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kroetendetekt.:

@Homer J: Zeitfrage

6
18.12.11 23:59
Sehr schön geschrieben, und dazu kommt noch, dass die Mediation ausgeweitet wurde. Als das bekannt gemacht wurde, war schon 15.12.2011, 1 Woche vor dem nächsten Hearing.  Wenn die DIME-Partei nicht nur irgendwas Vorgekautes abnicken und unterschreiben soll, dann haben die noch richtig was zu tun...

Grüße

kroetendetektor
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Schnurrstrac.:

@Hotstockrunner

3
19.12.11 00:00
Ich denke nicht, daß massenhaft etwas auftauchen wird.
Aber ich glaube auch nicht , daß eine Firma dieser Grössenordnung eine so
schlamoige Holding hat , das genau 0,00000 $ Dollar da sind und nur diese 4 mrd vom
WMB-Konto bei JPM, und die Tax-Refounds . Das wäre ja ein Zufall.
Antworten
Hotstockrunn.:

danke für die antwort

4
19.12.11 00:41
schnurrstracks
aber ich habe mich sicher falsch ausgedrückt
ich kopiere polys text noch mal hier ein

In der NewCo tauchen dann aus.

...heiterem HimmelUnmegen von Assets auf...das Spiel kennen wir aus anderen Fällen!!!

Darum darf die Sache so nicht ausgehen...B A S T A  !!!!!!!!!!

zitat ende

nochmal
egal was in anderen fällen passiert ist
wäre ich froh wenn es so endet das bei gründung der newco assets auftauchen

ich hab meine gegenfrage sicher zu einfach struktuiert
gute nacht
„Nur weil du paranoid bist, heißt das nicht, dass sie nicht hinter dir her sind.“
Terry Pratchett
Antworten
klarakaro:

with catz!

 
19.12.11 01:00
WithCatz Member Level  
          §
Share
          §Sunday, December 18, 2011 3:59:22 PM
Re: None
          §Post # of 352320
A 'meow' of sorts.. nothing surprising, or should be.


I wish I had some cohesive or at least solid and congealed thoughts to share, but honestly I don't. I had hoped that the EC’s “letter” to shareholders would have hit by now, but the latest information I/we have is that it may be Monday. But honestly, I don’t expect that “letter” to clear up things complete.

In fact, I expect it to add to the questions – answer some, bring up new ones.

There are still wheels-in-motion here. While certain things with PORv7 seem “known”, there are significant unknowns that affect anybody’s investments, including mine, and guesses are the only thing to go on. I can argue both sides of various equations and assumptions.

If you’re expecting me to project WMMRC/NewCo value, PPS prices, or otherwise – then (a) you don’t know me and my postings very well, and (b) you aren’t realizing that this situation has way too many moving parts to give anything like that.

That said, my thoughts – hopefully constructive, are as follows:


The latest PORv7 seems to:

1) Provide a conversion ratio for Preferreds and Commons into NewCo equity. Right off the top may be 5% of NewCo going to SNHs who decide to take common stock instead of being cashed out – I am assuming, that since the SNHs wanted NewCo in the past, wholly to themselves, that they still want whatever piece they can get – so I’m assuming that 5% will go to SNHs.

2) The remainder of NewCo – 95% -- goes first – 70% of that, to Preferreds. TPS, Ps and Ks are the preferreds - pari-passu. In the exiting of Bankruptcy, the concept of “preferreds” is gone. Everybody becomes simple NewCo common equity. But 70% of that 95% will go to the current preferreds. This is how they are ‘approximating’ the priority required by law, and required to meet the “best interests of creditors test”. (For the last time, APR is a strictly applied waterfall issue if there is no settlement. In a settlement, priority still must be maintained, but it is ‘negotiable’ – does not violate APR as a negotiated item. But that negotiation MUST retain priority}

3) I expect TPS to raise cain about #2 - they were excluded, largely, from mediation and I feel will fight tooth-and-nail against this.

4) The remaining 30% of the 95% goes to existing commons.

5) DimeQ is a huge wildcard. IGNORE THIS FACT AT YOUR OWN INVESTMENT PERIL. Depending on how it is placed (as debt, or as equity) means either reducing the value of everybody, or just NewCo commons. This is HUGE. I can’t speculate further on what the court will do, or what the new mediation including DimeQ will do to this. But this ought to be on anybody’s radar as a huge unknown.

6) There are three values to NewCo. One is the value of WMMRC is “run-off” mode. The other is the value of non-debtor subs. And the third is the ‘unknown’ future value of the Litigation Trust. {A forth value, a negative one on the balance sheets, is the loans from the SNHs to litigate and/or merge -- that is a negative value as draws against those loans occur - and a liability that is of a big concern to me, and to others I've spoken with. Do not underestimate this issue.}

7) The Litigation Trust’s proceeds will first go to the H’s. (And up-streamed to SNHs up to a certain point to make up the difference between contract rate and FJR). After H’s are made logistically full (not to $34 a share, and not a re-re-fullness – they are paid once and only once by the estate) – then the excess gets put into the NewCo – and preferreds and commons will share alike in that. No cash, just the added value of NewCo. Targets of litigation, IMHO, are things like Goldman Sachs, Ratings Agencies, D&O insurances, etc -- JPM and FDIC are off-limits per the GSA. And such litigation, with perhaps the exception of D&O policies, will take some time. Perhaps signficant time. Period.

8 ) NewCo will HAVE to merge and merge again, etc to take advantage of the NOLs. You can't "write a check" on a NOL. I have seen and discussed estimates that this may take up to a year for the first merger to be completed and fully consummated. It’s much more than a trivial exercise. The market will take time to value the first "MergeCo" and the subsequent P/E of "MergeCo" and the next "SecondMergeCo", etc, etc. But after the first "merger", is successful -- then things get much smoother... IMHO.

9) However, we already know that the SNHs had planned for a merger (this was disclosed in the early, failed, PORs - however the mechanics and the target were undisclosed) and we also know from billings and from in-court testimony that offers had been made - similarly, the targets and mechanics were undisclosed. It’s going to be up to the “NewCo” BOD to evaluate merger potentials, and not rush into things. There are very specific IRS limitations – one of the biggest ones is that you can’t just merge with, say, a giant General Electric or Exxon and eat up all the NOLs at once. It’s gotta be a similar business, of similar size, of equals. Games of “subsidiaries” of big companies don’t fly either. In short, you can’t just “shop around” your NOLs.

10) The issue posted earlier yesterday about the ‘immediate’ tradability of NewCo stock, I believe to be a real issue. Now in practicality, it may not be a real issue. But for those who may have converted IRAs into ROTHs, you need to consider how such a ‘dark’ company stock may affect your ability to re-characterize, if you wanted to prior to your tax deadline (April 15th, or extensions to Oct) -- or the fact it may force you to pay the taxes on that conversion through separate funds. ASK YOUR TAX ADVISOR, not me.


Things I think are OVERBLOWN or not of significant magnitude.

1) NSS and some “mother of all short squeezes”. No. I think you have your evidence – the PORv7 didn’t produce one. There has been plenty of opportunity for any NSS of any magnitude to cover over 3 years. And the whole “you don’t pay taxes” thing has been totally debunked. I won’t argue this further. Why would any remaining, significant, NSS not close out at $.07 a share? That trivial remaining profit makes no logical sense. The only viable answer is the debunked “taxes” thing. That kite no longer flies. However, if you continue to hold that string -- good for you. I won't bother blowing for your kite to fly.

2) There are huge hidden assets. No. The non-debtor subs have been valuated. It’s in the DS. The other assets are in the GSA, unvalued in mass, but are scheduled to be ‘sold’ under the GSA for a pittance to JPM to cause them to be no longer a disputed asset. There will not, IMHO, be any new substantial ‘hidden’ assets showing up. This is a matter to grow-up about and accept, and not create fantasies about. If you continue to believe this, or proffer this -- then you're not reading anything in the GSA, or are misguided. IMHO.

3) JPM and/or the FDIC are going to swoop in at the last minute and sweeten the deal. No. Not in my mind, or not in any significant magnitude. There may be some adjustments, like in VISA Class-B share pricing, etc – but nothing of significant magnitude. If you have something factual to add here, then do so. But otherwise, you're wishing and hyping.

4) Stern saves us. No. This court has ruled that a “settlement” is not an “adjudication” for a non-core issue. Those items in the GSA are a “settlement” and have been ruled, by this court, not applicable to the “limited interpretation” of Stern. She may very well be wrong here. But it won’t help us. This Stern issue will be resolved well after we’ve exited bankruptcy, shares converted, monies disbursed, and it will be only a footnote after-the-fact on whether this court was ultimately right or wrong in her decision about Stern and “settlements”. If you have a factual case where a 'settlement' was delayed by Stern, then show it.

5) Applying "penny stock" mentalities to "reverse splits", etc -- this isn't such a thing - or the comparison is incorrect/bogus. That said, I'm not debating that in "penny land" that a RS is an issue. This IS NOT the same thing here, as exiting a bankruptcy. Apples/oranges. PERIOD. The changing of billions of shares between OldCo preferreds and commons (at the ratios mentioned above) into something managable in the number of shares outstanding is JUST a conversion -- not your "typical" issue of penny-stock "reverse splits". IMHO, get over it. Whether it's $1000 as 1000 shares at $1 each, or whether it's $1000 at 250 shares $4 each or whatever -- it's the exact same total value. Period. I trust the semi-average investor can do the various forms of math to determine the "NewCo" vs. "OldCo" shares they hold and the conversions -- and the OVERALL value. And if you can't, IMHO... You need to select a mutual fund to invest in.


Lastly, I really do think that we are in the end of this ‘game’. For better or for worse, this court IS going to approve a POR, of some form, in the very near future. The bankruptcy courts are set up to resolve bankruptcies. There will be, and the courts acknowledge this, never a ‘perfect’ or even ‘fair’ resolution to a bankruptcy – that is ‘fair’ to all parties. There is a process of imperfect application of law and settlements.

The court is NOT going to allow the Equity Committee to go on a search-and-destroy fishing expedition at this time, all the while draining the estates assets and monies further, to the hurt of creditors. It's not going to happen.

To that end, if the Equity Committee and the other major parties are “behind” a POR – barring an earth shattering asteroid-sized event or new fact, the situation is-what-it-is. And the court is going to approve, in substance, the proposed – and ‘mediated’, POR.

Wishful fantasies, not withstanding, are just that.

And if you don’t understand anything else – understand this: Everything “wrong” that was done to Washington Mutual - PRE BANKRUPTCY – that are “district court” – tort, etc issues, are settled away in the GSA. This bankruptcy court is so the issues are the remainders of the estate. Period. If you hold any "pre-bankruptcy" contempt, realize that your contempt will not help us here. That's fact. And that stinks. But that's fact to your and MY investment.


In closing:

I HATE what has been done here. I am a pre-seizure holder who has averaged down. I am dismayed by the whole process here. And that little light I held for justice and the ‘American way’ has been tarnished. I have learned way more than I ever wanted to about how ‘big money’ and Wall Street really works.

I am not satisfied – in the least – by what has happened here. But that doesn’t stop me from understanding it, to the best of my abilities, as being WRONG, so very wrong.

Yet, I can’t write a check on that, or buy or sell 'that' stock of contempt.

I can only buy or sell the stock I do have, which is rooted in the realities of the situation here.

GLTA. GLTY. And may we see a light at the end of this tunnel that is not an oncoming train. :)

Lastly, do not trust the SNHs or any of the "big boys" in this game. They are not out to help us. Be wary, and be concerned. I don't trust them one bit.


…Catz
Antworten
neverenough:

hab mei

3
19.12.11 01:01
order jetzt schonmal eintippt

dann muss ichs morgen früh net

aber miniorder.

aber egal.

gute nacht @all

ps wir brauchen nen plan für die abstimmung
Antworten
Schnurrstrac.:

@Hotstockrunner:

4
19.12.11 02:38
Ich nehme an , Poly  bezieht sich hier auf ein Posting , das eigentlich schon einige
Tage zurück liegt , wo jemand den Fall "KMART" geschildert hat.
Es ist auch wirklich so, daß Du Deine Finger nachzählen mußt , wenn Du solchen
Lumpen die Hand gegeben hast .
Antworten
Schnurrstrac.:

Gute Nacht , Neverenough

 
19.12.11 02:41
Ich mach jetzt das Licht aus , wenns recht ist.
Antworten
odin10de:

@Polytour

7
19.12.11 02:54

Zitat:

Ich erwarte, dass die Politik hier ein scharfes Auge drauf hat im Sinne der KLEINBÜRGER und Wähler!  

So sollte es ja auch sein, nur in Zeiten schwacher oder immer mehr schwächelnder Konjunktur gibt die Industrie über die Politik die Richtung vor.

Absatzmärkte werden immer kleiner und die Verbraucher (im Sinne fallender Stundenlöhne (zb: Leiharbeiter, usw.) immer weniger.

Die Staatsausgaben aber immer mehr steigen.  Die Politik weiß was auf den Konten der Bundesbürger (siehe Statistische Erhebung) an Geld liegt und da wollen die dran (natürlich per Gesetz sonst wäre es Raub).

mfg

 

Odin

 

 

Antworten
Chance 2 Risi.:

Homer J, post #173463.

7
19.12.11 02:58
Spitze! ! !, dein post wandert in mein Archiv.
Ich schließe mich uneingeschränkt deiner Meinung an.
Du hast es mit knappen Worten auf den Punkt getroffen.
Die Wahrheit ist oft entblößend einfach!
Wenn man sie denn trifft!
Antworten
Pjöngjang:

3 ex-WaMu leaders to pay FDIC total $425,000

23
19.12.11 05:56
Three former top executives of Washington Mutual, whose 2008 failure left thousands jobless and wiped out billions in stock-market value, will pay a combined $425,000 in cash to settle a lawsuit brought against them by federal regulators.

The out-of-pocket payments include $275,000 from former Chairman and CEO Kerry Killinger; $100,000 from former Chief Operating Officer Stephen Rotella; and $50,000 from David Schneider, who ran WaMu's home-loans division.

According to the agreement with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., WaMu's insurers will pay $39.6 million from "directors and officers" policies held by the bankrupt company. The $40 million in total payments will go to the FDIC, which sued the executives in its capacity as receiver for the failed bank.

The FDIC described the outlines of the deal this past Tuesday but did not release the full settlement agreement until late in the week. While all parties have signed off, the agreement has yet to be filed in court.

In addition to the cash payments, the three former executives will surrender to the FDIC certain claims they have pending in bankruptcy court against WaMu's holding company. Those claims have a face value of $24.7 million, but it's uncertain how much ultimately will be paid.

Killinger will give up retirement claims with a face value of $7.47 million. Rotella will give up severance claims with a face value of $11.46 million, and Schneider will give up $4.89 million in severance claims and $900,000 in bonus claims.

However, all three men will be allowed to pursue other bankruptcy claims against their former company.

Based on previous filings in the bankruptcy, Killinger retains claims with a face value of $3.8 million, Rotella's claims have a face value of $5.5 million, and Schneider's have a face value of $1.95 million.

As part of the deal, the FDIC will dismiss claims against Killinger's wife, Linda, and Rotella's wife, Esther. They had been sued for allegedly helping their husbands transfer homes and cash into trusts to keep them out of creditors' hands.

"The Killingers are pleased to have settled the lawsuit brought by the FDIC," their attorney, Barry Kaplan, said in a statement. "Settlement was an appropriate outcome to avoid years of additional distraction and costly legal proceedings."

A source close to the case, who spoke Sunday on condition of not being identified, said the settlement first will be submitted to federal bankruptcy court in Delaware, where WaMu's holding company is attempting to restructure.

The company's insurers need the bankruptcy court's permission to pay out their share of the settlement.

All money received by the FDIC will go toward offsetting losses the bank incurred on subprime mortgages, pay-option ARMs and home-equity lines of credit originated or acquired in the three years before its failure.

WaMu last week said it had reached a deal to resolve the welter of conflicting claims from bondholders, shareholders, the FDIC and other creditors.

As part of that deal, the FDIC will receive $125 million, in exchange for releasing its claims against 12 former WaMu directors and other ex-officials of the thrift.

WaMu will distribute around $7 billion in assets to its creditors and ultimately emerge from bankruptcy as a far smaller company, with its main assets being an investment company and a mortgage reinsurer.
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/...46824_wamu19m.html
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Pjöngjang:

Fair Game: In a WaMu Settlement With the F.D.I.C.,

22
19.12.11 05:58
Fair Game: In a WaMu Settlement With the F.D.I.C., Slapped Wrists

Worse, most of the money didn’t even come from the former executives’ pockets. Instead, it came from directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policies paid for by the bank.

The deal, agreed to by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, requires that the men, among them Kerry Killinger, WaMu’s former chief executive, forgo claims for insurance coverage and some past compensation that they had requested from the bankruptcy court.

To anyone familiar with WaMu’s Wild West lending practices — “The Power of Yes” was the bank’s motto — the agreement might seem like yet another example of the minimalist punishment meted out to major players in the credit boom and bust.

Here are the particulars: Mr. Killinger paid $275,000 in cash. He also agreed to forfeit claims against his WaMu retirement accounts with a face amount of $7.5 million.

These sums are a pittance when set against the $88 million in compensation that Mr. Killinger received from the bank from 2001 to 2007.

Stephen Rotella, WaMu’s former president, paid $100,000 in cash and gave up a claim to $11.5 million in compensation. David Schneider, its former home loans president, paid $50,000 and forfeited a claim to $5.8 million.

Mr. Rotella and Mr. Schneider were able to hang on to other claims that they have filed in the WaMu bankruptcy: Mr. Rotella retained a retirement account valued at $5.4 million, while Mr. Schneider kept a $1.9 million claim. It is unclear whether WaMu will pay these claims, of course. If it does, the executives will have to pay taxes on them.

“Pretty soft,” is how Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who heads the Senate’s permanent subcommittee on investigations, characterized the settlement in an interview on Friday.

“Washington Mutual Bank epitomizes everything that went wrong with the banking industry and contributed to the financial crisis, so the F.D.I.C. was right to go after the bank’s leadership,” Mr. Levin said in a statement issued on Tuesday. “Former WaMu executives Killinger, Rotella and Schneider are truly the 1 percent: they got bonus upon bonus when the bank did well, but when they led the bank to collapse, insurance and indemnity clauses shielded them from paying any penalty for their wrongdoing.”

Officials at the F.D.I.C. said they were pleased with the settlement and that it maximized its recoveries. The $64.7 million will be combined with $125 million that WaMu’s holding company agreed to relinquish to the regulator.

Although the settlement probably disappoints anyone hoping executives might be held personally accountable, it does illustrate what regulators are up against when litigating these matters.

For starters, the F.D.I.C. faced a time constraint. The insurance policies being tapped by the regulator were declining steadily in value as others making claims against the bank were paid.

The F.D.I.C. also had to confront the circular nature of the continuing WaMu bankruptcy and the claims being made against the institution. If the regulator had asked for higher payments from the former executives, the men could have turned around and requested that the bankrupt company pay the amounts under its indemnification policies. If the company did have to cover the F.D.I.C.’s requests, it could reduce the $125 million that WaMu has agreed to give the regulator.

Given these risks and the costs of continuing litigation, the F.D.I.C. said, it made sense to complete the $64.7 million deal.

Lawyers representing Mr. Killinger and Mr. Schneider did not respond to requests for comment.

Mr. Rotella issued this statement through a spokesman: “I believe the facts clearly demonstrate that during my brief tenure at WaMu, my efforts substantially reduced risk and addressed highly challenging business problems that predated my arrival. I continue to strongly dispute the F.D.I.C.’s allegations and regret that we did not have more time to finish restructuring WaMu successfully.”

Mr. Levin’s dismay over the settlement probably arises from his deep knowledge of WaMu and its practices. After all, he led the Senate’s 2010 investigation into the origins of the financial crisis, producing a 650-page report on actions taken by WaMu, Goldman Sachs and the credit ratings agencies, among others.

Mr. Levin’s office referred the findings to prosecutors for possible follow-up. Not much has happened since.

The damning report detailed WaMu’s questionable operations as well as those of its regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision. That feckless agency was responsible for overseeing three of the biggest disasters in mortgage lending history: Countrywide Bank, IndyMac Bancorp and WaMu. Mercifully, the Dodd-Frank law put an end to the O.T.S., folding it into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.

ARE the WaMu executives out of the woods? They’re getting close. Last summer, the Justice Department shut down its criminal investigation into WaMu and its officials, concluding that the evidence it had amassed “did not meet the exacting standards for criminal charges in connection with the bank’s failure.”

Mr. Levin noted that the O.C.C. could still act against WaMu’s former executives.

“There are some real possible enforcement actions they can take to go after civil money penalties,” he said. “They have the ability to go after securities violations for securities WaMu issued that were defective or misleading, unsafe and unsound practices, breach of fiduciary duty, general disregard for banking regulations — there’s still a way to get more accountability.”

Asked whether the O.C.C. would pursue such actions, a spokesman declined to comment.

Unfortunately, the agency’s history does not suggest that it will act aggressively on this matter. If past is prologue, the accountability deficit that many Americans find so disturbing is likely to grow even larger.
allbusinessnews.org/...lement-with-the-f-d-i-c-slapped-wrists/
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Pjöngjang:

Wa Mu collapsed, no prosecution of bankers

19
19.12.11 06:04
Washington Mutual bank collapsed in 2008, the largest bank failure in U.S. history.

It was the beginning of the banking failures that created the economic crisis.Last week the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission agree to a 64.7 Million settlement and no prosecution of Wa Mu executives. WA Mu  finally came crashing down on September 25, 2008. After one hundred-plus years of stable steady growth and expansion, ten years of aggressive acquisitions and record profits and one tumultuous year of disaster, the US Office of Thrift Supervision seized Washington Mutual Bank from its holding company after banking hours and placed it into Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation receivership. With rumors of its potential demise spreading, depositors withdrew $16.7 billion in 9 days , crippling the company’s liquidity and ability to act as a going concern. JPMorgan subsequently purchased the bank’s assets and deposits for $1.9 billion, less than a third of what was offered earlier in the year (in stock) and turned down by WaMu’s board . Washington Mutual’s collapse was the largest bank failure in U.S. history; when large banks fail many other stakeholders are affected, and many parties contributed to the problems that brought WaMu down. The class action complaint brought by Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP on behalf of investors offers a tremendous array of insider testimony and inside information about WaMu’s operations during the period 2005-2008; it is of such high quality, breadth and scope that it will be the primary source for this analysis. Defendants include top WaMu executives, directors, underwriters of securities offerings, and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, a Big 4 accounting firm.

Deloitte is accused of violating Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1934 by offering unqualified auditor’s reports attesting to the accuracy of financial statements incorporated into securities offerings made in 2006 and 2007.

Deloitte failed WaMu, and WaMu failed the public. Direct investors in Wamu securities and related derivatives lost substantial sums, and have procedural avenues to claim relief from these losses, whatever their worth. The public has yet another high-profile auditing failure, loss of confidence in the market, and no directly effective remedy. It could be useful to examine the lessons from WaMu and Deloitte’s failure: the decisions that brought them to collapse, the warnings ignored, the laws broken, and what this bank failure says about the audit industry.

WaMu’s “Whoo Hoo” Mortgage Business

According to many former employees of WaMu, the culture and focus of the bank began to change in 2005 with the placement of a new senior management regime. Stephen Rotella joined WaMu as president and COO and acted as president of the Home Loans Group until David Schneider took the position in mid-2005. WaMu also appointed a new Chief Enterprise Risk Officer (Ronald Cathcart) and a new Controller (John Woods) at this time . After 2000 and especially after the transition in leadership in 2005 WaMu’s focus became residential lending and related products as a driver of asset accumulation and interest income. In 2006 and 2007 nearly 70% of interest income and 60% of overall average assets were generated by residential real estate loans either originated by WaMu and held or sold or loans and mortgage-backed securities purchased for investment . This was no accident; WaMu’s new management team had very clearly focused on aggressive tactics to capture market share in residential real estate, offering a new 5 year plan in February 2005 intent on “transforming the company's mortgage business and maintaining a leading national position in mortgage lending…” . WaMu focused sales efforts on subprime lending and nontraditional products such as interest-only, 80/20, Option ARM and adjustable-rate loans. Mortgage lending had undergone something of a sea change since the last downturn in housing ended in the early 1990s. After the dot-com bubble burst in 2000 low interest rates, stagnant real wages, population growth and rapid appreciation made housing an attractive investment sector for quick cash and equity gains. Expanded markets in securitizing and trading of loans meant that a bank like WaMu could be aggressive in originating loans and earning origination fees without having to hold them in-house and take the attendant risks; lenders could securitize the loans and sell them to third parties as quickly as they could procure them. Highly potentially profitable interest-only, teaser, and especially Option ARM loans overtook traditional fixed-rate mortgages in the WaMu portfolio; Option ARMs themselves represented over 50% of WaMu’s portfolio from Q3 2005- Q2 2008 . Option ARM loans allowed the borrower to make a “minimum” payment below the interest due; the difference would negatively amortize into the principal until “recasted” into a new payment structure after hitting a ceiling of 110-125% of origination amount. Some WaMu employees interviewed for the class action complaint described the residential mortgage operations as “crooked” and “underhanded” . According to numerous witnesses loan salespeople were often unqualified or uninterested in ensuring that borrowers understood the terms of their loans; Confidential Witness 5 believed that “the majority” of Option ARM borrowers did not understand that their rate and payments would go up after the teaser period (Complaint p. 38). Repeatedly in the complaint employees stated that policy dictated from the highest levels encourage aggressive selling, wholesale noncompliance with company underwriting standards, fictitious appraisals, and “tremendous pressure from the sales guys to approve loans” and that, with the involvement of WaMu management, even questionable loans “usually got taken care of one way or another.” (Complaint p. 36).

weiter unter
choosingdemocracy.blogspot.com/2011/12/...-prosecution-of.html
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odin10de:

Insiderinformation ????

14
19.12.11 06:20
Auszug des Berichtes...

Washington Mutual’s collapse was the largest bank failure in U.S. history; when large banks fail many other stakeholders are affected, and many parties contributed to the problems that brought WaMu down. The class action complaint brought by Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP on behalf of investors offers a tremendous array of insider testimony and inside information about WaMu’s operations during the period 2005-2008; it is of such high quality, breadth and scope that it will be the primary source for this analysis. Defendants include top WaMu executives, directors, underwriters of securities offerings, and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, a Big 4 accounting firm.
Deloitte is accused of violating Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1934 by offering unqualified auditor’s reports attesting to the accuracy of financial statements incorporated into securities offerings made in 2006 and 2007.


Link:
choosingdemocracy.blogspot.com/2011/12/...-prosecution-of.html

Danke, Pjöngjang für diese Info

Odin
Antworten
pyramid:

homer,

32
19.12.11 06:20
bzgl. http://www.ariva.de/forum/...3906-News-364286?page=6938#jumppos173463

WGM arbeitet seit ablehnung, also seit september, an dem DS/POR - siehe rechnungen WGM und anderer Debtoren kanzleien. das war keine nacht und nebel aktion. deshlab dürfte es kein problem gewesen sein, ergebnisse der mediation einzuarbeiten, da diese bis zum zeitpunkt der anhörung, am 08.12., schon zwei monate lief.

die ankündigung von ergebnissen ist ihm auch nicht auferlegt worden. die war eh überfällig. und das was er da "präsentiert" hatte - es war ja nicht mehr als seine eigene lobpreisung seiner arbeitsleistung, ansonsten völlig inhaltslos und pathetisch.

und eine erstellung eines DS/POR in absprache mit den gegenparteien ist eher unwahrscheinlich. falls also verfälschte ergebnisse der mediation eingearbeitet worden sind, gibt es die möglichkeit, wie zu jeder eingabe, des einspruches, wenn parteien nicht einverstanden sein sollten.

was ich nun wieder für typischen Rosen Style halte, ist die verkürzte frist zum möglichen einspruch und die terminierung ausgerechnet über die feiertage. slap ! in your face ! das eine verkürzung so  einfach möglich ist ? scheinbar, da THJMW bei dieser ankündigung von Rosen nicht widersprochen hatte.

aber erstmal bin ich auf das puzzlestück vom EC gespannt , welches heute eingereicht werden soll. dürfte ja bis spätestens morgen auf kccllc aufschlagen.
Antworten
paketix:

auf eine erfolgreiche woche ;)

11
19.12.11 08:11
Antworten
fiat_iustitia:

...ja paketix, kann mich Dir nur anschliessen...

 
19.12.11 09:05
...das wird diese Woche ganz spannend...

fiat_iustitia
Antworten
Gelöschter Beitrag. Einblenden »
#173467

famherzig:

bin mal auf den handel heute gespannt

4
19.12.11 09:09
nach all den einschätzungen, die hier übers wochenende so gemacht wurden, bin ich wirklich gespannt. wird sich die verunsicherung an den verkäufen ablesen lassen.
wenn man so hört, für bis zu 2 jahren gesperrt, wird sich der ein oder andere sicherlich sagen, ne, das ist mir zu unsicher und auch zu lang. aber ich halte es da eher mit helmut kohl:
ICH SITZ DAS AUS
schönen erfolgreichen tag euch allen
Antworten
finale:

die Verunsicherung

5
19.12.11 09:19
wird oft gestreut durch Morgens runterkaufen in D von Amis,das sieht doch ein Blinder.
Die 0,11 ist drin ab Morgen denke Ich.
Antworten
Molly2006:

Haltefristen

18
19.12.11 09:22
Ich kann mir nicht vorstellen, dass bei den in der Mediation diskutierten Lösungen tatsächlich groß über Haltefristen gesprochen wird. Kernpunkt ist doch die Entschädigung der Commons Halter, wenn ich das richtig sehe. Wird ein Geschädigter vom Verursacher tatsächlich entschädigt, kann dieser schlecht verlangen, dass auf die Entschädigung weitere Jahre gewartet wird. Vor allem, wenn die Gefahr besteht, dass die vereinbarte Entschädigung durch weiteres Missmanagement (WMIneu) in dieser Zeit untergeht.
Antworten
tiger_001:

guten morgen nach europa...

6
19.12.11 09:26
nach der letzten woche bin ich ja mal gespannt wer hier noch von der sache ueberzeugt ist und wer nicht...
die 0,11 von "finale" wuerd ich aber auch sehen.... trotz der ganzen verunsicherung die hier ja offensichtlich kuenstlich erzeugt wird und wurde, sind wir ja immer noch gut aufgestellt....
sollte es noch weiter runter gehen, werde ich nachkaufen!!

ob jetzt zwei oder drei monatsgehaelter den bach runter gehen ist auch schon egal..;-)

take care und eine gruene woche

tiger
Antworten
alaadin75:

Guten morgen @ALL...

14
19.12.11 09:39

was kann denn noch mehr schief gehen als es schon war bzw. ist!?

Jeder spricht von histories biggest Bankfailure....und Betrug...und es gibt genug Beweise dafür!!!

Es kann nurnoch nach OBEN gehen....alles quatsch was da am Wochenende spekuliert wurde...von wegen wmi neu mit 200Mio.$...eher mit 20Mrd.$...und 100fach minimum vom jetzigen Kurs bei bleibender Aktienmenge...das ist wahrscheinlich das was Unser Rosen geschwärzt hat im Settlement Bericht...

Diese Woche wirds Hammerpositive News schneien freunde...und dann werden wir und die US Boys sagen ..."Marry Christmas"....

Nur meine Meinung!!!!

Antworten
4Blatt:

gesperrt?

24
19.12.11 09:40
hier wird überhaupt nichts gesperrt...
der titel wird weiterhin über die otc handelbar sein nachdem die umwandlung vollzogen ist natürlich nicht sofort aber innerhalb einiger weniger tage.

hier war nie die rede von haltefrist und sperrung?...

es geht nur darum das wir nicht an einer nyse oder ähnlichem handelbar sein werden das wars auch schon.dies wird einige quartale dauern da man gewisse richtlinien erfüllen muß und diese wohl nicht eingehalten wurden.

d.h. man hat halt immernoch die ach so lieben mm der otc im nacken jedoch auch diese können einen wert nicht unendlich manipulieren.

ka wo dieser schmarn nun wieder herkommt lest euch doch bitte durch was man euch vorlegt...
Antworten
der_erste_klon:

stellungnahme ec & edgar sargent

15
19.12.11 09:45
guten morgen zusammen .

ich habe mich gerade gefragt wieso ihr damit rechnet das heute eine stellungnahme des ec stattfinden soll.
also entweder hab ich was nicht mitbekommen oder das basiert alles auf der aussage des users meischer eder der angeblich mit mr sargent in kontakt ist .

"meischer_eder: Auskunft von Edgar Sargent 918.12.11 00:50 #173348
Habe von Edgar Sargent folgende Auskunft bekommen:
"A letter from the Equity Committee will be sent out with your ballots in January. I expect a draft of the letter to be filed with the Court Monday and available on the public docket.""

auch zu finden auf yahoo:
messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/...amp;frt=2#897293

also irgendwie glaube ich nicht das mr sargent zeit hat auf emails von aktionären zu antworten . imho.

wär allerdings nicht schlimm wenn das ec trotzdem heute bzw zeitnah ne kleine stellungnahme zum momentanen stand der dinge für die aktionäre machen würde .

auf eine erfolgreiche woche !
Antworten
wamufan-the-.:

der_erste_klon

5
19.12.11 09:50
ganz einfach...kommt heute keine Stellungnahme seitens des EC ist dieser ''meischer_eder'' sofort als gefährlicher, unseriöser User ala ''winner'' zu sehen!

Punkt!
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