COOP News (ehemals: Wamu /WMIH)

und frustriert bin ich nicht. im gegenteil immer wenn der kurs runter geht, hol ich nochmal tief luft...ich geh doch nicht jetzt, wo ich mich für wmih entschieden habe....tztztz...
allen gute nacht
oli

in #16963 fragt MeinMotto: hat jemand etwas von ID_Payback gehört?

darauf antwortet DepotOLI1 sofort (#16964): „der meldet sich erst wieder, wenn es einen feiertag gibt, an welchem ein settlement verkündet werden koennte.
oli“

um dann in einer längeren Stellungnahme zu behaupten ich hätte ein Settlement vorher gesagt.

Ich zitiere aus einem US-Posting  (gemeint ist der kommende St. Partrick’s Day):
„Keep what under the radar? I thought Holiday weekends were just for settlements.“

…also:

1.  habe ich das nicht getan, auch wenn es manche so auslegen, und

2.  habe ich nur zu erklären versucht, welche Bedeutung  für die US-Bürger das Thanksgiving-Wochenende hat. Das kann jeder unter
http://www.ariva.de/forum/wen-es-interessiert-moege-es-lesen-402582
nachlesen.

3.  muss ich mich von  DerBärliner  (#17012), uninteressant (#17050) und Gumoe (#17049) nicht darüber belehren lassen, wie ich DepotOLI1 auf seine unaufgeforderte Wortmeldung antworte!

@DerBärliner:  die Diskussion darüber erübrigt sich schon seit längerer Zeit, da ich hier nicht mehr schreibe. Ihr seid also vollkommen unter Euch und ich lese das natürlich auch mit einer gewissen Genugtuung.

….und nun vergesst mich wieder!

GN8  ID_pb

ich darf also nur noch schreiben wenn ich dazu aufgefordert werde ?. Das wusste ich nicht.
Durfte ich jetzt eigentlich antworten ? Man weiß es nicht...
oli

sorry, mein schwarzer war aus dem affekt, wie ein reflex wenn ich von päpsten, kirchen oder trollen lese....
Also nix für ungut!

Du kannst schreiben WAS und WANN Du willst!
...solang Du nicht über andere Witze machst oder meinst sie lächerlich zu machen!
...das gilt auch für Deine Mitstreiter!

...und nun habe ich mich entgültig abgemeldet und den Favoriten gelöscht!
...mir kommt das Kotzen, wenn ich Euch Pharisäern vielleicht noch Rechenschaft schulde!

11126   Stipulation Between Denise Cassese, George Rush, Richard Schroer and Washington Mutual, Inc., WMI Investment Corp., and WMI Liquidating Trust

www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229130313000000000004.pdf

...bravo! *ironie off*
/paketix

wäre echt verlockend...

wie jemand, dervor Monaten geschrieben hat:

" ...also nur noch einmal ganz tief durchatmen! .... Viele werden es möglicherweise erst im neuen Jahr erfahren, manche - soferne sie in den amerikanischen (seriösen) Threads lesen - wissen es bereits......Das Eis ist gebrochen; ein langes Warten nimmt sein Ende!!!..... Klar ist zunächst mal DASS! Offen ist noch WIEVIEL!...."

und Leuten mit anderer Meinung geraten hat:

"sich zunächst mal so flach unter dem Teppich zu machen, dass man die kleinste Bewegung nicht mehr wahrnehmen kann."

jetzt vollkommen die Fassung verliert, wenn es Leute wagen, an diese Postings zu erinnern und sich zu fragen, wo denn die gross angekündigte Einigung geblieben ist.

das Leute wie du noch den Finger in die Wunde legen.
Fällt euch sonst nichts ein.

Black Horse Capital LP, Black Horse Capital Master Fund Ltd, Greywolf Capital Partners II LP, Greywolf Capital Overseas Master Fund, Greywolf Opportunities Fund II LP, Greywolf Structured Products Master Fund, Ltd., Greywolf Capital Overseas Fund II, Pines Edge Value Investors Ltd., Pine River Convertibles Master Fund Ltd. (f/k/a Nisswa Convertibles Master Fund Ltd.), Pine River Fixed Income Master Fund Ltd. (f/k/a Nisswa Fixed Income Master Fund Ltd.), Pine River Master Fund Ltd. (f/k/a Nisswa Master Fund Ltd.), LMA SPC for and on behalf of the MAP 89 Segregated Portfolio, Visium Global Master Fund, Ltd., Visium Catalyst Credit Master Fund, Ltd., VR Global Partners, L.P., Scoggin Worldwide Fund Ltd., Scoggin Capital Management II LLC, Scoggin International Fund Ltd, Karnak Partners, L.P., Ermitage Selz Fund, Ltd., GAM Selection Hedge Investments, Inc., and Varana Onshore, LP.

Das Litigation Sub Committee ist fuer Klagen gegen dritte zustaendig.

2 Mitglieder wurden vom EC bestimmt (waren auch EC Mitglieder…Willingham und Honorable Judge David Southard)

2 vom Creditors Committee (Kirchner und Klein)  

1 von den TPSler (wird dem EC zugerechnet , aber fragt mal Faster was er von McKinnis haelt)

Initial Trust Advisory Board Members

CC Members:
1. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
2. Arnold Kastenbaum
3. Marc S. Kirschner

EC Members:
4. Joel Klein
5. Michael Willingham
6. Hon. Douglas Southard
7. Joe McInnis (TPS Member)
CC-EC Member:
8. Matthew Cantor

Holdco Member:
9. Misha Zaitzeff

Tricadia Member:
10. Mayur Lakhani

Initial Litigation Subcommittee Members

1. Hon. Douglas Southard
2. Michael Willingham
3. Marc S. Kirschner
4. Joel Klein
5. Joe McInnis

Dem Trust stehen 60 Millionen zur Abwicklung und Klagen zur Verfuegung.

40 Millionen fuer die Liquidation und Abwicklung von alten BK Claims. Diese Summe kann aber erhoeht werden.  (Wie es aussieht, wird das wohl auch geschehen. Dafuer muss aber die Genehmigung des TABS eingeholt werden. Das TAB stimmt ab nach Supermajority ( 2/3 Mehrheit) Das bedeutet   7 von 9.
9  deshalb, weil das 10 Mitglied, von HoldCo, kein Stimmrrecht hat. Sollte sich das TAB auf 5 Mitglieder verkleinern, was moeglich ist, gilt 3 aus 5.  
Die Abwicklung wird groesstenteils von WGM und Alvarez und Marshall durchgefuehrt, und die langen bekanntlich gerne und reichlich in den Estate Topf.

Dem Litigation Sub Committee stehen 20 Millionen zur Verfuegung.  Die sind  in 2 Tranchen aufgeteilt.Ueber die ersten 10 Millionen kann das Lit Sub Com. Frei verfuegen, bei der Verwendung der zweiten Tranche muss das TAB sein O.K geben. Auch das Litigation Sub Committee kann nach einer Erhoeung des Etats fragen. Auch hier muesste das TAB zustimmen , also 7 von 9 Abstimmung.  
Das Litigation Sub Committe entscheidet auch nach Supermajority ( 2/3 Mehrheit), also 3 von 5.

Interessant finde Ich, das auf die Moeglichkeit verwiesen wird, das das TAB wie das Sub Committee , um das Budget zu entlasten, auch nach anderen  Quellen und Moeglichkeiten  der Finanzierung suchen sollen . (  Ist Susmanns Vertrag, den keiner kennt, so was aehnliches wie ne andere Quelle oder Moeglichkeit. Fuer mich immer wahrscheinlicher)

Beim TAB wie beim Litigation Committee.

Bei Streitigkeiten , Unklarheiten untereinander , kann das Gericht angerufen werden , um nach Rat oder Weisungen zu bitten. Hierfuer muesste ein Antrag beim Gericht eingereicht werden. Dafuer kann auch ein Anwalt zu Hilfe gezogen werden.

Bei Abstimmungen kann sich ein Mitglied selbst als Befangen erklaeren (conflict interest) , und an der Abstimmung nicht teilnehmen.  Wenn er sich nicht selbst als Befangen erklaert,  andere  Mitglieder aber der Meinung sind, wird unter den verbleibenden Mitgliedern abgestimmt, ob der eventuell Befangene von dieser Abstimmung ausgeschlossen wird.

Ein Mitglied kann auch komplett aus dem Board verbannt werden, falls er betruegerisch oder bewusst irrefuehrend handelt.  Wieder nach Abstimmung

Auch der Liquidation Trustee (Kostouras0 kann nach 2/3 Mehrheit Abstimmung des TABS,s abgesetzt werden.

Der Resident Trustee soll wohl auch ein Auge auf die Sache haben , und wird gestellt von CSC Trust Company of Delaware


noch ein paar Adressen


Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153
Attention: Brian S. Rosen, Esq.
Facsimile: (212) 310-8007
Email: brian.rosen@weil.com
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
MAC: N9311-110
625 Marquette Avenue, 11th Floor
Minneapolis, MN 55479
Attention: Thomas Korsman
Facsimile: (612) 667-9825
Email: Thomas.m.korsman@wellsfargo.com

Arnold Kastenbaum
655 Barrymore Lane
Mamaroneck, NY 10543
Email: akastenbaum@yahoo.com

Joel Klein
PPM America, Inc.
225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 1200
Chicago, IL 60606
Facsimile: (312) 634-0050Email: Joel.klein@ppmamerica.com

Michael Willingham
Email: wservices@earthlink.net
Matthew Cantor
235 West 71st Street, 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10023
Email: mcantor4@me.com

Marc S. Kirschner
Kirschner Consulting Company
18 East 94th Street, Suite 1A
New York, NY 10128
Facsimile: (212) 722-0349
Email: mskirschner@kirschnerconsulting.com

Hon. Douglas Southard
Email: dksouthard@sbcglobal.net

Joe McInnis
GREYWOLF CAPITAL
4 Manhattanville Road, Suite 201
Purchase, New York 10577
Facsimile: 914-251-8244
Email: joe.mcinnis@greywolfcapital.com
Misha Zaitzeff
HoldCo Advisors, LP
32 Broadway, Suite 1112
New York, NY 10004
Email: misha@holdcoadvisors.com

Mayur Lakhani
Tricadia Capital
780 Third Ave., 29th floor
New York, NY 10017
Email: mlakhani@tricadiacapital.com
CSC TRUST COMPANY OF
DELAWARE, not in its individual capacity,
but solely as Resident Trustee
By: /s/ Alan R. Halpern
Name: Alan R. Halpern
Title: Vice President
mm03-1212_8ke101.htm Page 48 of 57


CSC Trust Company of Delaware
2711 Centerville Road, Suite 400
Wilmington, DE 19808
Attention: Trust Administration
Fax: 302-636-8666
Email: csctrust@cscinfo.com
with a copy to:


Wie es ausschaut sind da ein paar Huerden eingebaut, was Interessen Konflikte betrifft. Ob das aussreicht um Fasters Bedenken auszuraeumen ? Hmm…na ja, kann schon verstehen das sich Faster da so seine Gedanken macht.

Alles ohne Gewaehr, muesste aber grob hinkommen. Falls noetig, Korrekturen erwuenscht


Ansonsten bekomme Ich immer mehr das Gefuehl , das einige hier ne Mimose im Stammbaum haben. Tssss

Lg

HEUTE SCHNIBLO-TAG.
14.März

gruss

Danke für EUERE Bemühungen incl. INFO`s

MfG.L:)

p.s.  ...ist schon witzig zu beobachten, wie sich User nach so langer Zeit immer noch aus der Reserve locken zu lassen ;)
Konzentriert EUCH vieleicht mal auf das wesentliche anstatt EUCH gegenseitig anzumachen!

TROLL`s gibt es doch hier nun wahrlich genug!

gibt es wieder einen interessanten Link!

Allerdings von mir eingesetzt. Gruß an die graumacher!

der charly

Vollkommen recht. Um so wichtiger ist es, dass hin und wieder so ein "Wachrüttler"
-wie du es bist- hier mal postet.

By Josh Rosner - March 13th, 2013, 8:00AM

www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/03/jpm-wamu/


Washington Mutual: a Story of Opacity and Impunity

Perhaps no other example illustrates JPMorgan’s scorched-earth legal approach better than the disputes over the estate of Washington Mutual (WaMu), which the firm acquired from the FDIC in September 2008. JPMorgan portrays its purchase of WaMu during the depths of the financial crisis as a patriotic act performed by a well-run bank. Its public statements and regulatory filings tell a different tale.

In August 2009, Deutsche Bank, as trustee for about $92 billion of notional WaMu securitizations, filed suit against the FDIC demanding the repurchase of billions of dollars of mortgages that they argued violated representations and warranties in the pooling agreement. The FDIC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that JPMorgan had assumed the liabilities in the WaMu purchase. Consequently, Deutsche Bank amended its complaint to add JPMorgan[i]. JPMorgan is protected by a broad gag order that has sealed away, from public view, any internal communications on Washington Mutual. We have had to rely on public information and information provided as a result of freedom of information requests.

After several years of agreeing with the FDIC’s position and acknowledging that it acquired the mortgage liabilities of Washington Mutual[ii], JPMorgan appears to have changed its mind when it realized the enormity the industry’s mortgage putback risks[iii]. JPMorgan is now boldly demanding indemnification from the FDIC Insurance Fund.

JPMorgan, which in the aftermath of the financial crisis, accepted more than $391 billion of government emergency program support[iv], is seeking to shift losses on over $190 billion of Washington Mutual-related mortgage securities onto the FDIC – claiming that for a mere $1.9 billion it bought nearly all of the positive value of WaMu and was able to stick the public with essentially all of the ongoing losses. If the firm fails in these efforts it could be stuck with settlement costs on claims of between $3 and $5 billion. Unfortunately, a continued lack of clarity about the firm’s reserves coupled with recent plaintiff-friendly court rulings that may increase putback settlement costs make it difficult to assess whether JPMorgan is adequately reserved.

Since it began to deny its obligation, JPMorgan has repeatedly tried getting the FDIC to agree that it has approval to settle and then send the FDIC the bill.  The arrogance, impunity and extent to which lengths JPM’s lawyers go in attempts to saddle the FDIC with its own losses are amazing. In a strongly worded letter of response to JPM’s repeated attempts to fool the FDIC into stating or implying it accepted consent, the FDIC strongly states that it has not consented to any actions or inactions by JPM and that “insomuch as these assertions may have become boilerplate language in correspondence from this firm, please consider this letter to be the FDIC’s standing rebuttal” [v]. Still, recent press reports suggest that JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank are engaged in settlement talks and that JPM’s strategy may be to settle with the Deutsche Bank (Trustee) investors, indemnify those investors and have them file a claim against the FDIC for indemnification.

Even beyond losses on the $92 billion of original principal balance for which Deutsche Bank is trustee, there are losses associated with another $100 billion of WaMu mortgage securities over which either JPMorgan or the FDIC will ultimately be required to settle.

The Acquisition

In early 2008, JPMorgan began to do due diligence on Washington Mutual with an eye to acquiring the troubled but still solvent firm, but because of the potential for big losses at WaMu, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon chose not to move forward with an acquisition[vi]. Three months later, WaMu was bankrupt. As the FDIC began to plan for the closing and sale of WaMu, it offered bidders five possible transaction structures[vii], each with different levels of acquired liabilities.

On September 23 and 24, 2008, the FDIC negotiated over JPMorgan’s bid, which was for the acquisition of all of WaMu’s assets and liabilities except for the preferred stock, subordinated debt and senior debt of the bank[viii]. The deal structure that JPMorgan chose also required that the winning bid come at the least cost to the FDIC.

During the talks, JPMorgan sent an e-mail[ix] to the FDIC expressing concerns and seeking clarity about the “liabilities assumed by the assuming bank”[x] and expressed concern over the broadness of the provision[xi]. In a Q&A document released during the initial invitation to bid process, the FDIC made it clear that the obligations associated with mortgage securitizations would pass to the buyer[xii], their position did not change and JPMorgan did not receive the desired changes to the standard indemnification to protect itself against the liabilities associated with Washington Mutual’s mortgage securitizations. It couldn’t have been clearer that JPMorgan understood the liabilities it was accepting.

The FDIC did make limited changes to the standard bidding form, indemnifying the bank for up to $500 million for damages brought by Washington Mutual or third parties.[xiii] The agency also agreed to provide JPMorgan indemnification against mortgage-borrower (but not investor) claims[xiv], a frequent cause for concern in the fall of 2008.

On September 25, 2008, the FDIC announced that JPMorgan acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual at no cost to the FDIC’s insurance fund [xv].  In an SEC filing that evening, JPMorgan said it “acquired all deposits, assets and certain liabilities of Washington Mutual’s banking operations from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), effective immediately. Excluded from the transaction are the senior unsecured debt, subordinated debt, and preferred stock of Washington Mutual’s banks. JPMorgan Chase will not be acquiring any assets or liabilities of the banks’ parent holding company (WM) or the holding company’s non-bank subsidiaries. As part of this transaction, JPMorgan Chase will make a payment of approximately $1.9 billion to the FDIC”[xvi].

Clearly, the FDIC and JPMorgan both intended and believed that all liabilities not specifically excluded were transferred. Had the FDIC believed otherwise it would have considered its potential exposures to retained liabilities in its announcement and, if there were other bidders, in its decision to award Washington Mutual to JPMorgan. After all, the FDIC has a statutory obligation to approve the least costly resolution.

Acknowledgment of WaMu Liabilities

When JPMorgan announced its earnings for the fourth quarter of 2008, Dimon proudly claimed that JPMorgan was “doing its part” to help stabilize the financial markets and hasten recovery. We assumed risk and expended resources to assimilate Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual.”[xvii] The comments make for a great patriotic sound-bite but deserve further scrutiny in light of the bank’s subsequent claim that it never acquired WaMu’s mortgage liabilities. After all, since the bank bought WaMu’s assets at book value and wrote the loan book down by $31 billion, it is hard to understand what risk it took if it didn’t acquire the liabilities relating to Washington Mutual’s securitization activities.

In a Jan. 9, 2009, SEC filing, Freddie Mac disclosed that “JPMorgan Chase will assume Washington Mutual’s recourse obligations to repurchase any of such mortgages that were sold to Freddie Mac with recourse. With respect to mortgages that Washington Mutual sold to Freddie Mac without recourse, JPMorgan Chase has agreed to make a one-time payment to Freddie Mac with respect to obligations of Washington Mutual to repurchase any of such mortgages that are inconsistent with certain representations and warranties made at the time of sale[xviii].” This filing, like several filings made by JPMorgan, demonstrate that the firm had recognized its obligations to repurchase WaMu-related mortgages sold to the GSEs[xix]. If, as JPMorgan now contends, these repurchase obligations were the rightful liabilities of the FDIC, then one must ask how the firm could legally have settled them on behalf of the FDIC. In fact, section 12.2(f) of the Purchase Agreement specifically protects the FDIC from paying for liabilities it did not assume by requiring that it consent to any settlement that would result in an indemnification obligation.

Further supporting the argument that JPMorgan acquired the WaMu liabilities are SEC filings and presentations to shareholders by JPMorgan. In connection with 2010 earnings, the bank warned that “we and certain of our subsidiaries, as well as entities acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions, have made such representations and warranties in connection with the sale and securitization of loans (whether with or without recourse… Our obligations with respect to these representations and warranties are generally outstanding for the life of the loan, and relate to, among other things, compliance with laws and regulations; underwriting standards; the accuracy of information in the loan documents and loan file; and the characteristics and enforceability of the loan…. if a loan that does not comply with such representations and warranties is sold, we may be obligated to repurchase the loan and bear any associated loss directly, or we may be obligated to indemnify the purchaser against any such loss. Accordingly, such repurchase and/or indemnity obligations …acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions…could materially and adversely impact our results of operations and financial condition.” The essence was repeated in other filings as well[xx].

In November 2011, Judge Denise Cote[xxi]of the Southern District of New York  found that “JPMorgan does not directly contest the Amended Complaint’s detailed allegations that it has assumed WaMu Bank’s liabilities with respect to the securitizations at issue here.  Indeed, as the plaintiff points out, JPMorgan itself has publicly referenced its liability for ‘repurchase and/or indemnity obligations arising in connection with sale and securitization of loans’ by, among others, WaMu.  The FDIC has likewise opined that ‘the liabilities and obligations’ arising from WaMu’s sale of mortgage-backed securities ‘were assumed in their entirety by JPMC [(JPMorgan Chase)] under the P&A Agreement, thereby extinguishing any potential liability by FDIC Receiver.’ Thus, for the purposes of this motion, there is no dispute that JPMorgan is a proper defendant with respect to FHFA’s WaMu- related claims.” Did this finding cause JPMorgan to increase its litigation reserves? We do not know because their disclosures are inadequate.

Lack of Clarity on Reserving Policy

On the first quarter of 2010 earnings call, JPMorgan’s Michael Cavanagh noted that the bank had put up representation and warranty reserves for WaMu exposures related to both GSEs but acknowledged that the reserves were difficult to decipher, were in several pockets and he then informed investors that JPM would not give any more meaningful guidance or detail[xxii]. In a November 2010 presentation at a Bancanalysts Association of Boston Conference, a JPMorgan senior executive provided details of the Company’s “Private Label  Repurchase Risk Exposure” broken out by Chase, Bear and WaMu and by product type. Nowhere in this presentation did the firm disavow the liabilities or suggest that they were the liabilities of the FDIC[xxiii].

In January 2010, recognizing that JPMorgan’s disclosures were inadequate for investors’ ability to analyze its risks, the SEC sent a letter to Michael Cavanagh directing the bank to provide greater detail[xxiv] of their repurchase obligations. Again, rather than providing investors with the class-leading transparency JPMorgan often claims, the bank responded to the letter, in redacted form[xxv], requesting confidential treatment of certain portions of their response.

While, in the past the bank repeatedly acknowledged its acquisition of WaMu repurchase liabilities and initially included those in discussions of repurchase reserves, it appears those policies have not been consistent over time. Where earlier WaMu-related repurchase liabilities appear to have resulted in increased repurchase reserves it seems that once JPMorgan decided to assert that the WaMu repurchase liabilities as the FDIC’s obligation, the comparability of their already weak disclosures became even less analyzable.

New Mortgage Suits

In the past few months, a new round of mortgage-related suits were filed against the firm. investors, regulators, prosecutors, and insurers have filed a new round of claims against the bank related to billions of dollars’ worth of securities backed by residential mortgages.

On February 5, 2013, in the matter of Assured Guaranty v. Flagstar[xxvi], U.S. Southern District Court Judge Jed Rakoff appears to have created precedent by handing down a decision to allow staistical analysis provided by Assured’s independent auditor, rather than loan-by-loan analysis, to be a basis for findings of breaches to PSAs and Reps and Warranties in pooled mortgage loans. The auditor found that 606 of the sample of 800 loans across the trusts were found to have material breaches. While the ruling will likely be appealed, the reality is that it significantly heightens the risks to JPM and other defendants in putback litigations. It may also lead JPM to determine that they need to increase reserves.

In November 2012, CIFG Assurance sued JPM over more than $100 million of losses it sustained in CDOs. U.S. Bank, as Trustee, also filed suit[xxvii], claiming breaches of certain terms and conditions of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements (defining the parties’ obligations to each other) of an RMBS with $698 million of original principal balances suffered losses of $358 million. In a sample of the loans that defaulted, the plaintiffs claim that 74% had one or more breaches. Mortgage insurer Syncora Guarantee also filed suit[xxviii] claiming that, as a result of misrepresentations on almost 85% of the loans involved in the deal, Syncora has had to pay more than $94 million in claims to investors on losses of more than $111 million. The National Credit Union Administration Board filed suit against JPM on WaMu-related losses on almost 50 RMBS deals. In the filing, the NCUA demonstrates the massive difference between the expected losses and the actual losses in these deals[xxix]. This follows an NCUA suit filed against JPM relating to $3.6 billion of “faulty” securities related to JPM’s Bear Stearns acquisition.

In October 2012, the New York Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, filed suit against JPM related to alleged misrepresentations in RMBS securities offerings, which are claimed to have resulted in $22.5 billion losses of the $87 billion in original principal value[xxx].

On February 4, 2013, related to a suit filed against JPMorgan by Dexia, Dexia released hundred of e-mails and employee interview transcripts suggesting that JPM received independent underwriter reports showing that between 8% and 20% of the loans sampled for inclusion in pools did not meet underwriting guidelines. Rather than disclose these defects to investors, JPM overrode the independent determinations to create a “final, sanitized version.”[xxxi]

und was soll uns der text jetzt sagen? quellen posten ohne kommentare finde ich irgendwie komisch! da hätte der link auch gereicht!

nicht alles ist richtig oder falsch.

bist Du die Mutter der Nation..?
häng Dich doch nicht überall rein, er hat wolle angeschrieben..

Der gleiche Artikel wurde bereits gestern von Pjöngjang eingestellt: www.ariva.de/forum/WMI-Holdings-Corp-News-461347

soll ich mich besser benehmen als du

manchen leute hier muss echt langweilig sein