at potential in the longer run. In most cases, this tighter-than-normal stance of policy before the recession appears to have reflected some combination of initially higher-than-normal labor utilization and elevated inflation pressures. As a result, a large portion of the rate cuts that subsequently occurred during these recessions represented the undoing of the earlier tight stance of monetary policy. Of course, this situation could occur again in the future. But if it did, the federal funds rate at the onset of the recession would be well above its normal level, and the FOMC would be able to cut short-term interest rates by substantially more than 3 percentage points.

A recent paper takes a different approach to assessing the FOMC's ability to respond to future recessions by using simulations of the FRB/US model.19 This analysis begins by asking how the economy would respond to a set of highly adverse shocks if policymakers followed a fairly aggressive policy rule, hypothetically assuming that they can cut the federal funds rate without limit.20 It then imposes the zero lower bound and asks whether some combination of forward guidance and asset purchases would be sufficient to generate economic conditions at least as good as those that occur under the hypothetical unconstrained policy. In general, the study concludes that, even if the average level of the federal funds rate in the future is only 3 percent, these new tools should be sufficient unless the recession were to be unusually severe and persistent.

Figure 2 in your handout illustrates this point. It shows simulated paths for interest rates, the unemployment rate, and inflation under three different monetary policy responses--the aggressive rule in the absence of the zero lower bound constraint, the constrained aggressive rule, and the constrained aggressive rule combined with $2 trillion in asset purchases and guidance that the federal funds rate will depart from the rule by staying lower for longer.21As the blue dashed line shows, the federal funds rate would fall far below zero if policy were unconstrained, thereby causing long-term interest rates to fall sharply. But despite the lower bound, asset purchases and forward guidance can push long-term interest rates even lower on average than in the unconstrained case (especially when adjusted for inflation) by reducing term premiums and increasing the downward pressure on the expected average value of future short-term interest rates. Thus, the use of such tools could result in even better outcomes for unemployment and inflation on average.

Of course, this analysis could be too optimistic. For one, the FRB/US simulations may overstate the effectiveness of forward guidance and asset purchases, particularly in an environment where long-term interest rates are also likely to be unusually low.22 In addition, policymakers could have less ability to cut short-term interest rates in the future than the simulations assume. By some calculations, the real neutral rate is currently close to zero, and it could remain at this low level if we were to continue to see slow productivity growth and high global saving.23 If so, then the average level of the nominal federal funds rate down the road might turn out to be only 2 percent, implying that asset purchases and forward guidance might have to be pushed to extremes to compensate.24 Moreover, relying too heavily on these nontraditional tools could have unintended consequences. For example, if future policymakers responded to a severe recession by announcing their intention to keep the federal funds rate near zero for a very long time after the economy had substantially recovered and followed through on that guidance, then they might inadvertently encourage excessive risk-taking and so undermine financial stability.

Finally, the simulation analysis certainly overstates the FOMC's current ability to respond to a recession, given that there is little scope to cut the federal funds rate at the moment. But that does not mean that the Federal Reserve would be unable to provide appreciable accommodation should the ongoing expansion falter in the near term. In addition to taking the federal funds rate back down to nearly zero, the FOMC could resume asset purchases and announce its intention to keep the federal funds rate at this level until conditions had improved markedly--although with long-term interest rates already quite low, the net stimulus that would result might be somewhat reduced.

Despite these caveats, I expect that forward guidance and asset purchases will remain important components of the Fed's policy toolkit. In addition, it is critical that the Federal Reserve and other supervisory agencies continue to do all they can to ensure a strong and resilient financial system. That said, these tools are not a panacea, and future policymakers could find that they are not adequate to deal with deep and prolonged economic downturns. For these reasons, policymakers and society more broadly may want to explore additional options for helping to foster a strong economy.

On the monetary policy side, future policymakers might choose to consider some additional tools that have been employed by other central banks, though adding them to our toolkit would require a very careful weighing of costs and benefits and, in some cases, could require legislation. For example, future policymakers may wish to explore the possibility of purchasing a broader range of assets. Beyond that, some observers have suggested raising the FOMC's 2 percent inflation objective or implementing policy through alternative monetary policy frameworks, such as price-level or nominal GDP targeting. I should stress, however, that the FOMC is not actively considering these additional tools and policy frameworks, although they are important subjects for research.

Beyond monetary policy, fiscal policy has traditionally played an important role in dealing with severe economic downturns. A wide range of possible fiscal policy tools and approaches could enhance the cyclical stability of the economy.25 For example, steps could be taken to increase the effectiveness of the automatic stabilizers, and some economists have proposed that greater fiscal support could be usefully provided to state and local governments during recessions. As always, it would be important to ensure that any fiscal policy changes did not compromise long-run fiscal sustainability.

Finally, and most ambitiously, as a society we should explore ways to raise productivity growth. Stronger productivity growth would tend to raise the average level of interest rates and therefore would provide the Federal Reserve with greater scope to ease monetary policy in the event of a recession. But more importantly, stronger productivity growth would enhance Americans' living standards. Though outside the narrow field of monetary policy, many possibilities in this arena are worth considering, including improving our educational system and investing more in worker training; promoting capital investment and research spending, both private and public; and looking for ways to reduce regulatory burdens while protecting important economic, financial, and social goals.

Conclusion
Although fiscal policies and structural reforms can play an important role in strengthening the U.S. economy, my primary message today is that I expect monetary policy will continue to play a vital part in promoting a stable and healthy economy. New policy tools, which helped the Federal Reserve respond to the financial crisis and Great Recession, are likely to remain useful in dealing with future downturns. Additional tools may be needed and will be the subject of research and debate. But even if average interest rates remain lower than in the past, I believe that monetary policy will, under most conditions, be able to respond effectively.

Es ist die Aufgabe des Marktes, so viele Marktteilnehmer wie möglich in die Irre zu führen.
Der USA Bären-Thread Anti Lemming
Anti Lemming:

Yellen "hawkish" - wie kontraindikativ erwartet in

 
26.08.16 16:15
# 642 + 641. Offen bleibt, ob Wall Street dem Geschehen den 2004-2007-Spin geben kann. Bislang lief der SP-500 volatil seitwärts seit der Rede (aktuell 2181).

www.marketwatch.com/story/...st-rate-hike-has-strenghtened-2016-08-26

Fed’s Yellen says case for another interest-rate hike has strengthened

Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen on Friday said the case for another interest rate hike is strengthening, sending a strong signal the U.S. central bank is preparing to increase them as soon as next month.

“In light of the continued solid performance of the labor market and our outlook for economic activity and inflation, I believe the case for an increase in the federal funds rate has strengthened in recent months,” Yellen said in a speech prepared for delivery to the Jackson Hole summit.

This is a more explicit statement about the near term path of interest rates that many Fed watchers had expected. The Fed expects “moderate growth” in gross domestic product, additional strengthening in the labor market and inflation rising to 2% over the next few years, Yellen said.

She said that any decision on interest rates “always depends on the degree to which incoming data continues to confirm the Fed policy committee’s outlook.”...

Der USA Bären-Thread Keno77
Keno77:

Die naechste Zinserhoehung ist m. E. nah

 
26.08.16 16:18
Ich wuerde diese Rede - c. p. - schon als eine Ankuendigung einer baldigen Zonserhoehung werten.
Es ist die Aufgabe des Marktes, so viele Marktteilnehmer wie möglich in die Irre zu führen.
Der USA Bären-Thread harryhammer
harryhammer:

Zinsanhebung

 
26.08.16 16:30
Sehe ich auch so.
Der USA Bären-Thread Keno77
Keno77:

Ich verstehe dann nur nicht......

 
26.08.16 16:36
... die aktuelle Reaktion der Maerkte:  schwaechelnder Dollar, steigende Aktienkurse.
Es ist die Aufgabe des Marktes, so viele Marktteilnehmer wie möglich in die Irre zu führen.
Verborgener Beitrag. Einblenden »

Der USA Bären-Thread Stöffen
Stöffen:

Allein mir fehlt der Glaube

2
26.08.16 16:48
was eine Zinserhöhung in den USA anbelangt.

Vor kurzem machte ein Artikel im San Francisco Gate auf die enorme Verschuldung der US-Unternehmen aufmerksam. Der Artikel ist hier einsehbar:

>>> The hidden risk to the economy in corporate balance sheets <<<

“There’s a misconception that companies are swimming in cash,” said Andrew Chang, a director at S&P Global Ratings. “They’re actually drowning in debt.”
www.sfgate.com/business/article/...my-in-corporate-9182807.php

Es dürfte einleuchtend sein, dass ein Schuldendienst bei ultra-niedrigen Zinsen wesentlich leichter fällt, was in dem besagten Artikel auch recht gut rüberkommt:

"And while debt is high, low interest rates have helped lighten the burden."

Und exakt in diesem Umfeld fängt dann die Fed damit an, die Zinsen zu erhöhen?

Aktuell sieht die Lage bereits so aus:

>>> The number of companies that have defaulted so far this year has already passed the total for all of last year, which itself had the most since the financial crisis. Even among companies considered high-quality, or investment grade, credit rating agencies say a record number are so stretched financially that they’re one bad quarter or so from being downgraded to “junk” status.

Companies whose debt is already deemed “junk” are in the worst shape in years. To pay back all they owe, they would have to set aside every dollar of their operating earnings over the next eight and a half years, more than twice as long as it would have taken during the 2008 crisis, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch. <<<

Es ist sicherlich unschwer auszumalen, was passieren dürfte, wenn die Zinsen anziehen: In den USA würde eine Pleitewelle durch's Land rollen.
Bubbles are normal and non-bubble times are depressions!
Der USA Bären-Thread Anti Lemming
Anti Lemming:

Komplette Yellen-Rede

 
26.08.16 16:49
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160826a.pdf

(war einschlägigen Kreisen sicherlich schon vorher bekannt)
Der USA Bären-Thread gogol
gogol:

Ich bleibe dabei

 
26.08.16 17:04
vor der US Wahl gibt es nur Worte, nicht mehr !
weil die FED zu Feige ist um in den Wahlkampf einzugreifen und was nun geschrieben wird, was Analysten aus ihren Worten ,, saugen,, ist für mich bla bla .........
auf unserem Planeten gibt es nur Propheten
Der USA Bären-Thread Saurier
Saurier:

Wollen wir die Diskussion über die FED ....

 
26.08.16 17:27
... und deren unsägliche verbale Verrenkungen nicht einfach lassen? ALLE Assetpreise sind sind hoch sind werden den Rückwärtsgang einlegen völlig unabhängig davon was die Zentralbanken machen. Das deren Maßnahmen der Realwirtschaft nichts genutzt haben ist erwiesen, sonst würden sie beendet, über den angerichteten Schaden gibt es täglich objektive! Beweise. Es ist beinahe albern anzunehmen das die Fortsetzung von etwas was nichts nützt sondern schadet die Wirkung plötzlich umkehrt und die Preisblasen stützt oder nachträglich rechtfertigt. Man sollte sich lieber versuchen herauszubekommen wann die Sause zuende ist. Da nützen fundamentale Betrachtungen anscheinend nichts, denn die waren auch vor 2 oder 3 Jahren schon so gültig wie heute und "es" stieg weiter (Außer Gold da entweicht die Luft schon und wird es weiter tun). In von Spekulanten und überproportional mit Derivaten gehandelten Märkten werden die Kehrstellen charttechnisch erkennbar sein.
Der USA Bären-Thread Shenandoah
Shenandoah:

es kommt auf den nächsten US Jobmarktbericht an

3
26.08.16 17:58
...ich denke mal, der wird dann (zufälligerweise) demnächst nicht so gut ausfallen....
Der USA Bären-Thread Saurier
Saurier:

Zur Nachprüfung empfohlen ...

3
26.08.16 17:59
... ich will das "charttechnisch erkennen" von #657 wenigstens etwas belegen. Das Abknicken von MA4 und EMA4 + Signallinienschnitt vom CCI ist bei vielen Basiswerten und vielen Zeitebenen ein brauchbares prozyklisches Signal. Der S&P könnte auf Wochenbasis das Signal auslösen, sieht aus wie kurz davor.
(Verkleinert auf 67%) vergrößern
Der USA Bären-Thread 935546
Der USA Bären-Thread Saurier
Saurier:

#659 - Gilt auch auf Monatsbasis ..

 
26.08.16 18:10
(Verkleinert auf 67%) vergrößern
Der USA Bären-Thread 935552
Der USA Bären-Thread Stöffen
Stöffen:

Besonders heiße Luft

3
26.08.16 19:17
gibt's hier:

Bei zehnjährigen US-Treasuries, die mit 1,5% rentieren, beläuft sich das KGV auf fast 70.

Zehnjährige Anleihen Grossbritanniens rentieren mit 0,5%, was einem Kurs-Gewinn-Verhältnis von 200 entspricht.

Das KGV französischer Staatsanleihen (Rendite: 0,16%) beträgt 625.

Gar nicht mehr berechenbar ist das KGV von zehnjährigen Schweizer, deutschen oder japanischen Staatsanleihen, weil sie eine negative Verfallsrendite aufweisen.
Bubbles are normal and non-bubble times are depressions!
Der USA Bären-Thread lifeguard
lifeguard:

und dünne luft..

 
26.08.16 21:47
""Es ist eine falsche, aber weit verbreitete Annahme unter Politikern, dass man schwache Institute stabilisieren muss." Vielmehr müsse es eine Marktbereinigung zu Gunsten der Starken geben dürfen. "

Wirtschaftlich ein Riese, in der Finanzbranche ein Zwerg - so sehen Analysten Deutschland und seine Banken.
Der USA Bären-Thread Saurier
Saurier:

#659 - US-Indices Signale Nachlese

 
26.08.16 22:11
Abgesehen davon das zu meinen Handelsregeln gehört an FED-Geschwafel-Tagen nicht zu handeln gab es m. E. kein Shortsignal auf Wochenbasis. Im S&P wurde die CCI-Linie nicht geschnitten, im DOW fehlt der MA4, bei den Futures sieht es noch schlechter aus. Es fehlt mir auch noch der obligatorische Bondpreisrückgang welcher vor größeren Aktienmarkt-Downern auftritt. Ich gehe davon aus das es aktienmäßig noch etwas raufgeht (Die paar % ändern nichts an der Gesamtsituation), Bonds tendenziell runter (Bund Futures vielleicht von der EZB gebremst) und Rohstoffe inklusive Edelmetalle fett runter.
Der USA Bären-Thread lifeguard
lifeguard:

cheese!

 
26.08.16 22:45
"Mehr als eine Milliarde Pfund Käse stapeln sich in amerikanischen Kühlhäusern. Doch wer soll das alles essen? Um dem Käseberg Herr zu werden, verabschieden sich selbst die USA von der geliebten Marktwirtschaft. "
Der USA Bären-Thread Saurier

Bondpreisrückgang vor Aktienpreisrückgang

 
Wie in 663 erwähnt hier noch mal als Bild. Ob das für US auch gilt weiß ich nicht.
(Verkleinert auf 78%) vergrößern
Der USA Bären-Thread 935624

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