Der USA Bären-Thread

>>>Aktie brach um 90 Prozent ein

So ganz wohl ist mir bei der Sache allerdings nicht. Schon einmal gab es  einen vielbejubelten „Alibaba-Börsengang“. Das war 2007 in Hongkong. Dabei ging es um das B2B-Geschäft Alibaba.com, das damals der größte Unternehmensbereich war. Auch damals war die Begeisterung der Anleger groß und die Wachstumsperspektiven schienen gewaltig zu sein. Am Ende ging die ganze Geschichte aber alles andere als rühmlich aus. Daran war das Unternehmen nicht unschuldig.<<<

so zumindest Calpers,die sich von Ihren Hedgefondsbeteiligungen für Pensionen jetzt trennen
Und Gretchen Morgenson hat einen schönen Artikel in der NYT dazu,daraus:

Citing high costs and complexity associated with its holdings in 24 hedge funds and six so-called funds of funds, Calpers said the investments were “no longer warranted.” Hedge funds typically charge 2 percent of the assets they manage and an additional 20 percent of any profits they generate. Investors in funds-of-funds pay even more: 3 percent and 30 percent.

In its announcement, Calpers said nothing about the performance of the hedge fund investments, but it was probably dismal. As the stock market has roared to new highs, most hedge fund managers have been unable to keep up. According to Preqin Ltd., a research firm, hedge funds have vastly underperformed the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index over the last one, three and five years. Other indexes show them lagging on a 10-year basis, too. Fund-of-funds performance is even worse.

....But the question remains whether other public pension funds, whose managers have committed far more of their portfolios to hedge funds, will follow Calpers’s lead. After all, many of these funds follow the advice of consultants who are paid more for advising pensions when hedge funds are involved.

Among the problems posed by hedge funds, pension experts say, are exorbitant fees and illiquidity. (Many hedge funds have one-year lockups, limiting investors’ ability to get out.) Moreover, they are about as transparent as mud.......
www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/business/...funds.html?ref=business

krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/...icherheitsamt-trivial/

man fragt sich natürlich,was das soll.Offensichtlich wird es schon länger diskutiert als BlutundBoden-Begriff ,something very German
talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/homeland-defense-is-unamerican
by Josh Marshall
Homeland Security the phrase "does have a deep blood and soil tinge to it which is distinctly Germanic, more than a touch un-American, and a little creepy."

At this point using the phrase almost seems natural and with the Department of Homeland Security it's part of the official national vocabulary. It's so pervasive it's hard not to use it, if for no other reason than that people might otherwise not know quite what you're referring to.
m.thenation.com/blog/...-chris-matthews-cant-go-homeland-again
interessanter ist der zweite Punkt bei Matthews

But here's what Matthews says ...

   "I am very uncomfortable with the phrase ‘homeland.' It strikes me as totalitarian. It's a term used by the neocons, they love it. It suggests something strange to me. Like who else are we defending except America?

"WMD. Homeland. It's the language of the neocons," he says. "It's the language to get us further into wars."....It has all the easy and shallow patriotism of "USA! USA!" but with loads of gravitas...
And the heightened ability to visualize horror is what's driving us now toward war (or, as John Kerry puts it, "a very significant counter-terrorism operation"). Americans' big shift toward supporting air strikes in Iraq and Syria came only came after seeing the beheadings of two Americans on video

...the phrase goes back to a December 1997 Pentagon report called "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st century." That was during the Clinton administration.... the 'homeland defense' concept was always closely tied to creating a missile shield over the United States.

www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/world/...-threats-beyond-isis-.html

....Some American officials and national security experts said the intense focus on the Islamic State had distorted the picture of the terrorism threat that has emerged from the chaos of Syria’s civil war, and that the more immediate threats still come from traditional terror groups like Khorasan and the Nusra Front, which is Al Qaeda’s designated affiliate in Syria.

Mr. Fadhli, 33, has been tracked by American intelligence agencies for at least a decade. According to the State Department, before Mr. Fadhli arrived in Syria, he had been living in Iran as part of a small group of Qaeda operatives who had fled to the country from Afghanistan after the Sept. 11 attacks. Iran’s government said the group was living under house arrest, but the exact circumstances of the Qaeda operatives were disputed for years, and many members of the group ultimately left Iran for Pakistan, Syria and other countries.

In 2012, the State Department identified Mr. Fadhli as Al Qaeda’s leader in Iran, directing “the movement of funds and operatives” through the country. A $7 million reward was offered for information leading to his capture. The same State Department release said he was working with wealthy “jihadist donors” in Kuwait, his native country, to raise money for Qaeda-allied rebels in Syria.

Nun sollen mit der "Greenshoe"-Option (= Nachemission zur Deckung der großen Nachfrage) noch weiter 3,2 Mrd. (= 15 % zusätzlich) an Anlegerkapital eingesammelt werden.

Damit der Scheiterhaufen beim Abfackeln noch höher brennt.

Alibaba reportedly exercising green shoe option

Last Update: 9/21/2014 6:24:00 PM

NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- E-commerce company Alibaba Group's bankers are reportedly exercising their option to sell more shares, Dow Jones Newswires reported Sunday, citing unnamed sources familiar with the matter. The so-called green-shoe option, which is often exercised if demand for the stock is strong, would increase the initial public offering size to $25 billion from $21.8 billion, making it the biggest IPO in history, according to Dow Jones. Alibaba's shares debuted on the New York Stock Exchange on Friday, with the stock closing out its first day at at a 38% premium to its IPO price.

...is back!

IPOs mit Kurssteigerungen von fast 50% am ersten Tag der Kursnotierung.
Das erinnert sehr an 1999/2000.

Das alles passiert angeblich weil Aktien alternativlos sind, weil die Fed die Aktien niemals mehr fallen lassen wird und weil die US- Wirtschaft vor einem neuen gigantischen Boom steht.

Naja, ich warte einmal die nächste 10% Korrektur ab... dann kann man vielleicht vorsichtig da nochmals rein gehen, um am letzten großen Aktien-Boom (die Lemminge springen auf) zu partizipieren. Die Betonung liegt bei "vorsichtig"!

wie in der gesamten Geschichte der Finanzmärkte zuvor?

JA; so lange bis das Gegenteil wieder bewiesen wurde.

Was mich aber derzeit schon verwundert ist, dass die Rohstoffe in einem Aufwärtszyklus, den wir angeblich in den USA haben, seit 2011 immer weiter fallen. Ist das nicht ein Widerspruch in sich? Aber auch das verwundert mich kaum noch.
Alain Greenspan hatte das Ende der 1990er Jahre "Irrational Exuberance" genannt.

Our September Advanced GLI came in at 3.0%yoy, down from last month"s reading of 3.1%yoy. Momentum decreased to 0.25%mom from 0.29%mom last month

www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-09-21/...ic-slowdown-goldman-warns

G20 beschließen Investitionsschub und warnen vor Risiken
AIRNS (dpa-AFX) - Mit einem Investitionsschub vor allem in der Infrastruktur wollen die führenden Industrie- und Schwellenländer (G20) die Weltwirtschaft weiter ankurbeln. Die Finanzminister und Notenbankchefs bekräftigten bei ihrem Treffen in Cairns in Australien am Sonntag das Ziel, bis 2018 zwei Prozent mehr Wachstum zu schaffen, als ohne zusätzlichen Maßnahmen möglich gewesen wäre. "Investitionen sind nötig, um die Nachfrage anzukurbeln und Wachstum zu beschleunigen", hieß es.

Sie räumten Risiken ein, etwa durch geopolitische Spannungen und Unsicherheiten in den Finanzmärkten. Die G20 mahnten die Industrieländer, auf Deflationsrisiken zu achten. "Uns ist bewusst, dass sich in Zeiten niedriger Zinsen exzessive Risiken in den Finanzmärkten anhäufen können", hieß es weiter in der Erklärung.....
www.faz.net/agenturmeldungen/adhoc/...or-risiken-13165317.html

To the list of worriers who feel financial markets are getting overheated, add 20 more.

Finance ministers from the Group of 20, which includes the United States, the U.K, the European Union and China, warned at their latest meeting that financial markets may be headed for a slump. “Downside risks persist, including in financial markets,” the group said in a statement from Cairns, Australia. “We are mindful of the potential for a build-up of excessive risk in financial markets, particularly in an environment of low interest rates and low asset price volatility.”

It’s unusual for government finance ministers to comment on the direction of financial markets, yet concern about inflated stock prices is now mainstream.....
finance.yahoo.com/news/...a-stock-market-bubble-153542781.html

U.S. stocks fell, led by a plunge among small companies, as sales of existing homes unexpectedly dropped and China’s finance minister damped stimulus hopes.

The Russell 2000 Index of small-cap stocks sank 1.6 percent, the most since July. Yahoo! Inc. (YHOO) dropped 2.3 percent to lead the Dow Jones Internet Composite Index to a one-month low. Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. slid 2.1 percent after surging in its trading debut Sept. 19.  

.......Russian share market is at present on of the most hated and probably most underweighted in the world. The stock market has under-performed every other index in the world since 2011 and continues to trade well below its all time highs recorded in 2008. As already previously discussed, valuation metrics such as CAPE or P/B are signaling Russia to be one of the ceapest markets in the world.

I first started buying Russian shares during March panic sell off in the form of Russian Small Caps. Interestingly, as we can see from the chart above, Russian stocks still remain above that low. Now, I am not sure whether or not that will be a case in a month or two, however I am bullish on this cheap stock market and will be opening new positions on any further weakness. Personally, I am looking for a move above $25.50 on the RSX ETF and a break above major moving averages to confirm my view......

shortsideoflong.com/2014/09/interesting-market-movements/

David Stockman sieht Alibaba als prototypisch für die chinesische Kartenhaus-Wirtschaft, für die er einen baldigen Kollaps erwartet. Obwohl Wall Street weiß, dass China hart landen wird, bleiben Goldman und Co. die treibende Kraft hinter "momentum-getriebenen Anstiegen aller Art", egal wie unsinnig dies sind. Alibaba ist das erschreckendste Beispiel dafür. Denn hinter der letzten Freitag auf 230 Milliarden Dollar aufgeblasenen Marktkapitalisierung steckt buchstäblich NICHTS.

Auch als genereller "Rant" ist Stockmans Blog-Beitrag unterhaltsam und lesenswert.

davidstockmanscontracorner.com/...all-street-is-off-it-rocker/

They Do Ring A Bell At The Top: Alibaba Proves Wall Street Is Off Its Rocker
by David Stockman • September 22, 2014

They do ring a bell at the top.

On Friday Alibaba gained $65 billion of market cap in 5 minutes!  And that was on top of the $170 billion IPO price—-a valuation that was not all that shabby to begin with.  In fact,  BABA weighed in for the opening bell at 20X its $8.6 billion in sales.

Well, the above red hot multiple was not actually with reference to the company’s results, but to its drop-box financials. That is, before the day was over it was trading at 27X the LTM sales posted for a shell in the Cayman Islands—-an entity on the word processor of a law office located there which may or may not receive actual cash dividends and honest accounting statements from a myriad of entities that do countless things in China.

Ah, yes, in China—-the most stupendous bubble of unsustainable construction, borrowing, speculation and corruption known to the pages of history.

So with regards to BABA’s [= Alibaba, A.L.] $230 billion market cap at week’s end, you can say this: None dare call it price discovery!

What it shows is that Wall Street is well and truly off it rocker. The Chinese swindlers behind BABA didn’t even have to tap their home market. These preposterously over-valued shares were sold overwhelmingly to Wall Street—-to the gamblers, speculators and robo-traders that have occupied what was once a reasonably honest capital market.

Its not just that the $25 billion raised in the offering will go in part to insiders and in part to a blind pool for the acquisition of anything operating in China or not in China. That isn’t the real red flag. The real one is, well, an actual red flag.  Namely, the utterly unexamined idea that China is just another capitalist economy like the US, UK or even Italy, for crying out loud; and that it is galloping off into a glorious future and a middle class consumption orgy that will make what takes place daily in America’s 3,800 Wal-Marts look diminutive.

The Wall Street brokers thus threw up a storm of statistics about BABA’s GMV (gross merchandise volume) of $300 billion being 3X that of Amazon. And that the number of customers at 279 million is more than the number of adult Americans. Then there are also 8.5 million sellers, 14.5 billion annual orders, and also customers that are eagerly adopting mobile purchasing—a metric that is up 38% to 188 million in the last six months yet still only a small fraction of China’s 700 million internet users.  In short, the pitch is a modern version of “a billion lamps to China”.

Well, I’m sorry kids. China is a monstrous house of economic cards and an inherently unstable polity that will blow sky high in a matter of time—-and probably not that much more time. You can’t capitalize what is nothing more than a proxy for everyday retail commerce in China’s maniacal economy with a PE meant for real capitalist enterprises that have invented something of profoundly transformative significance, such Google—- or in their day, Microsoft, Intel, IBM and the Ford Motor Company.

By contrast, Alibaba is a purely derivative mass merchant of e-commerce. It is a Chinese copy of Amazon, eBay, PayPal, YouTube, Twitter and the New York Yankees—-all rolled into an opaque and convoluted financial pyramid that would have made Goldman Sach’s ill-fated schemes of 1929 look reasonable. Moreover, even its Cayman Island grade financials prove that there is absolutely nothing unique and non-replicable about the business model of this purveyor of stupendous volumes of cheap stuff to China’s retail masses.

Stated differently, there is no known capitalist market in which a mass merchandizer with no inventories, no stores, no warehouses, no patents, no state monopoly and virtually no fixed assets whatsoever is worth $230 billion. Indeed, BABA has virtually no working capital and the only assets visible on its balance sheet are cash, $300 million worth of un-depreciated computer software and equipment and $6 billion of intangibles and advances spread among the archipelago of entities that comprise the house which Jack (Ma) built.

Yes, its all new age retail–that is, an internet based purveyor of e-commerce. But that’s just the point—there are no barriers to entry and plenty of competition. In fact, Alibaba is just a cyberspace broker that even in a real capitalist economy would have an impossible time warding off competition and erosion of its currently super-fat first mover margins.  And it surely does have rambunctious competition in China’s essentially lawless internet space— such a Tencent Holdings and the 500 million users of its smartphone messaging apps services—potentially all of whom are being converted to on-line shopping.

That’s very different than Amazon, for example, which carries $8 billion of inventories and $12 billion of fixed PPE—mainly in its massive and virtually irreplicable warehousing and distribution system. That’s not just a barrier to entry—its a veritable bricks and mortar wall.

But here’s the thing. BABA isn’t remotely worth $230 billion because even in China its 40% broker’s margins cannot possibly endure the tsunami of competition it is likely to face—even in the near future.  But honest PE multiples and capitalization rates are driven by the longer-term future, and China’s middle class doesn’t have one!

This is just another version of Japan Inc.—a state-built house of debt, export mercantilism and fabulous over-investment that eventually came to a dead stop 20 years ago. And Japan at least had some rudiments of true capitalism such as law, contracts and some vestiges of market discipline.

As to the case of China’s red capitalism, however, there is no place in the history books where can you find a booming economy that is so artificial, fragile and prone to cataclysmic accident. It has not grown organically from the grass roots owing to capitalist enterprise. Not in the slightest.

Instead, it [China] has been concocted from the center by communist party bureaucrats who discovered the miracle of an unhinged printing press; who adopted the economic arithmetic of Keynesian GDP accounting under the slogan “if you build it, we will count it”; who created a vast pyramidal apparatus of credit distribution down a cascade of corruption that is pleased to call itself a banking system; and which is now swamped in mindless, debt-fueled speculation and building without any semblance of economic discipline, efficiency or rationality.

Folks, that is how a backward economy which was until recently run according to the precepts of Mao’s little red book managed to balloon its total credit outstanding from $1 trillion to $25 trillion in just 14 years after the turn of the century.  That is how an orgy of construction resulted in more cement production in China during 2012-2013 than in the USA during the entire 20th century—-a time which witnessed the building of the New York subway, the Hoover Dam, the vast expanse of Army Corps of Engineers waterways, the Interstate Highway system, the sprawl of American suburbia and its 13 billion square feet of mall space, among countless others.

It is also how China ended up with upwards of 70 million empty apartments, thousands of miles of bridges and roads that are virtually unused, notorious and proliferating ghost cities, and thousands of miles of hastily built high speed railways that are unsafe and mired in corruption. It is also the well-spring of a precarious system of local government finance that is based on little more than monumental speculation and inflation of the price of the lands which were seized by the state 65 years ago. And the list goes on and on.

That there will be a thundering collapse of China’s stupendous borrowing and building spree is only a matter of if, not when. And in that event, the mirage of China’s booming middle class will become painfully evident. Indeed, it is the very same frenetic buyers of stuff on BAMA websites who have jobs which will disappear when the building boom stops and who have asset ledgers which will violently deflate when China’s towering debt bubble finally bursts.

So why did Wall Street capitalize an opaque mass merchant operating in a precarious economy at 27X sales?  The answer is that Wall Street is a momentum driven casino that is now over-valuing everything that moves and all that stands still.

That’s the ultimate evil of monetary central planning. Having destroyed honest price discovery in the financial markets, the Fed now “accommodates” the speculators one meeting at a time—in deathly fear of a hissy fit that will bring down the entire phony edifice of insensible asset inflation that it has midwifed since the last financial crisis. You would think that absurdities like the Alibaba IPO would finally get the attention of our clueless monetary politburo.

But apparently not. As they watch the market climb the precarious chart pattern shown below, you wonder where they think it will all end.

Unfortunately for the American people, the nirvana of Keynesian full employment does not suggest itself as one of the possibilities.

- aktuell mit Death Cross - bleibt schwächster Index in USA:

.

Der Chart unten zeigt, dass viele Rohstoffpreise seit 2011 deutlich gefallen sind: Der Preis für australische Kohle (rot) hat sich nahezu halbiert. Die Lebensmittelpreise (grün) fielen seit 2011 im Schnitt um knapp 20 %.

Gail Tverberg hält dies im Blog-Beitrag unten für ein bärisches (Deflations-)Signal.

ourfiniteworld.com/2014/09/21/...ing-to-the-end-of-oil-supply/

Low Oil Prices: Sign of a Debt Bubble Collapse, Leading to the End of Oil Supply?

Oil and other commodity prices have recently been dropping. Is this good news, or bad?

I would argue that falling commodity prices are bad news. It likely means that the debt bubble which has been holding up the world economy for a very long–since World War II, at least–is failing to expand sufficiently. If the debt bubble collapses, we will be in huge difficulty.

Many people have the impression that falling oil prices mean that the cost of production is falling, and thus that the feared "peak oil" is far in the distance. This is not the correct interpretation, especially when many types of commodities are decreasing in price at the same time. When prices are set in a world market, the big issue is affordability. Even if food, oil and coal are close to necessities, consumers can"t pay more than they can afford.

A person can tell from Figure 1 that since the first part of 2011, the prices of Brent oil, Australian coal, and food have been trending downward. This drop in prices continues into September. For example, as I write this, Brent oil price is $97.70, while the average price for the latest month shown (August) is $105.27. It is this steeper, recent drop, which many are concerned about. [könnte mit Russland-Sanktionen zusammenhangen, A.L.]

We are dealing with several confusing issues. Let me try to explain some of them.

Issue #1: Over the short term, commodity prices don"t reflect the cost of extraction; they reflect what buyers can afford.

Oil prices are set on a worldwide basis. The cost of extraction varies around the world. So it is clear that oil prices will not match the cost of extraction, or the cost of extraction plus a reasonable profit, for any particular producer.

If oil prices drop, there is a temptation to believe that this is because the cost of production has dropped. Over a long enough period, a drop in the cost of production might be expected to lead to lower oil prices. But we know that many oil producers are finding current oil prices too low. For example, the Wall Street Journal recently reported, "Royal Dutch Shell CEO: Can"t deny returns are too low. Ben van Beurden prepared to shrink company in order to boost returns, profitability." ....

In the short term, low prices are likely to signal that less of the commodity can be sold on the world market. Commodities such as oil and food are very desirable products. Why would less be needed? The issue, unfortunately, is affordability. Affordability depends largely on (1) wages and (2) debt. Wages tend to be fairly stable. The likely culprit, if affordability is leading to lower demand for desirable products like oil and food, is less growth in debt. [Wenn das Gehalt real konstant bleibt und z. B. die Mieten steigen, muss woanders gespart werden, A.L.]

Issue #2: Economic growth tends to produce a debt bubble.

Many economists believe that technological innovation is the key to economic growth. In my view, economies need a combination of the following to have economic growth of the type experienced in the last 100 years:1

(Increase in debt) + (cheap-to-extract fossil fuels) + (cheap-to-use non-fossil fuel resources) +  (technological innovation)

In such a case, debt keeps increasing as an economy grows. Unfortunately, this economic growth is only temporary, because resources tend to become more expensive to use over time, making the "cheap" resources required for economic growth disappear.

The problem underlying the rising cost of resources (both for fossil fuels and others) is that we tend to use the cheapest-to-extract resources first. Technological innovation continues to occur, but as diminishing returns hit both fossil fuels and other resources, there are larger and larger demands on technology to keep costs in line with what workers can afford. Eventually, the cost of resources (net of technological improvements) rises too much, and economic growth is cut off. By this time, a huge mountain of debt has been built up.

Let me explain further how this happens. Without fossil fuels, the world is pretty much stuck with the goods that can be made with wood, or from other basic resources such as animal skins, cotton, flax, or clay. A small quantity of metal and glass goods can be made, but deforestation quickly becomes a problem if an attempt is made to "scale up" the quantity of goods that require heat in their production.

Once inexpensive coal became available, its availability opened the door to technological innovation, because it provided heat in quantity that had not been available previously. While ideas such as the steam engine had been around for a long time, the availability of inexpensive coal made the production of metals needed for the steam engine, plus train tracks and railroad cars, available at reasonable cost.

With the ability to make steel and concrete in quantity (both requiring heat) came the ability to make hydroelectric dams and electrical transmission lines, thus enabling electricity for public consumption. Oil, as a liquid fuel, paved the way for widespread use of additional innovations, such as private passenger automobiles, mechanized farm equipment, and airplanes. Between coal and oil, many workers could leave farming and begin jobs in other sectors of the economy.

The transformation that took place was huge: from wooden tools and human or animal labor to a modern industrial society. How could such a big change take place? Before the change, the ability to generate a profit that might be used for future capital investment was very limited. Also, the would-be purchasers of products made in an industrial economy were very poor. I would argue that the only way of bridging this gap was debt....

The use of debt has several advantages:

   It allows the consumer to buy the end product made with the new resources, assuming the end product isn"t too expensive relative to the consumer"s earnings.
   It gives resource-extracting businesses the money they need to buy equipment and to hire workers, prior to the time they have earned profits from resource extraction.
   It gives the companies the ability to build factories, before they have accumulated profits to pay for the factories.
   It allows governments to fund needed infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, before having the tax revenue available to pay for such infrastructure.
   Most importantly, the "demand" generated by (1), (2), (3) and (4) raises the price of resources sufficiently that it makes it profitable for companies in the business to extract those resources.

Because of these issues, debt and cheap fossil fuels have a symbiotic relationship.

(1) The combination of debt, inexpensive fossil fuels, and inexpensive resources of other kinds allows the production of affordable goods that raise the standard of living of those using them. The result is what we think of as "economic growth."

(2) The economic growth provides the additional income needed to pay back the debt with interest. The way this happens is indirectly, through what is sometimes described as "greater productivity of workers." This greater productivity is really human productivity enhanced with devices made possible by fossil fuels, such as sewing machines, electric milking machines, and computers that allow workers to become more productive. Indirectly, the higher productivity of workers benefits both businesses and governments, through higher sales of goods to consumers and through higher taxes. In this way, businesses and governments can also repay debt with interest.

Higher-priced resources are a problem. Higher-priced resources of any kind tend to "gum up the works" of this payback cycle. Higher-priced oil in particular is a problem. In the United States, when oil prices rise above about $40 or $50 barrel, growth in wages stops.

(Charts im Original)

With higher oil prices, the rise in the standard of living stops for most workers, and good-paying jobs become difficult to find. There are a couple of reasons we would expect wages to stagnate with higher oil prices:

(1) Competition with cheaper energy sources. When oil prices rose, countries using a very high percentage of oil in their energy mix (such as the PIIGS in Europe, Japan, and United States) became less competitive in the world economy. They tended to fall behind China and India, countries that use much more coal (which is cheaper) in their energy mix.

(zwei weitere Charts)

(2) Need to keep the price of goods flat. Businesses need to keep the total price of their products close to "flat" despite rising oil prices, if they are to continue to sell as much of their product after the oil price increase as previously. Oil is one major cost of production; wages are another. An obvious way to offset rising oil prices is to reduce wages. This can be done in several ways: outsourcing work to a lower cost country, greater automation, or caps on wages. Any of these approaches will tend to produce the flattening in wages observed in Figure 2.Based on Figure 2, an oil price above $40 or $50 per barrel seems to put a cap on wages, and indirectly leads to much less economic growth. Even if we didn"t hit this oil price limit–for example, if we had discovered a liquid fuel that could be produced in quantity for less than $40 barrel–we would eventually hit some kind of growth limit. For example, the limit might be climate change or too much population for food production capability. Even too much debt can be a limit, if citizens" incomes don"t rise in a corresponding manner. At some point, it becomes impossible even to make interest payments if the debt level is too high. Indirectly, citizens wages even support business and government debt, because business revenues and tax revenues depend indirectly on wages.

Issue #3: Repaying debt is very difficult in a flat or declining economy.

Once growth stops (or slows down too much), the debt bubble tends to crash, because it is much more difficult to repay debt with interest in a shrinking economy than in a growing one.

(zwei weitere Charts)

The government can hide this issue for a very long time by rolling over old debt with new debt and by reducing interest rates to practically zero. At some point, however, the system seems certain to fail.

Not all debt is equivalent. Debt that simply blows bubbles in stock market prices has little impact on commodity prices. In order to keep commodity prices high enough for producers to want to continue to produce them, the debt really has to get back into the hands of the potential buyers of the commodities.

Also, any changes that tend to reduce world trade push the world economy toward contraction, and make it harder to repay debt with interest. Thus, sanctions against Russia, and Russia"s sanctions against the US and Europe, tend to push the world toward debt collapse more quickly.

Issue #4: Rising oil and other commodity prices are a problem, especially for countries that are importers of those commodities.

Most of us are already aware of this issue. If oil prices rise, or if food prices rise, our salaries do not rise by a corresponding amount. We end up cutting back on discretionary purchases. This cutback in discretionary purchases leads to layoffs in these sectors. We end up with the scenario we had in the 2007-2009 recession: falling home prices (since higher-priced homes are discretionary purchases), failing banks, and many without jobs. ....

The reason that low oil and other commodity prices are welcomed by many people now is because the opposite–high oil and other commodity prices–are so terrible.

Issue #5: Falling oil and other commodity prices are a problem, if the cost of production is not dropping correspondingly.

If commodity prices drop for any reason–even if it is because a debt bubble is popping–it is going to affect how much companies are willing to produce. There is going to be a tendency to cut back in new production. If prices drop too far, it is even possible that some companies will leave the market altogether.

Even if it doesn"t look like a country "needs" the current high oil price, there may still be a problem. Oil exporters depend on the high taxes that they are able to obtain when oil prices are high. If they cannot collect these taxes, they may need to cut back on programs such as food subsidies and new desalination plants. Without these programs, civil disorder may lead to cutbacks in oil production.

Issue #6: The growth in oil sales to China and to other emerging markets has been fueled by debt growth. This debt growth now seems to be stalling.

Growth in oil consumption has mostly been outside of the United States, the European Union, and Japan, in the recent past. China and other emerging market countries kept demand for oil high.

(zwei Charts)

...This rise in debt [in China] now seems to be slowing, based on a Wall Street Journal report. A person wonders whether this stalling debt growth is affecting world oil and other commodity prices.

(zwei Charts)

Other emerging markets also seem to be experiencing cutbacks. Since 2008, the United States, Europe, and Japan have had very easy money policies. Some of the money available at low interest rates was invested in emerging markets. Now the WSJ reports, Fed Dims Emerging Markets" Allure. According to the article investors, investors are taking a more cautious stance on new investment because of fear of rising US interest rates.

Of course, other issues affect debt and world commodity demand as well. If interest rates rise, they many have a tendency to shrink new lending, in general, because loans become less affordable. Sanctions of one country against another, such as the US against Russia, and vice versa, also tend to reduce demand.

Issue #7: Debt bubbles have been a problem in past collapses.

According to Jesse Colombo, the Depression was to a significant result the result of debt bubbles that built up during the roaring twenties. Another, longer-term cause would seem to be the loss of farm jobs that occurred when coal allowed tasks that were previously done by farm workers to be done by either electricity or by horses pulling metal plows. The combination of a debt bubble and loss of jobs seems to have parallels to our current situation.

Many believe the subprime housing bubble crash contributed to the Great Recession. The oil price spike of 2007 and 2008 played a major role as well.

[A.L.: Dies bedeutet: Wall Street versuchte 2008, durch Rohstoffpreis-Aufblasung den Hauspreis-Kollaps und die daraus drohenden Bankenprobleme "wegzuinflationieren". Dies gelang jedoch nicht, weil die teueren Rohstoffe die Weltwirtschaft völlig lähmten. Folge war ein kombinierter Wirtschafts- und Rohstoffpreis-Kollaps: WTI-Öl fiel von Mitte bis Ende 2008 von 147 auf 35 Dollar. Werden Rohstoffe zu billig, lohnt sich angesichts der wegen Ressourcenknappheit stark gestiegenen Förderkosten die Förderung für viele Produzenten nicht mehr, so dass Rohstoffe TROTZ (und im Endeffekt WEGEN) der billigen Preise knapp werden. Ohne Rohstoffe aber fehlt der Motor für weiteres Wachstum, so dass ein Deflationskollaps droht. Daher offenbar auch die Inflationspolitik der Notenbanken]

Issue #8: If we are facing the collapse of a debt bubble, it is quite possible that prices of many commodities will fall. This could possibly lead to a collapse in the supply of many types of energy products, more or less simultaneously.

(Der Chart von Tverberg - siehe nächstes Posting - zeigt, wie sich das auf die künftige Ölproduktion auswirken könnte).

Figure 8. Estimate of future energy production by author. Historical data based on BP adjusted to IEA groupings.

Clearly governments will try to prevent another sharp crash in commodity prices. The question is whether they will be successful in propping up commodity prices, and for how long they will be successful. In a finite world, fossil fuel energy production eventually must decline, but we don"t know over precisely what timeframe.

Issue #9: My steep decline contrasts with the "best case" forecast of future oil consumption given by M. King Hubbert.

M. King Hubbert wrote about a scenario where another type of fuel completely takes over, before oil and other fossil fuels are phased out. He even discusses the possibility of making liquid fuels using very cheap nuclear energy. The way he represents the situation is the following:

(zwei ältere Charts zum ersatzweisen Einsatz von Nuklearenergie)

In such a scenario, it is possible that oil supply will begin to decline when approximately 50% of resources are exhausted, and the down slope of the curve will follow a symmetric "Hubbert curve." This situation seems to represent a best possible case; it doesn"t seem to represent the case we are facing today. If a debt collapse occurs, much of the remaining fuel is likely to stay in the ground.

Issue #10: Our economy is a networked system. Increasing debt is what keeps the economy inflated. If wages fail to keep pace with debt growth, the system seems likely to eventually crash.

In previous posts, I have represented the economy as a self-organized networked system, consisting of businesses, consumers, governments (with laws, regulations, and taxes), financial system, and international trade.

One reason the economy is represented as hollow is because the economy loses its capability to make goods that are no longer needed–such as buggy whips and rotary dial phones. Another reason why it might be represented as hollow is because debt is used to "puff it up" to its current size. Once the amount of debt starts shrinking, it makes it very difficult for the economy to maintain its stability.

Many "peak oilers" believe that if we have a problem with the financial system, all we have to do is start over with a new one–perhaps without debt. Everything I can see says that debt is an essential part of the current system. We could not extract fossil fuels in any significant quantity, without an ever-rising quantity of debt. The problem we are encountering now is that once resource costs get too high, the debt-based system no longer works. A new debt-based financial system likely won"t work any better than the old one.

If we try to build a new system without fossil fuels, we will be really starting over, because even today"s "renewables" are part of the fossil fuel system. We will have to go back to things that can be made directly from wood and other natural products without large amounts of heat, to have truly renewable resources....

fed/lz Brüssel/Frankfurt - EZB-Präsident Mario Draghi bekräftigte die Ansage, dass für die EZB beim Ankauf nur erstklassige (senior) oder mit Staatsgarantien besicherte Mezzanine-Papiere in Frage kommen. "Wir werden keine Mezzanine-Titel ohne explizite Garantie erwerben", unterstrich er und betonte, dass die Notenbank beim ABS-Kauf auf Transparenz Wert lege: "Wir werden wissen, welche Arten von Krediten darin verbrieft sind." Er erinnerte daran, dass die EZB bereits Erfahrung mit Asset Backed Securities habe, weil sie diese Wertpapiere schon länger als Sicherheiten anerkenne. Der Italiener zeigte sich optimistisch, dass die ABS-Käufe dazu beitragen werden, den Kreditmarkt wieder in Schwung zu bringen. Er verwies darauf, dass es bereits Signale für eine Belebung gebe - wenn auch bislang nur recht schwache.

Im Rückblick auf die zurückhaltende Nachfrage beim jüngsten Langfristkreditprogramm (TLTRO) erklärte Draghi, diese sei im Rahmen der Erwartungen gewesen. Nach vorn blickend wiederholte er, dass die EZB bereit sei, bei Bedarf weitere unkonventionelle geldpolitische Maßnahmen zu ergreifen.

Bundesbankpräsident Jens Weidmann hat die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) indes davor gewarnt, noch weitere Schritte in Richtung Staatsfinanzierung zu gehen, etwa mit einem möglichen Ankauf von Staatsanleihen. Den Notenbanken sei es verboten, Staaten Kredit zu gewähren und Staatspapiere bei ihrer Emission zu erwerben. Und mit gezielten Anleihekäufen am Sekundärmarkt müssten sie sich den Vorwurf gefallen lassen, dieses Verbot zu umgehen, kritisierte Weidmann im Interview mit dem Nachrichtenmagazin "Der Spiegel".

Auch den unlängst von der EZB angekündigten Ankauf von Pfandbriefen und strukturierten Wertpapieren (ABS) zur Ankurbelung der Kreditvergabe hält Weidmann für "gefährlich", da wegen des geringen Volumens in diesem Markt die EZB gezwungen wäre, auf hochriskante Papiere auszuweichen. Und auch bei relativ sicheren Papieren sollte die EZB nach Ansicht von Weidmann nicht höhere Preise zahlen, als dies ein privater Investor tun würde. Außerdem müsste eine "umfassende Transparenz über die Käufe" sichergestellt sein.

Weidmann sieht die EZB insgesamt auf einem gefährlichen Weg. Ihre jüngsten Entscheidungen bedeuteten eine "grundsätzliche Weichenstellung und eine einschneidende Veränderung für die Geldpolitik", sagte er. Denn es gehe nicht mehr nur darum, die Kreditvergabe anzukurbeln, sondern nötigenfalls auch auf direktem Weg Geld in die Wirtschaft zu pumpen. Weidmann warnte die EZB zudem, sich vor den Karren der Politik spannen zu lassen. Ansonsten riskiere sie ihre Unabhängigkeit: "Wenn die Notenbank politisches Nichthandeln kompensiert, wird der Druck, dieses wieder und wieder zu tun, immer größer, und sie läuft Gefahr, ihr Ziel der Preisstabilität aus dem Blick zu verlieren."

Daraus resultiert fast zwingend eine deflationäre Abwärtsspirale: Da trotz sinkenden Angebots die Preise nicht wieder steigen, geben immer mehr Hersteller die Rohstoffproduktion ganz auf. Rohstoffe werden dadurch noch knapper - was die darbende Wirtschaft zusätzlich lähmt. Ohne Öl und Rohstoffe fehlt der Motor für neues Wachstum.

Daher wohl auch die Inflationierungspolitik der Notenbanken - die das Grundproblem allerdings nicht lösen kann. Denn das eigentliche Grundproblem ist die jahrhundertelange Schulden-Pyramidisierung, die bei physisch begrenzten Rohstoff-Ressourcen zwangsläufig irgendwann zum Schuldenkollaps führt - egal wieviel die Notenbanker pumpen.

Ich bin mit bei den Tverberg-Thesen nicht sicher, ob sie nicht dazu dienen sollen, die Inflationspolitik der Notenbanken samt hoher Energiepreise (beides nützt Wall Street und der Ölmafia) zu rechtfertigen und ein Revival der Kernenergie durchzudrücken. Man muss sich daher fragen, wie zwingend seine Argumentation wirklich ist.
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Weitaus sinnvoller scheint mir eine neue Energiepolitik, die nicht mehr auf fossile oder nukleare Ressourcen angewiesen ist. Diese wird vor allem deshalb nicht mit Nachdruck verfolgt, weil erneuerbare Energien in der Regel dezentral erzeugt werden [Windrad auf dem Feld, Photovolatik auf dem Dach, Strom und Wärme aus Gülle (Methan)]. Das passt Wall Street und den Energiekonzernen nicht, die weiter an ihrer "zentralen Distribution" und Terminkontrakt-Schachereien verdienen wollen.
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Hier der von Tverberg erwartete Rückgang der Rohstoffproduktion infolge fallender Rohstoffpreise:

In der Regel bleibt dann nur noch der Staat, der im Gegensatz zu den anderen Akteuren auch während einer Deflation Schulden aufnehmen und damit Nachfrage erzeugen kann. Schaut man jedoch auf die Schuldenstände vieler entwickelter Länder, so wird klar, dass es da eigentlich nur wenig oder überhaupt keinen Spielraum für eine weitere Schuldensause gibt. Japan war in den vergangenen gut zwei Dekaden das eindrückliche Beispiel dafür was passiert, wenn sich erst einmal geringe (oder gar negative) Inflationswerte etabliert haben, von seinem mittlerweile exorbitanten Schuldenpegel hier mal kurz abgesehen. Und ist der Leitzins erst einmal bei Null angelangt, so gibt es auch nicht mehr viel, was man dann zur Ankurbelung tun könnte. Selbst die Einführung eines Negativzinses würde wenig bewirken. Das Horten von Geld zu verteuern ist nicht gleichbedeutend damit, dass die Menschen nun das Geld mit vollen Händen ausgeben, vor allem dann nicht, wenn ihnen die wirtschaftliche Zukunft recht unsicher erscheint.

Es bleibt an dieser Stelle jedoch festzuhalten, dass das stark anschwellende Deflationsgeheule mittlerweile wie eine klar interessensgeleitete Propaganda erscheint, welche darauf abzielt, dass die EZB ja bereitwillig die Geldschleusen bis zum Anschlag aufreisst bzw. aufgerissen lässt. Denn wir befinden uns trotz allem immer noch in einem Umfeld mit leicht erhöhten Teuerungsraten.

Die aktuellen Kommentare von Otmar Issing sowie des französischen Zentralbankers Christian Noyer  verdeutlichen, dass die Ängste der EZB vor einer Deflationsspirale unbegründet erscheinen. Der ehemalige EZB-Chefvolkswirt Otmar Issing, der als einer der "Väter" des Euro gilt, hält die Deflationsgefahr für eine "Chimäre" (Einbildung) und sieht desweiteren auch keinerlei Beleg für die Gefahr einer sich beschleunigenden Deflation.

Auch nach Ansicht des französischen Notenbankgouverneurs Christian Noyer befindet sich die Eurozone nicht in einer Phase des allgemeinen Preisverfalls, so Noyer in einem Interview mit der WirtschaftsWoche.

Die möglichen Aktionen der EZB, wie z.B. ein der Fed ähnliches Quantitative-Easing-Programm oder den Ankauf verbriefter und gebündelter Kredite, sogenannter Asset Backed Securities (ABS), zielen hier allerdings wohl stark auf die Subventionierung maroder Großbanken. Die geschürte Angst vor einer Deflation stärkt zudem das Segment langlaufender Anleihen weiter.

So schreibt Stefan Isaacs im Blog der Bondvigilanten treffend:

"Die schiere Größe des europäischen Bankensystems bleibt der Schlüssel zum Verständnis der Probleme, mit denen sich die Entscheider in Europa herumschlagen müssen. Berücksichtigt man, dass das Bankensystem (im Vergleich zum BIP) dreimal so groß ist wie in den USA, deutlich mehr „faule“ Kredite existieren und -  wie die Abbildung unten zeigt – unbedingt Schulden abgebaut werden müssen, dann überrascht es nicht, dass die so genannten Transmissionsmechanismen offenbar nicht mehr richtig greifen."

www.bondvigilantes.com/deutsch/2014/09/12/...ere-zeit-niedrig/

infolge zu niedriger Öl- (und Gas-)Preise.

(ergänzend zu # 418 und 420)

Die Ökonzerne haben sich allerdings, was im Telegraph-Artikel etwas zu kurz kommt, auch für die üblichen Aktienrückkäufe (Ziel: mehr Geld für die Chefetage, weil die Ausübung von Mitarbeiteroptionen lukrativer wird) und wegen der günstigen Möglichkeiten, die die Junkbond-Blase bietet, so stark verschuldet - wie viele andere (US-)Firmen.

Tatsache jedoch ist, dass die schuldenfinanzierten Neuprojekte der großen Ölkonzerne alle darauf basieren, dass der US-Ölpreis (WTI) nicht unter 80 Dollar pro Fass fällt. Ein kostenintensives Projekt von Petrobras in Brasilien sollen sogar 130 Dollar/Faß nötig machen, um keine Verluste zu bringen. Der Kurs von Petrobras hat sich seit 2010 gedrittelt - offenbar weil kaum jemand mehr an die Realisierbarkeit so hoher Öpreise glaubt.

Hinderungsgrund sind u. a. die Verbraucher, die unter Reallohnabbau leiden und für Öl/Benzin/Energie nicht beliebig tief in die Tasche greifen können (siehe Argumente in # 420)
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www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/...tfall-in-cash.html

Oil and gas company debt soars to danger levels to cover shortfall in cash

The world’s leading oil and gas companies are taking on debt and selling assets on an unprecedented scale to cover a shortfall in cash, calling into question the long-term viability of large parts of the industry.

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) said a review of 127 companies across the globe found that they had increased net debt by $106bn in the year to March, in order to cover the surging costs of machinery and exploration, while still paying generous dividends at the same time. They also sold off a net $73bn of assets.

This is a major departure from historical trends. Such a shortfall typically happens only in or just after recessions. For it to occur five years into an economic expansion points to a deep structural malaise.

The EIA said revenues from oil and gas sales have reached a plateau since 2011, stagnating at $568bn over the last year as oil hovers near $100 a barrel. Yet costs have continued to rise relentlessly. Companies have exhausted the low-hanging fruit and are being forced to explore fields in ever more difficult regions.

The EIA said the shortfall between cash earnings from operations and expenditure -- mostly CAPEX and dividends -- has widened from $18bn in 2010 to $110bn during the past three years. Companies appear to have been borrowing heavily both to keep dividends steady and to buy back their own shares, spending an average of $39bn on repurchases since 2011. [A.L.: Das machen fast alle US-Firmen, ist daher nicht Öl-spezifisch...]

The agency, a branch of the US Energy Department, said the increase in debt is “not necessarily a negative indicator” and may make sense for some if interest rates are low. Cheap capital has been a key reason why US companies have been able to boost output of shale gas and oil at an explosive rate, helping to lift the US economy out of the Great Recession.

The latest data shows that “tight oil” production has jumped to 3.7m barrels a day (b/d) from half a million in 2009. The Bakken field in North Dakota alone pumped 1m b/d in May, equivalent to Libya’s historic levels of supply. Shale gas output has risen from three billion cubic feet to 35 billion in just seven years. The EIA said America will increase its lead as the world’s largest producer of oil and gas combined this year, far ahead of Russia or Saudi Arabia.

However, the administration warned in May that “continued declines in cash flow, particularly in the face of rising debt levels, could challenge future exploration and development”. It said that upstream costs of exploring and drilling have been surging, causing companies to raise long-term debt by 9pc in 2012, and 11pc last year.

Upstream costs rose by 12pc a year from 2000 to 2012 due to rising rig rates, deeper water depths, and the costs of seismic technology. This was disguised as China burst onto the world scene and powered crude prices to record highs. Major disruptions in Libya, Iraq, and parts of Africa have since prevented oil from falling much below $100, even though other commodities have been in the doldrums. But even flat prices for three years have exposed how vulnerable the whole oil and gas edifice is becoming.

The major companies are struggling to find viable reserves, forcing them take on ever more leverage to explore in marginal basins, often gambling that much higher prices in the future will come to the rescue. Global output of conventional oil peaked in 2005 despite huge investment.

Steven Kopits from Douglas-Westwood said the productivity of new capital spending has fallen by a factor of five since 2000. “The vast majority of public oil and gas companies require oil prices of over $100 to achieve positive free cash flow under current capex and dividend programmes. [A.L.: Die hohen Dividenden könnten auch gesenkt werden, tun nicht not.] Nearly half of the industry needs more than $120,” he said.

Analysts are split over the giant Petrobras project off the coast of Brazil, described by Citigroup as the “single-most important source of new low-cost world oil supply.” The ultra-deepwater fields lie below layers of salt, making seismic imaging very hard. They will operate at extreme pressure at up to three thousand meters, 50pc deeper than BP’s disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.

Petrobras is committed to spending $102bn on development by 2018. It already has $112bn of debt. The company said its break-even cost on pre-salt drilling so far is $41 to $57 a barrel. Critics say some of the fields may in reality prove to be nearer $130. Petrobras’s share price has fallen by two-thirds since 2010.The global oil and gas nexus is clearly over-extended and could face a severe crunch if oil prices slip towards $80. A growing number of experts say it would be wiser to shrink the industry to a profitable core, returning revenues from existing ventures to shareholders and putting some companies into partial “run-off” rather than risking fresh money on projects that may prove to be ruinous white elephants.

The International Energy Agency in Paris says global investment in fossil fuel supply rose from $400bn to $900bn during the boom from 2000 and 2008, doubling in real terms. It has since levelled off, reaching $950bn last year. The returns have been meagre. Not a single large oil project has come on stream at a break-even cost below $80 a barrel for almost three years.

A study by Carbon Tracker said companies are committing $1.1 trillion over the next decade to projects requiring prices above $95 to make money. Some of the Arctic and deepwater projects have a break-even cost near $120. “The oil majors like Shell are having to replace cheap legacy reserves with new barrels from much more difficult places,” said Mark Lewis from Kepler Cheuvreux.

The new worry is that many companies will be left with “stranded assets” as climate accords kick in. The IEA says companies have booked assets that can never be burned if there is a deal limit to C02 levels to 450 (PPM), a serious political risk for the industry. Estimates vary but Mr Lewis said this could reach $19 trillion for the oil nexus, and $28 trillion for all forms of fossil fuel.

For now the major oil companies are mostly pressing ahead with their plans. ExxonMobil began drilling in Russia’s Arctic ‘High North’ last week with its partner Rosneft, even though Rosneft is on the US sanctions list.

“Exxon must be doing a lot of soul-searching as they get drawn deeper into this,” said one oil veteran with intimate experience of Russia. “We don’t think they ever make any money in the Arctic. It is just too expensive and too difficult.”

Also wenn die Projektion in diesem Chart oben realistisch sein sollte, dann sieht die Welt bald ein totales Chaos.

Aber zum Glück kennt niemand die Zukunft.
Es wird die Energie produziert werden, die benötigt wird. WIE ist eine Frage der Ökonomie.
Wer denkt, dass er Alternative bevorzugen muss, wird eben mittelfristig höhere Energiekosten ernten. Das wird wieder über mehr Schulden finanziert werden. Bricht das Schuldensystem zusammen, werden jene Energien verwendet, die tatsächlich gerade wirtschaftlich sind, weil mit Subventionen der Alternativen wird dann nicht mehr viel laufen.
D.h. der weitere Ausbau der meisten Alternativen wäre dann beendet. Die bestehenden subventionierten Anlagen würden weiter betrieben werden und die Investoren würden vermutlich einen Teil ihrer Investment verlieren.

sagt  Mediobanca

The OECD has drastically cut its growth forecast for Italy. The depression will drag on though most of 2015.

The economy will contract by 0.4pc this year. It will remain stuck in the doldrums next year with growth of just 0.1pc.

If so, Italy’s public debt will spiral to dangerous levels next year, ever further beyond the point of no return for a country without its own sovereign currency and central bank.

“This is catastrophic for the finances of the country. We’re heading for a debt ratio of 145pc next year,” said Antonio Guglielmi, global strategist for Mediobanca.

“Who knows the maximum number that the market will tolerate? The number is already scary, but for the time being Draghi’s poker game is proving successful, and there is now the smell of QE keep the game going for a bit longer.”
It has been an abominable few days for the Italian economy. ISTAT said today that industrial output fell by 1pc in July (m/m), and 1.8pc from a year ago. It is down a fifth since 2008.

Exports from the regions fell 2.5pc in the second quarter (q/q). The figures for the South were nothing less than catastrophic: Sicilia (-11.1), Sardegna (-11.2), Basilicata (-24.6). It seems that the Mezzogiorno is falling off the bottom of the Italian economy.....
blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/...ve-italy-now-says-mediobanca/

“It is going to take a nuclear bomb to turn this around. If Draghi ends up doing almost nothing – and there is a lot of scepticism about the ECB's plans – Italy is dead,” he said......

Der Rubel hat sehr nachgegeben, das ist natürlich für exportstarke Unternehmen wichtig. Gerade Ölfirmen profitieren davon. Das ist ein kurzfristiger Effekt. Auf längere Sicht ist auch die wirtschaftliche Annäherung an China und Asien in den Bereichen Öl und Gas sowie Infrastruktur und im Agrarsektor sicher positiv zu bewerten. Die Schweinebauern profitieren....Der russische Aktienmarkt bietet wegen seiner hohen Dividendenausschüttungen sehr viel Potenzial, derzeit gerade bei ölexportierenden Ländern. Die Banken haben wir stark untergewichtet. Selbst wenn wir die Ukraine beiseite lassen, gab es schon vorher Probleme. Positiv bin ich für die Stahlindustrie gestimmt, da haben einige restrukturiert. Außerdem sind die Stahlimporte aus der Ukraine zurückgegangen, das hilft russischen Stahlkonzernen.

Welche Branchen bevorzugen Sie?

Derzeit vor allem Ölexporteure, die sind kaum fremdfinanziert und bieten eine hohe Dividende.....
wirtschaftsblatt.at/home/boerse/investor/...ink=/home/index.do