Der Geldverwalter Marc Faber gilt als Ultra-Pessimist und Zyniker. In seiner Weltsicht werden Anleihen wertlos vefallen und Währungen ins Nichts kollabieren. Im Gespräch mit dem Handelsblatt warnt er vor den Folgen der Schuldenkrise.
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„Der Dollar wird auf Null fallen“
Der Geldverwalter Marc Faber gilt als Ultra-Pessimist und Zyniker. In seiner Weltsicht werden Anleihen wertlos vefallen und Währungen ins Nichts kollabieren. Im Gespräch mit dem Handelsblatt warnt er vor den Folgen der Schuldenkrise.
http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/...-wird-auf-null-fallen;2666969
http://www.ariva.de/forum/Lebensversicherung-Altersvorsorge-422310
Ich wollte das Thema zunächst hier einstellen. Dachte dann jedoch, die Diskussion könnte zu sehr eine Eingendynamik entwickeln und das Thema des Thread verfehlen. Somit habe ich einen gesonderten Thread eröffnet.
Mich würde eure Meinung und eure Vorgehensweise interessieren?
Permanent
schlecht ausfallen. Dann wird es nichts mit dem negativen Überaschungsmomentum.
Permanent
September probably offered little relief in the nation's vexing unemployment problem, setting the stage for more Fed intervention that experts give only dubious prospects for success.
Economists expect Friday's jobs numbers to be a wash—private payrolls likely increased 75,000 but the government cut another 78,000 Census workers from its payrolls.
When factoring in the other variables, that probably means zero jobs growth and an unemployment rate inching up to 9.7 percent from 9.6 percent, mainly because more unemployed people rejoined the search for work.
The reasons behind the poor jobs outlook are myriad, experts say: The tax climate remains uncertain as November's election prospects hang in the balance; the government is continuing to peel off Census workers; and while double-dip recession fears are coming off the table, belief that the recovery will be slow and painful is not.
"We're settling into what I would call this slow-growth mode that will be with us until we have resolved some structural problems in our economy. How long that is going to take nobody knows—it could be several quarters or several years," says Bart van Ark, chief economist at the Conference Board. "Everybody's just incredibly cautious because we are beginning to realize this was one of the worst recessions and not just a cyclical thing."
That's hardly what was expected when the government began spending its $810 billion in stimulus funds that was supposed to drive the unemployment rate down to about 8 percent by now.
What has happened instead has been a slog through very slow growth in which GDP could rise as little as 1.5 percent in the third quarter, according to some estimates.
"With a lot of the spending, it doesn't seem to be sticking here. It's going somewhere else," says Doug Roberts, chief investment strategist for Channel Capital Research in Shrewsbury, N.J. "In the near future, nothing seems to be ready to radically reverse this."
Enter the Federal Reserve.
The US central bank is expected to announce some form of quantitative easing—essentially the printing of money—as soon as its November meeting. A weak jobs report Friday likely would give Chairman Ben Bernanke and the rest of the Fed governors strong impetus to justify stepping in and taking other measures to drive down interest rates.
"The message that the Fed has been sending is very clear and that is that the status quo is unacceptable," says Zach Pandl, economist at Nomura Securities in New York. "The Fed is very clear. It has a mandate for full employment. We're not getting there fast enough and further monetary easing looks necessary."
But doubts linger about whether the Fed will be able to spur the economy.
After all, the central bank's policies have yielded mixed success at best, with a $2.5 trillion balance sheet expansion still leaving the economy with near double-digit unemployment and consumer and business confidence weak.
"I don't know what the purpose of QE would be," says Kurt Karl, chief US economist for Swiss Re in New York. "They'll have to reiterate that they'll put in QE2 if economic weakness warrants it. So far in my reading of the economy, it doesn't warrant it.
"Therein lies the rub: If they think the economy needs QE2 it's not a good sign to the market or the economy. So they have a delicate balance to strike there."
Some analysts believe that until the political situation in Washington gets settled in November's midterm elections, businesses will be loathe to make any commitments.
"As far as corporate America hiring again it's basically dependent on what happens in Washington," says Peter Cardillo, chief economist at Avalon Partners in New York. "If the opposition party should gain enough seats to perhaps reverse the present administration's policies somewhat, then I think you'll see a big pickup in employment."
Instilling consumer confidence is the key, says Cardillo, who actually is more optimistic than consensus as he sees net job gains of about 25,000 and the jobless rate holding steady at 9.6 percent.
"The problem is you have consumers who are still very wary," he says. "Unless you change the mood of the consumer, spending is not going to fall of a cliff. But by the same token, it's not going to be robust anytime soon."
And without that consumer generating final demand, there's little hope businesses will feel confident enough to start hiring.
"The Fed has little tools in terms of giving the economy a new pulse," says van Ark of the Conference Board. "It can avoid things getting worse. In the meantime we are looking at huge issues that need to be resolved. For that we need growth."
zum Thema Kredite/QE zeigt sich u. a. in folgendem Artikel von Tom Graff, Bondspezialist (und aktiver Bond-Trader) von street.com. Ich hab meine Kommentare in Klammern, grün und kursiv jeweils hinter den Aussagen/Behauptungen eingefügt.
Tom Graff
Japan buys assets, U.S. not far behind
10/5/2010 5:47 AM EDT
Japan's announcement that it would purchase $420 billion in new assets, including private assets, (heißt das, dass die BoJ auch Aktien hochkaufen will?? Das hat sie schon mal gemacht, aber erst bei Nikkei 7000.) has sent the yen tumbling. It will also inevitably cause comparisons to the U.S.'s apparently inevitable (wirklich "unvermeidlich"? - klingt wie das Unwort "alternativlos"...) push toward QE2.
I scratch my head at comparisons between monetary policy in the U.S. and that of Japan. In the early 1990's, when Japan was in the early stages of a real estate bust, the BoJ was very reticent to provide monetary stimulus. Savings in Japan continued to grow while banks were increasingly unable to lend out their growing deposit base. (Das ist die typische Bilanzrezession, die Richard Koo, Chefvolkswirt von Nomura, für Japan ausgemacht hat.) In a healthy economy, savings equals borrowing. But in Japan, unhealthy banks were not carrying out their money transmission duties. (Das ist für mich eine typische Ami-Fehldeutung. Die Banken in Japan haben - wie jetzt in USA - deshalb so wenig verliehen, weil es so wenig Nachfrage nach Geld gegeben hat. Firmen investieren nicht, wenn die Wirtschaft schrumpft und die Wachstumserwartungen niedrig sind, nicht mal bei Nullzinsen. Von "Pflichtverletzung" der Banken kann daher nicht ernsthaft die Rede sein.)
Japan did nothing to address this problem (Koo würde scharf widersprechen, denn ohne QE hätte es in Japan höchstwahrscheinlich eine Depression gegeben), choosing instead to allow weak banks to flounder. For all the complaints about the American bailouts, these did not leave institutions unable to lend. (Das ist die typische Wallstreet-Lüge. US-Banken haben seit März 2009, als QE begann, nur wenig verliehen - und dies aus den gleichen Gründen wie in Japan: Firmen, denen es halbwegs gut geht, wollen kein Geld, weil die Umstände (mangelnde Kapazitätsauslastung) keine Erweiterungsinvestitionen ratsam erscheinen lassen. Andere sind entweder nicht kreditwürdig oder holen sich das Geld lieber über Junkbond-Emissionen vom Geldmarkt, weil dies - wegen der BondoMania - für sie billiger ist. Statt das Zentralbank-Geld zu verleihen, haben es die US-Banken lieber für das Hochzocken von "Assets aller Art" verwendet.)
In the U.S., the problem is an unwillingness on the part of well-capitalized businesses to borrow. That is, it is demand for credit that is weak, not supply. (Wo ist der Unterschied zu Japan in den 1990ern? In Japan wollten die Firmen auch nichts leihen. Außerdem macht es wenig Unterschied, ob Banken nichts verleihen, weil sie nicht können (Japan) oder ob sie nichts verleihen, weil Firmen nichts wollen (Japan UND USA)). Fortunately, this is a problem that monetary policy can actually help address. (Das halte ich für "die Bernanke-Illusion". Fakt ist, dass die Fed ihr Pulver verschossen hat und QE2 nichts mehr bringt.) Create some inflation expectations and you create a penalty for holding idle cash. (Die Crux ist, dass es sich hierbei lediglich um Inflations-ERWARTUNGEN handelt, wie sie jetzt die gepumpten Rohstoffpreis-Anstiege verheißen. Wenn realwirtschaftlich die Preise fallen, ist Cash neben Bonds der Outperformer schlechthin.)
This will create a disincentive for corporations to hold so much cash, draining the banking system of excess reserves and bringing idle resources back into the economy. (Sehe ich nicht. Wenn die Wirtschaft kaum wächst und unter-ausgelastet ist, sind Investitionen viel zu riskant.. Außerdem wirkt es sich deflationär aus, wenn Zockerbanken die Rohstoffe hochkaufen, da dies die Massenkaufkraft in USA schmälert. Steigende Benzinpreise mögen zwar die InflationsERWARTUNG schüren, doch wenn gleichzeitig WalMart die Preise senkt, weil die Amis anderweitig sparen müssen, ist die Gesamtwirkung unterm Strich deflationär. Bei Deflation kann das "viele Cash" auf den Firmen-Konten sogar bei Nullzins Real-Gewinne abwerfen. Investitionen würden dann später noch billiger.)
As new regulations push banks toward safer investments and lending practices, the middle class will suffer the most, banking analyst Meredith Whitney told CNBC.
The 26 percent of mostly low-income Americans who don't have bank accounts—as well as the wealthy—are only marginally affected by tighter credit from more stringent banking regulations, Whitney said.
But those in the middle class who have relied on access to credit will suffer as banks that "can't price risk now" become increasingly afraid to make loans.
"We have to reckon with the fact that a very large portion of the US consumer base—which is really middle-class consumers—that were extended credit for the first time in huge swaths are being debanked from the system, so they're delevering," Whitney said, referring to the trend of consumers to save more while paying down debt.
"It's that middle group that is actually getting squeezed and pushed down in terms of demographics," she added. "That is going to put a lot of pressure on the US economy."
Rather than lending, banks in the new regulatory environment are focusing on trading for clients and with currencies, as well as asset management and advising, according to a report in Tuesday's Wall Street Journal.
That means less money to lend to consumers accustomed to having credit to pay for cars, improve their homes or go on vacation.
"The real problem that exists is people just having credit ripped from their wallet. That's a social adjustment that we're going to have to deal with," said Whitney, head of the Meredith Whitney Advisory Group in New York. "If you had money and you don't have money anymore, that's a traumatic experience. If you had access to credit and you don't have anymore, that's a big adjustment and there'll be social consequences because of it."
Whitney is noted for calling the collapse of the financial system when the subprime mortgage market began imploding.
In her interview Wednesday, she called bank stocks uninteresting for now as the US economic recovery lags.
"The banks stocks are just boring at this point. They're not going to go up that much, they're not going to go down that much," she said. "If you've got a great international strategy, that's more exciting."
She did say that Visa and Mastercard offer opportunities in the financial sector as more and more banking operations become card-based transactions. Visa is off 24 percent while Mastercard is down 16 percent from their respective April 26 peaks, but Whitney said the credit card industry will regain strength.
"I like anything that embraces payments," she said. "That's just a freight train moving in the direction of 'let's have better ease of payments.'"
Ich hatte darüber schon im März in einem Spaß-Posting geschrieben.
Nun könnte es Ernst werden:
Technical Analysis
Catching the Wave: Ready to Jump Ship
By Ken Goldberg
Street.com Contributor
10/5/2010 9:15 AM EDT
Elliott Wave Theory is not just a predictive pattern recognition tool. It tracks crowd psychology and herd sentiment as populations swing from one pendulum extreme (mania) to the other (depression), Elliotticians, when gauging the maturity of any given trend, often seek a number of particular key characteristics.
For instance, the crowd acts differently toward risk, leverage, and trust at market lows than it does at market highs. Therefore, if we compare these and other measures at various times, objective conclusions can be made about anxiety vs. complacency, mania vs. depression and bullish vs. bearish positioning.
As a general rule, when the crowd feels secure about the future, it takes on more risk. One way to measure crowd security is via a survey conducted by the American Association of Individual Investors. When respondents to the survey are overwhelmingly bullish, for instance, very few of the respondents say they're "bearish." This lack of bearishness is attributable to the crowd's "certainty" that the economy is improving and that the markets will rise in the future.
As it turns out, when this bearishness reaches an extremely low ratio, any concurrent market rally becomes unsustainable and a meaningful decline tends to follow. Recently the survey pushed to an extremely low bearish reading of only 24.26%. This reveals that the crowd has become even more certain of continuing market gains than it had been in October of 2007, the month of the all-time highs.
As we continue our analysis, in addition to being able to observe the herding effect, we can also see what professional traders' sentiment shows. There are times when the public and professionals differ in their respective views on the market. In fact, for decades the public was thought to be "dumb money," always buying or selling at the wrong time, while the professionals were thought to be "smart money," entering and exiting various assets at the right time.
According to the Daily Sentiment Index (DSI) -- which polls professional traders each day for their bullish or bearish opinions on a host of trading vehicles -- the professionals are in much the same mindset as the general public. That is, both are at similarly extreme levels of certainty about continuing economic and market improvement.
The DSI recently hit 87% bullishness for stocks, matching the very high level reached in late July, when the Dow reversed around 10,720 and fell to 9950 in the next month. This year, moreover, these two 87% readings were trumped at the April market peak, when bullishness reached 92%. What's alarming is that the supposed dumb and smart money have aligned in their complacency and certainty of the future. Historically, this is a dangerous condition.
The crowd's complacency is actually understated by these measurements. The lack of "safe" yield has caused our collective unconscious to chase risk, rather than avoid it, which is what we've done as a herd for decades. Elliott explains this phenomenon: "In a bear market, the whole purpose of a second wave or (B) wave is to remove the emotional stress created by the first wave down that precedes it."
This second wave's emotional stress reduction (complacency), then, is now manifesting itself throughout the entire financial complex -- except in the case of the dollar, which has thus far been on the rise. So much relief came as a result of the Federal Reserve's first round (so far) of quantitative easing that the Troubled Asset Relief Program was closed, and the recession was declared officially finished by the government.
The strength of instances of wave two (or wave B) -- or the fallacy thereof -- is about to tested. The government has been selling back shares of Citigroup (C) , General Motors (GM) , and AIG (AIG) -- shares the public had already owned, in essence, after the raft of bailouts in 2008 and 2009. The current Elliott Wave position -- which suggests the imminent beginnings of an enormous wave 3 decline -- seems predict future offerings will fail or be pulled.
This second wave has been of such a major degree that everything has been rising together, even though many of these asset classes haven't been positively correlated for decades, if ever. Sentiment is so manic regarding commodities that cotton and sugar recently posted DSI bullishness readings of 97% and 98% respectively. The euro is uber manic as well, showing 97% bullishness. This is even more extreme than the 93% reading at the November 2009 price level of 1.5100, which came just before the euro tanked by 32 handles in seven months.
Interestingly, even though all of these supposedly disparate trading vehicles are rising to multi-month to multiyear highs in concert, the Market Volatility Index (VIX) -- i.e., the fear index -- is not declining to new lows under those of April. According to Elliott Wave Theory, psychology, sentiment and price don't always shift concurrently, nor do they always do so in the same sequence. It all depends on the size of the shift. The first round of quantitative easing -- and the possible coming second round -- can manipulate price for a while. However, once the crowd's "mood" changes, nothing can keep it from its destiny.
Sentiment is at historically bullish extremes and the VIX is not making new lows, so the only question is when -- not if -- we'll see the beginnings of textbook Elliott third-wave formations. The above chart shows the bigger, weekly picture of the S&P 500. Elliott Wave and Fibonacci theories both forecast that third waves break below the extremes of first waves. Therefore, the 666 level on the S&P 500 -- that reached prior to the end of the Great Correction that began in late 2007 -- is the minimum level that should be broken. Both the white and the blue paths in this chart are extremely bearish in the intermediate term, but the blue path offers a year of respite in 2011 if the coming test of 850 (plus or minus 50 points) holds its ground.
For further insight into how dramatically lower index prices are possible, check my recent RealMoney Columnist Conversations and columns regarding Elliott forecasts on Priceline (PCLN) , Google (GOOG) , and other past and present high flyers. Priceline is just ending a five-wave sequence from its 2002 catastrophic low, and has Elliott/Fibonacci support in the $177-to-$248 zone in the coming six to 18 months. Google, meanwhile, is just ending a wave-two bounce of its own from the July low. Its third wave is targeting $325, and perhaps the mid-$200s.
At the time of publication, Goldberg was short GOOG and the euro.
Chart 1 dazu: VIX-Prognose: Goldberg "sieht" einen Retest der 2008-Höchststände bei 90.
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