auf 3 % statt der 5 % der letzten 25 Jahre, d.h. etwas Ähnliches wie das von Doug Kass konstatierte "sub-par"-Wachstum. Die Rezession wäre dann zwar überwunden, weil die Wirtschaft wieder wächst, aber sie wächst dann halt mit weitaus "weniger Dampf" als in den Boomjahren. Grund ist das "Deleveraging" alter Exzesse.
Was hat das für Folgen? Gross (Chef des weltgrößten Bonds-Fonds PIMCO, der zur Allianz gehört) glaubt, dass werde sich auf Erträge in allen Assetklassen auswirken. Die Zinsrendite liegt laut Gross in grober Näherung in der Höhe des zu erwartenden BIP-Wachstums - in Zukunft also eher bei 3 % als bei bislang 5 %. Auch Aktien steigen in einem solchen Umfeld langsamer, was - gekoppelt mit häufigeren Pleiten - die KGVs mittelfristig runterbringt. Galt in der Blasenzeit der letzten 15 Jahre ein KGV von 20 als akzeptabel oder gar günstig, dürfte es - nach meiner Überschlagrechnung - nun ebenfalls um 3/5 fallen (wie das BIP-Wachstum), so dass wir mittelfristige eher KGVs von 12 sehen werden.
Bei SP-500-Gewinnen von aktuell knapp 60 Dollar ergäbe sich für den SP-500 dann ein Kursziel von 60 x 12 = 720. Ist dieses erreicht, beträgt das jährliche Zuwachspotential im Mittel 3 %. Wir kämen dann in 12 Jahren wieder auf den jetzigen Stand von 1020.
Dass Aktien, wie bislang, ein "Risikoaufschlag" von 2 bis 3 % auf die Zinsrendite sicherer Bonds zugebilligt wird, weil sie im Mittel mehr einbringen, dürfte in Zeiten von Sub-Par-Wachstum und gehäuften Pleiten auch nicht mehr der Fall sein. Hinzu kommt, dass in den nächsten zehn Jahren massenhaft "aus-cashende" Babyboomer auf die Aktienkurse drücken.
Auch Doug Kass meint, der SPX kratze zurzeit am oberen Bereich einer neuen langfristigen Trading-Range. Die kommende Erholung sei bereits voll - und tendenziell übertrieben - eingepreist. Der jüngste Höhenflug bei den Aktien verdankt sich der Illusion vieler Anleger, die Indizes würden nun schnell wieder ihre Vorkrisen-Stände erreichen.
Gross glaubt zudem, die Fondsindustrie werde unter den neuen niedrigeren Gewinnparametern leiden. Aktiv gemanagte Aktien-Fonds konnten bislang ca. 1 % pro Jahr von den Einlagen als Spesen einstreichen. Das mag bei einem mittleren Kursanstieg von 8 % pro Jahr zu verschmerzen sein, bei 3 % Wachstum ist es das sicherlich nicht mehr. Damit dürfte der ohnehin angeschlagene Finanzsektor weiter geschwächt werden.
Bill Gross:
...Now, however, things have changed, and it is apparent that there is massive overcapacity in the U.S. and indeed the global economy. As reflexive delevering has unveiled the ugly stepsister of the “great 5% moderation,” nominal GDP has not only sunk below 5%, but turned at least temporarily negative. If allowed to continue – and this is my critical point – a portion of the U.S. production capacity and labor market will have to be permanently laid off. Nominal GDP has to grow close to 5% in order for the economy’s long-term balance to be maintained. Otherwise, employment levels become unsustainable, retail shopping centers unserviceable, automobile production facilities unprofitable, and the economy itself heads towards a new normal where unemployment averages 8 instead of 5%, housing starts total 1.5 instead of 2 million, and domestic auto sales 12, instead of 16 million annual units. Critically in the readjustment process, debts are haircutted via corporate defaults and home foreclosures, and equity P/Es are cut based upon increased risk and substantially lower growth expectations. A virtuous circle of expansion turns into a vicious cycle of recession or low-growth stagnation. Label it what you will, but a modern capitalistic economy based on levered financing and asset appreciation cannot thrive if its “return on capital” or nominal GDP suffers such a significant shock.
Policymakers/government to the rescue –we hope. 0% interest rates, quantitative easing, $1.5 trillion deficits, trillions more in FDIC or explicit government guarantees, a trillion plus in MBS and Treasury bond purchases, TALF, TARP – I could, but I need not go on. Can they do it? In other words, can they successfully reflate to 5% nominal GDP and recreate an “old” normal economy? Not likely. The substitution of government-backed vs. private-leverage is one strong argument against the possibility. Despite the attractive financing rates incorporated with the TALF, TLGP and other government-subsidized financing programs, they come with quality constraints (larger collateral haircuts and mortgage down payments, to name a few) that inhibit the “new normal” lenders from approaching the standards of the 5% nominal-based shadow banking system. Just last week, President Obama proposed new “transaction fees” for “far out transactions” undertaken by financial companies. “If you guys want to do them,” he said, “put something into the kitty.” In turn, there are internal Washington Beltway/external Main Street USA, politically imposed limits which will thwart policy expansion beyond the current stasis. Most of the politicos and even ordinary citizens are screaming for limits on monetary/fiscal expansion: “No TARP II! 1.5 trillion dollar deficits are enough! The Fed must have an exit plan!” etc. If there are such future political constraints or caps (both domestically and from abroad), then one should recognize that most of the ammunition has been spent stabilizing the financial system, and very little directed towards the real economy in terms of job loss prevention. Where is the political will or wallet now to grant corporate tax breaks for private sector job creation or to even hire new government workers, aside from a minor positive push with military enlistment? In brief, the “new normal” nominal GDP, the future return on our stock of labor and capital investment, will likely be centered closer to 3%, for at least a few years once a recovery is in place beginning in this year’s second half. Diminished capitalistic risk taking and constrained policymaker releveraging will lead to that likely conclusion.
Investment conclusions? A 3% nominal GDP “new normal” means lower profit growth, permanently higher unemployment, capped consumer spending growth rates and an increasing involvement of the government sector, which substantially changes the character of the American capitalistic model. High risk bonds, commercial real estate, and even lower quality municipal bonds may suffer more than cyclical defaults if not government supported. Stock P/Es will rest at lower historical norms, and higher stock prices will ultimately depend on tangible earnings growth in the form of increased dividends, not green shoots hope. An investor should remember that a journey to 3% nominal GDP means default/haircuts for assets on the upper end of the risk spectrum, as well as extremely low yielding returns for government and government-guaranteed assets at the bottom end. There is no investment potion for this new environment other than steady income-producing bond and equity investments in companies with strong balance sheets and high dividend yields, as well as selectively chosen emerging market commitments where nominal GDP growth prospects are tilted upward as opposed to gravitating to new lower norms. Madame Rue has met her match.
William H. Gross
Managing Director
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