nicht nur Libor und neuerdings Euribor,nein auch Derivative wurden manipuliert mit täglichen Absprachen via Telefon oder Emails-organisiertes Verbrechen
Der Spiegel hat eine interessante Geschichte dazu und zu Moryoussef und Barclays und die Untersuchungen der European Commission zu Kartellabsprachen bei Derivativen sowie zu den Bafin-Untersuchungen bei der Deutschen Bank-leider auf englisch
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/...illions-a-847453.html...In the London financial district, Moryoussef was seen as cool and unassuming. He liked diving, read books and didn't put on airs in public, even when he moved into a £2.5-million ($3.9 million) apartment in London's St. John's Wood neighborhood with his wife and two children.
Moryoussef traded in interest rate derivatives during his time at Barclays. He and his fellow traders knew exactly how much money they stood to lose or gain if the Libor or Euribor changed by only a fraction of a percentage point in one direction or the other.
And they apparently did everything they could to eliminate happenstance. Moryoussef communicated by phone or email with colleagues inside and outside the bank almost daily to steer interest rates in the right direction. To do so, they sent inquiries to the people who were responsible for inputting the Libor rates: the money market traders.
It was a conspiratorial group of underdogs who worked for various banks and met at least once a month for a beer or a mojito in New York, London or Frankfurt. By the middle of the last decade, when there seemed to be a surplus of money at the banks, they all had the same problem: They were derided or, worse yet, ignored by their colleagues in the trading rooms of major banks.
But what if it were possible to know where interest rates were headed at the end of the day, or even in the next hour? What if a few traders could manipulate the ups and downs of interest rates?
By 2005 at the latest, the traders would seem to have begun realizing just how much power they had were they able to collaborate within their small group. There was no need for formal contracts between large institutions, merely agreements among friends. A pointer here, a few traders meeting for lunch there, and soon the group had formed a global cartel that, according to investigators, reached from Japan to Europe to Canada.
Moryoussef, listed in the files of Britain's Financial Services Authority (FSA) as "Trader E," specialized in the Euribor. He reportedly bet €30 billion on certain movements of the interest rate, a normal dimension in the fast-paced money market. "The trick is that you can't do it alone," he bragged to outside colleagues at HSBC, Société Générale and Deutsche Bank, who allegedly cooperated with him.
While the traders were initially out to increase their bonuses, the manipulation took on a different dimension during the crisis. When the first banks began to wobble in 2007, it became more difficult for many financial companies to borrow money -- a problem that would normally be reflected in higher Libor rates.
Now even top managers at Barclays, alarmed by media reports, were instructing the Libor men to input lower rates. In October 2008, the manipulation became a question of survival for Barclays........
The Failure of the Regulators
On April 11, 2008, a member of the Barclays money market team called Fabiola Ravazzolo, an employee of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. .....
Last year, the European Commission filed several antitrust suits against various banks. Antitrust suits are considered to be the sharpest weapons in business law because they allow Brussels to impose stiff penalties on cartel participants.
"In our investigations, we concentrate on suspicious cartel agreements that include derivatives. This includes possible secret agreements about the determination of these lending rates," says European Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia. In other words, the investigators are interested in more than the manipulation of global interest rates to benefit specific parties. It's also possible that the enormous market for derivatives was manipulated.
"Derivatives traders are also believed to have agreed upon the difference between the buy and sell prices (spreads) of derivatives, thereby selling these financial instruments to customers under conditions that were not customary in the market," says the Swiss Competition Commission, which is also investigating possible cartels.......
Things will get especially uncomfortable for Deutsche Bank, because BaFin intends to double its regulatory capacities for the bank in the near future. Instead of two departments, there will be three or four devoted to Deutsche Bank. The regulator will reshuffle its internal organization to free up the necessary employees.
BaFin has also just prepared a position paper on a subject that is especially sensitive for Jain. The agency is now intensively addressing the question of how, in investment banking, the dangerous practice of proprietary trading could be isolated from the rest of the business through holding structures.......