Ambac Rocky Balboa oder chapter 11

Wieder Fieberträume, BringFrieden? Die 50 % sind, leicht erkennbar, völlig frei erfunden. Oder hast Du irgendeine Quelle für eine derartige Exposure von Ambac aus diesem CDO?

Lass mal. Es ist ohnedies egal. Bei der Zahlung handelt es sich um ein settlement über eine STRAFE, die die SEC aussprechen könnte. Das Geld kriegt die SEC. Sonst niemand.

Citi Should Be Forced To Pay $285 Million For CDO Misdeeds But Not, Y’Know, Over And Over Again

ProPublica, who do great reporting on CDO lawsuits and have been taking the SEC’s new “if you call us repeatedly about fraud, we will eventually take your name and number and return your call within 3 to 5 business days” program seriously, today point out that there may be a little bit of miscommunication between Citi and the SEC over whether the $285 billion settlement that Citi agreed to yesterday on one $1bn CDO gets Citi off the hook for the tens of billions of other CDOs, some of which maybe don’t count among Vikram’s very finest moments:

A bank spokesman said the SEC would not be examining any of those deals. “This means that the SEC has completed its CDO investigation(s) of Citi,’’ the spokesman asserted in an e mail.

Whew, that’s a relief. Wait:

“The $285 million settlement resolves only the Class V Funding III CDO, and we will not hesitate to bring further charges where we determine that there has been unlawful conduct,” an SEC spokesman said.

Hmm. This seems like the sort of thing that you’d want to resolve before handing over the $285mm.

Actually it’s hard to take that SEC spokesman’s line seriously, unless someone at the SEC is really planning to sue Citi over one CDO per quarter for the rest of his or her career. More likely, they’ve moved on to other things, like suing all the banks that haven’t been sued yet over exactly one miserable CDO apiece. ProPublica thinks this is lame, given that pretty much every Citi CDO was roughly as bad as this one, only one individual was charged, he was just a director, and everything he did was signed off by multiple layers of people above him all of whom were pretty axed to toss tons of terrible risk into CDOs and unload them on guys who were not paying all that much attention.

Which seems plausible. And if you think it’s wrong to, um, do all that stuff, the SEC’s behavior is puzzling. Why sue over one $1bn CDO in which, to be fair, Citi was naked short half the notional and the guy structuring the deal called it “dogshit”? Why not sue over $20++ bn of CDOs where, well, somebody was short all of the notional and probably you could find an email from someone on the structuring side saying “these buyers are tools” or “I hate this deal” or at least “the font on the offering circular is too small”?

If, on the other hand, your basic view is that sellers should disclose the facts about the assets that they’re selling, but are not obligated to give open and honest disquisitions on their feelings about those assets, then this sort of makes sense. Every bank pays a symbolic settlement so that people can be good and angry, the settlement is big enough as a percentage of notional of their most ridiculous-sounding deal that it looks like a win for the SEC, and the SEC doesn’t have to go to court and push a kind of novel theory of what information should be material to a structured product investor. And the bank gets to limit the attention it gets over this stuff, and avoid the small but scary possibility of a massive settlement on all its deals.

Let’s test that view. Here’s ProPublica on one of Citi’s deals that apparently won’t be getting them in trouble:

Completed in June 2007, this $3 billion deal contained a mysterious $750 million position in a CDO index. Experts believe that such positions were included for the purposes of shorting the market. Did Citi disclose why it included these assets to the investors in this CDO? As much as 30 percent of the assets in the deal were from unsold Citi CDOs. Was this a dumping ground for decaying assets the bank could not unload, as a lawsuit by Ambac, which was settled, charged?

Wait those are easy! “Did Citi disclose why it included these assets to the investors in this CDO?” Who cares? It doesn’t matter why someone sold you the thing you bought, it matters what you bought. Now, it is kind of odd to buy a CDO 25% of which is an index product. But that would be odd no matter why it was included. (If anything, it’s less damning than single-name assets: unlike maybe with single names, Citi has no privileged information on whether the underwriting, etc., of the things included in the index is particularly bad. If they’re short the index, it’s a pure macro bet.) If you’re buying this thing, the thing to ask yourself is “why am I buying this CDO 25% of which is an index of CDOs?” – not “why is Citi selling it to me?”

“Was this a dumping ground for decaying assets the bank could not unload?” Yes, of course! When banks have big positions, they sell them! (Mostly.) When they have assets that they can’t unload, they try harder to unload them. Possibly by lowering the price, or (as here) by throwing in less-horrible assets in a package deal. If you buy a CDO from a bank, where that bank is placement agent, and you really don’t know that the bank is trying to sell it, then no amount of disclosure can help you.

Did Citi Get a Sweet Deal? Bank Claims SEC Settlement on One CDO Clears It on All Others [ProPublica, related, less related]

http://dealbreaker.com/2011/10/...y%E2%80%99know-over-and-over-again/

Tread Carefully When Rumors Are Flying!

http://jutiagroup.com/20111021-tread-carefully-when-rumors-are-flying/

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1015973/1015973111020000000000008.pdf

Im übrigen hat das Kommite nun einen Antrag gestellt, nach dem die IRS kein Geld erhält. Da fragt man sich, warum die überhaupt Geld forderten, wenn nun im Dokument steht das die IRS nie eine Forderung in der Art und Weise hätte berechtigt stellen dürfen?

Und seit wann forscht eine Wertpapierregulierungsbehörde einen Betrugsfall nach, erhebt bei Nachweis eine Schadenszahlung und behält die dann für sich ein, die Geschädigten erhalten aber kein Geld daraus? Sesamstraße oder wo?

Ambac Financial Group Inc. /quotes/zigman/1312239 ABKFQ +6.10% will ask a Manhattan bankruptcy judge Wednesday to establish procedures for an official estimation of what it owes the Internal Revenue Service, a potential tax bill that helped drive the bond insurer into bankruptcy and could still result in a complete liquidation of the company.

Ambac says court-supervised estimation of how much it owes for back taxes would be preferable to a drawn-out court battle, which the bond insurer said would cause it to "run out of money" despite its Wisconsin-based operating arm funding 85% of the costs.

The IRS claims that Ambac owes it $807.2 million in taxes and interest stemming from what it called improper accounting, a significant cloud over everything Ambac does in bankruptcy court. Ambac has said in court papers that the accounting, which involves how it treated credit default swap contracts, was proper and it doesn't owe money for the taxes.

Earlier this month, a judge said creditors can vote on Ambac's bankruptcy-exit plan, which would give control of the company to its bondholders and keep it in business. Ambac Financial is the parent company of the failed bond insurer Ambac Assurance Corp., which is in the control of Wisconsin regulators.

Originally an insurer of municipal bonds, Ambac sold guarantees on billions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities and more complex vehicles known as collateralized-debt obligations, or CDOs. When the housing meltdown hit, many of these securities turned toxic, leaving Ambac with heavy losses. Ambac has warned that if it loses the fight with the IRS, it would likely torpedo its exit plan and force its liquidation.

Tuesday in Wilmington, Del., the Los Angeles Dodgers' season-ticket holders will make their case for an official committee to represent them in the baseball club's Chapter 11 case.

A group that includes the family of Frank Sinatra has asked that an official committee be named in the proceeding, which began when owner Frank McCourt took the team into bankruptcy amid a fight for control over the team, with Commissioner Bud Selig in hot pursuit.

Calling themselves the Dodgers' "most loyal and financially invested fans," the season-ticket holders are concerned the fight over the Dodgers' finances will lead to sacrifices that will affect the value of the tickets. A reduction in concession services, they have argued, could cause ticket holders "to miss one or more innings while standing in insufferable lines."

Earlier this week, the Dodgers said season-ticket holders have no cause for concern, while the creditors committee disagreed in a filing with the bankruptcy court.

"Put bluntly, any eventual reorganization plan for [the Dodgers] will not include plans for how many hot dog stands will be in operation at Dodgers Stadium," the committee wrote. "The plan will not include any covenant stating that no Dodgers fan will ever wait an entire inning for a fountain soda."

Official committee status means the Dodgers' bankruptcy estate has to pay the season-ticket holders' bankruptcy lawyers and financial advisers as well as its own and those hired by the creditors committee.

The Chapter 11 case is poised for a winner-take-all battle between owner McCourt and Selig, and the case is headed to trial Oct. 31. At issue in the trial will be whether Selig can block McCourt's attempt to sell broadcast rights and force a sale of the team itself.

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/...ff-in-bankruptcy-court-2011-10-21

Ich sag ja, wer lesen kann ist im Vorteil. Citibank hat die CDO ausgestellt. Credit Swiss vermittelt. AMBAC hatte die CDO versichert. Wo soll da AMBAC bei faulen CDO involviert gewesen sein Pfandbrief. Gib mal bitte Quelle.

“The $285 million settlement resolves only the Class V Funding III CDO, and we will not hesitate to bring further charges where we determine that there has been unlawful conduct,” an SEC spokesman said.

Did Citi get a sweet deal? Some observers think so.

“Citibank arranged countless CDOs that were built to fail, but the SEC apparently limited its case to a single CDO where they had particularly vivid and powerful proof,” says Stephen Ascher, a securities litigator at Jenner & Block, which has sued Citibank on various structured finance transactions.

“This represents extreme caution, at best — and a failure to grapple with the magnitude and harmfulness of the misconduct, at worst.”

ProPublica has been investigating the practices of the investment banks in the lead-up to the financial crisis for three years. Our research found a number of Citi CDOs similar to the deal featured in the SEC’s Class V complaint, and more information on Citi’s CDO business has emerged in lawsuits and subsequent investigations. Responsibility for these practices did not begin or end with Mr. Stoker. Among the questions still unanswered: How much did Stoker’s immediate bosses know? What did the heads of Citigroup’s CDO business, fixed income business and trading businesses know about Citi’s CDO dealings?

In the settlement announced this week, the SEC charged Citigroup with misleading its clients in the $1 billion Class V Funding III. The regulator said that the bank failed to disclose that it, rather than a supposedly independent collateral manager, had played a key role in choosing the assets in the deal when the bank marketed it to clients. Citigroup also failed to tell its clients that it retained a short position, or bet against, the CDO it created and sold. In addition to the $285 million fine, the SEC also charged Credit Suisse Alternative Capital, which was supposed to choose the assets that went into the CDO, and a low-level executive at that firm, with securities law violations.

Stoker becomes only the second investment banker after Goldman Sachs’ Fabrice “Fabulous Fab” Tourre to be charged by the SEC in conjunction with the business of creating CDOs, which were at the heart of the financial collapse in the fall of 2008. According to the SEC, Stoker played a leading role in structuring Class V Funding III. Stoker declined to comment. His lawyer has said he is fighting the charges.

The SEC complaint shows that Stoker was regularly communicating with other Citi executives about his actions. One top Citi executive coaches employees in an email that Credit Suisse should tell potential buyers of Class V about how it decided to purchase the assets, even though Citi, not Credit Suisse, was making the calls.

In October 2006, people from Citi’s trading desk approached Stoker about shorting deals that Citi arranged. Later, in Nov 3, 2006, Stoker’s immediate boss inquired about Class V Funding III. Stoker told his boss that he hoped the deal would go through. He wrote that the Citi trading group had taken a position in the deal. Citi’s trading desk was shorting Class V Funding III, betting that its value would fall. Stoker noted that Citi shouldn’t tell Credit Suisse officials what was going on, and that Credit Suisse had agreed to be the manager of the CDO “even though they don’t get to pick the assets.’’ Less than two weeks later, this executive pressed Stoker to make sure that their group at Citi got “credit” for the profits on the short.

This Citi official, unnamed in the complaint, was not charged by the SEC.

If Class V Funding III was some outlier, the SEC’s action might make more sense. But it wasn’t.  Citigroup’s CDO operation churned out at least 18 CDOs around the same period. Often they were large CDOs, created with credit default swaps, effectively a bet that a given bond will rise or fall. Most of the CDOs included recycled Citi assets that the bank couldn’t sell. By purchasing pieces of its older deals, Citigroup could complete deals and keep the prices for CDO assets higher than they otherwise would be. Some investors helped picked the assets and then bet against them, facts that Citi didn’t clearly disclose to other investors in the deals.

Closing the book on Citi’s CDO business means the public may never know the true story of Citigroup’s, and Wall Street’s, actions during the financial crisis. One of the largest victims of the CDOs was the bond insurer Ambac. The now-bankrupt firm settled with Citi in 2010, long before it got to the root of the problems with securities Citi convinced it to insure. A shareholder class action lawsuit that is wending its way through the courts has the potential to reveal some details, but often such cases are settled with evidence then sealed from public view.

Among the unresolved questions: What was Citigroup’s role in a series of deals involving Magnetar, an Illinois-based hedge fund that invested in small portions of CDOs and then made big bets against them?  Our investigation showed that Citi put together at least 5 Magnetar CDOs worth $6.5 billion.  Did Citi mislead the investors who lost big on these deals?

Here are some other questions about Citi CDOs created around the time of Class V Funding III:

• 888 Tactical Fund. A February 2007, $1 billion deal, it had a significant portion of other Citi deals in it. Did the bank have influence over the selection of the assets, as it did in Class V Funding III?
• Adams Square Funding II. A $1 billion March 2007 deal. The pitch-book to clients for Class V Funding III was adapted almost wholesale from this deal, according to the SEC complaint. Was Citigroup shorting this deal, or adding assets that were selected by others to short the deal? And was that adequately disclosed to clients?
• Ridgeway Court Funding II. Completed in June 2007, this $3 billion deal contained a mysterious $750 million position in a CDO index. Experts believe that such positions were included for the purposes of shorting the market. Did Citi disclose why it included these assets to the investors in this CDO? As much as 30 percent of the assets in the deal were from unsold Citi CDOs. Was this a dumping ground for decaying assets the bank could not unload, as a lawsuit by Ambac, which was settled, charged?
• Armitage. This $3 billion March 2007 CDO looked a lot like Ridgeway II. It had a large portion of other CDOs, much of which came from other Citi deals, including $260 million from Adams Square Funding II. Did Citi adequately disclose to investors what they were buying?
• Class V Funding IV. A $2 billion June 2007 deal, Citi appears to have done this directly with Ambac. The SEC complaint about Class V Funding III makes it clear that Ambac was unaware of Citi’s position in that deal. Did the bank disclose more to Ambac in this deal?
• Octonion. This $1 billion March 2007 CDO bought some of Adams Square Funding II. Adams Square II bought a piece of Octonion. A third CDO, Class V Funding III, also bought some of Octonion. Octonion, in turn, bought a piece of Class V Funding III. How did Citi and the collateral managers involved in these deals justify this daisy chain of buying?

http://www.ukprogressive.co.uk/...-it-on-all-others/article15252.html

Enge Grenzen für die Garantien des Schuldenschirms EFSF

Der Schuldenschirm EFSF kann nur in engen Grenzen Garantien geben. Nur durch Abbau von Ungleichgewichten ist die Schuldenkrise der Euro-Zone lösbar.

Ug. Während Politiker und Berater um die Ausgestaltung der neusten Planes zur Eindämmung der Schulden- und Bankenkrise der Euro-Region ringen, befassen sich die Finanzmärkte bereits intensiv mit vermuteten Inhalten. Die Aktienmärkte machen es sich leicht und reagieren auf Zeichen einer Lösung freundlich. Marktanalytiker bemühen sich dagegen, der Sache auf den Grund zu gehen. Sie heben die hohe Komplexität und innere Verbindung der drei Hauptprobleme, für die Lösungen gesucht werden, hervor: Wie hoch soll die Abschreibung der griechischen Staatsschulden, der Schuldenschnitt, ausfallen (die Antwort dürfte zum Präzedenzfall werden), um wie viel müssen die Banken ihr Eigenkapital erhöhen, um die auftretenden Verluste zu verkraften, und welche «Leverage» (Hebel) soll der Hilfsfonds EFSF haben?

Einfache Mathematik

Weitgehend Einigkeit herrscht in Marktkreisen, dass es wünschenswert wäre, wenn diesmal Ergebnisse erreicht werden, die nicht alle Probleme in die Zukunft verschieben. Der jetzt im Zentrum der Gespräche stehende Vorschlag, den Schuldenschirm als Versicherer von Staatsanleihen einzusetzen, basiert vor allem auf Arbeiten von Paul Achleitner von der Allianz und von Sony Kapoor von dem kleinen, in London domizilierten Think-Tank Re-Define. Kapoor arbeitet bereits seit 2010 an seiner Empfehlung, den Schirm mit einem Hebel zur Stärkung der Finanzkraft zu versehen; Vorbild sind die US-Bond-Versicherer MBA und Ambac. Bemerkenswert an der Versicherungslösung ist, dass «Leverage», eine der Ursachen der Finanzkrise, nun zu ihrer Überwindung beitragen soll.

Eine Analyse der Teilkaskoversicherung neuer Staatsanleihen durch den Schuldenschirm haben vor kurzem Willem Buiter und Ebrahim Rahbari (Citigroup Global Markets) vorgelegt. Sie kommen zum Schluss, dass dessen Finanzkraft deutlich unter dem theoretischen Maximum liegt. Wird die gesamte AAA-Finanzierungskapazität der EFSF von 440 Mrd. € für eine Garantie der ersten 20% der Verluste eingesetzt, könnten Käufe von Anleihen im Wert von bis zu 2,2 Bio. € unterstützt werden. Tatsächlich ist aber nicht die gesamte Kapazität einsetzbar. Die «stepping-out»-Länder (Griechenland, Irland und Portugal), können als Nutzniesser der EFSF keine Garantien geben. Andere Länder, die «de-facto stepping out»-Länder, werden von der Europäischen Zentralbank unterstützt und fallen auch aus (Italien und Spanien). Ausserdem müssen von der EFSF bereits eingegangene Verpflichtungen abgezogen werden. Realistischerweise einsetzbar für eine Versicherung wären deshalb maximal 300 Mrd. € oder sogar nur 200 Mrd. €, entsprechend Garantien von 1,5 Bio. € bzw. 1,0 Bio. €.

Reichen diese Summen aus? Die Gesamtverschuldung der Regierungen von Euro-Staaten beträgt 7,86 Bio. €. Wichtig in diesem Zusammenhang sind aber nicht die ausstehenden Anleihen, sondern die neuen Finanzierungsbedürfnisse. Buiter und Rahbari rechnen aus, dass bis zum 2. Quartal 2014 Griechenland, Irland, Portugal, Spanien und Italien einen Finanzierungsbedarf von etwas über 1,5 Bio. € haben, was die Garantiefähigkeit der EFSF aufs Äusserste anspannen würde. Sollte es notwendig werden, auch neue Anleihen von Belgien und Frankreich partiell zu garantieren, kämen weitere 1,2 Bio. € hinzu – von der EFSF nicht zu stemmen.

Unter der Voraussetzung, dass der Schuldenschirm nicht ausgeweitet wird, und unter realistischen Annahmen für das effektive Garantiekapital und die Garantiehöhe stösst die Versicherungslösung rasch an ihre Grenzen. Ausserdem ist fraglich, ob sich Anleger finden lassen, die mit einer Garantie von 20% zufrieden sind. Analytiker bemängeln ausserdem, dass ein zweistufiger Markt von garantierten und nicht garantierten Staatsanleihen entstehen würde.

Anhaltende Ungleichgewichte

Die Suche der europäischen Politiker nach einer endgültigen Krisenlösung vergleicht George Magnus von der UBS mit der Suche nach dem heiligen Gral. Die Straffung der Staatshaushalte und der Einsatz von finanziellen Techniken müsse letztlich erfolglos bleiben, solange es nicht gelänge, die sich in Handelsbilanzdefiziten und -überschüssen manifestierenden Ungleichgewichte der Euro-Zone nachhaltig zu beseitigen. Diese Aufgabe müsse von den Defizitländern und den Überschussländern gemeinsam angegangen werden.
 

http://www.nzz.ch/finanzen/nachrichten/...iligen_gral_1.13098765.html

Site updated Oct. 21, 2011

http://ambacpolicyholders.com/

http://ir.ambac.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=80774&p=irol-sec

www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-24…uptcy-case.html

Ambac Financial Group Inc. (ABKFQ) asked for
more time to control its reorganization in bankruptcy, as a
financial adviser said the company has enough money to meet its
obligations for at least five years.


Ambac, the holding company for a failed bond insurer, has
requested until Feb. 3 to control its Chapter 11 case in New
York. The company had $52.8 million in available resources as of
Oct. 14, according to C.J. Brown, a managing director of
Blackstone Advisory Partners L.P. who filed a statement today in
support of the extension.


“The company’s liquidity position is expected to remain
sufficient for at least the next five years,” Brown said.

Ambac already has a plan to exit bankruptcy that resolves
how it will share a tax benefit with its operating unit, Ambac
Assurance Corp., which is being overseen by Wisconsin
regulators. Creditors are voting on that plan, which is
scheduled to go before a judge Dec. 8 for final confirmation.

The company’s spending rate until it exits bankruptcy is
about $2.5 million to $4.5 million a month, Brown said. Ambac
Financial expects future cash inflows from its operating unit
worth $5 million per year, and Ambac Assurance will contribute
at least 85 percent of the costs of a dispute with the IRS and
give it a cash grant worth $30 million, Brown added.


To complete its Chapter 11 case, Ambac needs to end a
dispute with the Internal Revenue Service over the way it
accounts for losses on credit-default swaps. Those losses, or
“net operating losses” are valued at $7 billion, according to
Ambac. The company seeks to use $4.7 billion of the losses for
future tax years, Ambac said in yesterday’s filing.


The holding company case is In re Ambac Financial Group
Inc. (ABK), 10-15973, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New
York (Manhattan).

To contact the reporter on this story:
Tiffany Kary in New York
at tkary@bloomberg.net.

Ambac Financial Group Inc. (ABKFQ) bat um mehr Zeit für ihre Sanierung in Konkurs Kontrolle, als Finanzberater sagte, das Unternehmen hat genug Geld, um seine Verpflichtungen für mindestens fünf Jahre zu erfüllen.


Ambac, der Holdinggesellschaft für eine fehlgeschlagene Anleihe Versicherer, hat sich bis 3. Februar aufgefordert, seine Chapter 11 Fall in New York zu kontrollieren. Das Unternehmen hatte 52.800.000 $ in zur Verfügung stehenden Ressourcen ab 14. Oktober, nach CJ Brown, einer der Geschäftsführer von Blackstone Advisory Partners LP, die eine Erklärung eingereicht heute zur Unterstützung der Erweiterung.


"Die Liquidität des Unternehmens wird voraussichtlich noch für mindestens die nächsten fünf Jahre ausreichen", sagte Brown.

Ambac hat bereits einen Plan zur Pleite, wie sie einen Steuervorteil mit Bedieneinheit, Ambac Assurance Corp, der von Wisconsin Regulierungsbehörden beaufsichtigt Aktie löst verlassen. Die Gläubiger sind auf dem Plan, die voraussichtlich vor einem Richter 8. Dezember zur endgültigen Bestätigung gehen wird Stimmrecht.

Das Unternehmen Abwicklungstempo, bis es beendet Konkurs geht es um $ 2.500.000 auf 4.500.000 $ im Monat, sagte Brown. Ambac Financial erwartet künftigen Mittelzuflüsse aus dem operativen Einheit wert $ 5.000.000 pro Jahr und Ambac Assurance wird mindestens 85 Prozent der Kosten eines Rechtsstreits mit dem IRS beitragen und geben ihm eine finanzielle Beihilfe wert $ 30.000.000, fügte Brown hinzu.


Zur Vervollständigung seiner Chapter 11 Fall muss Ambac einen Rechtsstreit mit dem Internal Revenue Service über die Art und Weise sie Konten für Verluste aus Credit Default Swaps zu beenden. Diese Verluste oder "operativen Verlusten" sind bei $ 7000000000 bewertet werden, je nach Ambac. Das Unternehmen zielt auf $ 4700000000 der Verluste für die zukünftige steuerliche Jahre zu nutzen, sagte Ambac in der gestrigen Einreichung.


Die Holdinggesellschaft Fall In re Ambac Financial Group Inc. (ABK), 10-15973, US Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

Tiffany Kary in New York bei tkary@bloomberg.net: Um die Reporter zu dieser Geschichte Kontakt

Ambac’s exclusivity motion is scheduled for a Nov. 7 hearing.

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-25/...ff-a-p-bankruptcy.html

From "Running out of Cash in 3 Months" to "Plenty of Money for 5 Years"

 

Just a very short time ago, AFG was threatening they would run out
of cash and be forced to liquidate within a few months if their plans were not rushed through. Interesting.

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/...mp;mid=10297&tof=1&frt=2

Wie kann das sein....??..?? Hhhhhmmmm............

...könntest Du und auch der Yahoo-Poster in peinlichstem Detail im disclosure statement nachlesen. Die 5 Jahre beziehen sich auf die reorganisierte Ambac nach dem Austritt aus Chapter 11. Blackstone hat eine diesbezügliche cashflow-Analyse gemacht.

Siehe hier: www.kccllc.net/documents/1015973/1015973110930000000000007.pdf

auf Gesamtseite 306.

Die "3 Monate" beziehen sich hingegen auf die Situation VOR Verlassen von Chapter 11. Während dieser Zeit entstehen für das Ambac Estate sehr hohe Kosten, und die führen dazu, dass die derzeit vorhandene Liquidität von knapp 50 Millionen Dollar rasend schnell erschöpft wird.

 

Für 2011 ab September bis Dezember 2011

Beginning Cash $ 56.6 $ 50.2 $ 46.3 $ 43.8

Dann steht da für den Zeitraum ab 2012, nun gemessen in Jahren, also nächstes Jahr 2013, dann 2014 etc.
$ 52.9 $ 64.4 $ 84.1 $ 116.6 $ 153.6
Die Cashpostion verbessert sich ab 2012 nachhaltig.

Und Pfandbrief hat schon recht, denn da steht im geschrieben das die Gläubiger noch am 8 Dezember über den Sanierungsplan abstimmen. Noch hat sich Nichts verändert. Allerdings stimmt die Aussage als solche das die Holding damit solvent ist.

wie sieht das jetzt für die Aktionäre aus.
Denke das hier eine deutliche Verbesserung eingetreten ist
in Bezug auf Ausbuchung

Die Einkünfte, welche Blackrpck sicherlich für die Holding für die folgenden Jahre meint, kommen sicherlich aus dem Tax-Share-Agreement. Sollte es den Aktionären nicht gelingen, dem Gericht deutlich zu vermitteln das so ein Tax-Share-Agreement schon im August 2010 mit besseren Konditionen bestand, welches aber nicht von Seiten der OCI erfüllt wurde, um damit gegen die Ausbuchung der Aktionäre vorzugehen, dann sehe ich schwarz für die Aktionäre.

Im Grunde zeigen die doch nun das was sie vorher verborgen gehalten hatten Stück für Stück öffentlich.

Die Aktionäre können auch noch gegen das Management bzw. ABK eine Klage einreichen, weil die Holding ABK 2008 nicht nur eine Kapitalerhöhung durchgeführt hatte, mit der sie sicher durch wäre, sondern zur Sicherheit auch noch Aktien frei am Mark verkauft hatte. Auf diesen Betrag über 1 Milliarden könnte man die Firma vielleicht noch verklagen, auch wenn die Gläubiger die Firma erhalten sollten.

Hätte AMBAC damals auf die Zahlung von Takefuji bestanden, dann wäre es auch gar nicht in so ein Dilemma gekommen.

Nach jetzigen Stand sind die Aktien am 8 Dezember wertlos oder die Aktionäre wären sich mal mit sinnvollen Klagen.

* Asks court to push bankruptcy confirmation to January

* Says hopes to resolve IRS dispute by Nov. 7

 NEW YORK, Oct 26 (Reuters) - Ambac Financial Group said it may delay until January the confirmation of its proposed bankruptcy reorganization plan as it works to resolve a tax dispute with the Internal Revenue Service.The bankrupt bond insurer told U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Shelley Chapman at a Wednesday hearing in Manhattan that it hopes to have a settlement in place with the IRS by Nov. 7, when Ambac is next scheduled to appear in court.

But "it is possible a deal with the IRS may necessitate some delay in confirmation" of the company's proposed restructuring plan, said Peter Ivanick, an attorney for Ambac.

Ambac suggested Jan. 19, 2012 as a possible new date to schedule a confirmation hearing for its bankruptcy plan, six weeks after the earlier Dec. 8, 2011 date. Chapman earlier this month approved an outline for a restructuring plan that would pay secured claimants in full, but likely wipe out equity holders.

The plan resolves tax and expense-related disputes with the company's Ambac Assurance Corp operating unit, and would provide some recovery for unsecured creditors holding $1.25 billion of senior notes and $444.2 million of subordinated notes. But the company seeks to apply $4.7 billion in net operating loss tax benefits in future years, a plan that could fall apart due to claims from the IRS challenging Ambac's tax accounting practices related to credit default swap contracts.

 The IRS has demanded the return of $807 million in past such benefits. Ambac this month asked the court to intervene in the matter and estimate the value of the IRS claim, but Ivanick said he aims to resolve the matter out of court.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/26/...ankruptcyNews&rpc=43

http://seekingalpha.com/article/...lions-should-be-brought-to-justice

Ambac Assurance Corp., the insurer of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania’s general obligation bonds, asked a judge to throw out the city’s bankruptcy today, the deadline for filing objections.

Ambac insured repayment of almost $65 million in city bonds, the company said in papers filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Harrisburg. The company repeated legal arguments already made by Harrisburg’s mayor and the state claiming the bankruptcy wasn’t authorized by local or Pennsylvania law.

The bankruptcy petition filed by a majority of the city council, and opposed by the mayor, “contains misleading and inaccurate statements about the current status of the law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the authority of the city to be a debtor under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code,” Ambac said.

A majority of the Harrisburg council voted to put the city into bankruptcy earlier this month. Since then, the mayor, Pennsylvania’s governor and creditors have asked the judge overseeing the case to dismiss the bankruptcy petition.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Mary D. France scheduled a hearing for Nov. 23 to decide whether to let the case proceed. Objections to the petition are due today.

Ambac’s parent, Ambac Financial Group Inc. (ABK), is in bankruptcy in New York. Ambac Assurance is being overseen by Wisconsin regulators.

Harrisburg, a city of 49,500 and seat of Dauphin County, as well as Pennsylvania’s capital, faces a debt five times its general-fund budget because of an overhaul and expansion of an incinerator that doesn’t generate enough revenue. Guaranteed debt is about $242 million, with $65 million of it overdue, the bankruptcy petition said.

The case is In re City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 11-06938, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg).

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-28/...to-city-s-bankruptcy.html

Hi,

... und wieder einen Termin vormerken:

"Der amerikanische Bankrott-Richter Mary D. France vorgesehen ein Hören zum 23. November, um zu entscheiden, ob man den Fall weitergehen lässt. Einwände gegen die Bitte sind heute erwartet."

 

MfG

Bin grad mal wieder hier und muß sagen ich fass es nicht, was geht den hier ab?

Pfandbrief: Löschung

21.10.11 20:52
#6456

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Laut meinem RSS Archiv lautete die Überschrift von PB Posting "@bringfrieden/marlboromann/nagumo", wo ist den da eine Unterstellung? Auch der Rest des Postings, soweit im RSS übertragen, enthält IMO nichts außergewöhnliches(im sinne von Unterstellungen oder Beleidigungen). Könnte mich einer der hier dauerhaft Mitlesenden bitte aufklären.