Wamu WKN 893906 News !

www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229100422000000000024.pdf

www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229100422000000000023.pdf

www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229100422000000000022.pdf

du hast recht, ich weiss ich sollte mich weder darüber aufregen, noch darauf eingehen.
aber irgendwie machts hin und wieder schon Spass soviel geballte Dummheit in nur einem User zu sehen und noch schöner ist es, diesem kleinen inkompetenten Schmierlappen dann mal zu sagen was man von ihm hält... weiss auch nicht warum, aber irgendwie ist es erfrischend.
Zum Thema WaMu kann ich nur soviel sagen: Es hat nie besser ausgesehen f Das heisst er muss irgendwo zwischen 13,4 und 14 Eurocent (sagen wir sein EK ist 13,7) soviele Shares gekauft haben dass er mit 0,3cent + pro share mehrere Tausend Euro im Plus war (sagen wir mal 4.000 Euro).
ý Daraus würde folgen, dass er für 166666,66Euro Shares gekauft hat und hält.

Wow, Respekt, genau so wie Toothsayer sich hier verhält, könnte man ihm doch glatt glauben, dass er einfachmal so 166k Euro in WaMu gesteckt hat. Das sind immerhin 17,361 Jahre Hartz4, daraus folgt, dass Toothsayer für 34Jahre lang die Hälfte seines, nennen wir es mal "Gehalts", beiseite gelegt hat um in WaMu zu investieren.

Wirklich klasse dieser Toothsayer. Sowas von glaubwürdig. cool.

Gruß

nicht hingehauen,
eigentlich sah mein post so aus:

du hast recht, ich weiss ich sollte mich weder darüber aufregen, noch darauf eingehen.
aber irgendwie machts hin und wieder schon Spass soviel geballte Dummheit in nur einem User zu sehen und noch schöner ist es, diesem kleinen inkompetenten Schmierlappen dann mal zu sagen was man von ihm hält... weiss auch nicht warum, aber irgendwie ist es erfrischend.
Zum Thema WaMu kann ich nur soviel sagen: Es hat nie besser ausgesehen für uns Shareholder.

Zum User Toothsayer nur noch eine KLeinigkeit:

Er sagte er Wäre heute noch ein "paar Tausender im Plus gewesen" aber nach dem "Absturz" heute (unglaubliche 5%) sei er im Minus.
Das heisst er muss irgendwo zwischen 13,4 und 14 Eurocent (sagen wir sein EK ist 13,7) soviele Shares gekauft haben dass er mit 0,3cent + pro share mehrere Tausend Euro im Plus war (sagen wir mal 4.000 Euro).
Daraus würde folgen, dass er für 166666,66Euro Shares gekauft hat und hält.

Wow, Respekt, genau so wie Toothsayer sich hier verhält, könnte man ihm doch glatt glauben, dass er einfachmal so 166k Euro in WaMu gesteckt hat. Das sind immerhin 17,361 Jahre Hartz4, daraus folgt, dass Toothsayer für 34Jahre lang die Hälfte seines, nennen wir es mal "Gehalts", beiseite gelegt hat um in WaMu zu investieren.

Wirklich klasse dieser Toothsayer. Sowas von glaubwürdig. cool.

Gruß

www.ifre.com/...turing-a-victory-for-wamu-shareholders/587890.article

J.P. Morgan and Citigroup were the only banks to bid for Washington Mutual as part of the auction process that is customary when insured U.S. banks and savings institutions fail. Under federal law, the FDIC must accept the "least-cost" offer from potential acquirers.

"The FDIC was able to sell WaMu through an unassisted transaction that protected all depositors and resulted in zero exposure to the government," an FDIC spokesman said. "No other bid accomplished this." Citigroup, J.P. Morgan and the Washington Mutual holding company, now in bankruptcy proceedings, declined to comment.

Former Washington Mutual Chief Executive Kerry Killinger told a Senate subcommittee last week that the seizure was unnecessary, accusing regulators of helping only financial institutions deemed "too clubby to fail." The old parent company has contended the banking operations were worth more than the $1.88 billion paid by J.P. Morgan, while bondholders have accused J.P. Morgan of fostering the conditions that led to the seizure. The FDIC, Washington Mutual's old parent company and J.P. Morgan are battling in a federal court over billions of dollars in deposits, pension benefits and tax refunds. A tentative settlement would split the assets among the three parties.

Citigroup initially considered buying Washington Mutual after being approached by the beleaguered thrift, according to people familiar with the matter, but didn't make an offer. Shortly before Washington Mutual was seized, FDIC officials sought bids from potential buyers. The day before the failure, Citigroup submitted what it called an "indicative" bid.

In a letter, Edward Kelly III, now chairman of global banking in Citigroup's institutional-clients group, wrote that the offer did "not conform to the bidding instructions for Washington Mutual." Still, the letter added, "our suggested approach will in fact provide greater systemic stability and lower losses than would any conforming bid."

In October 2008, Citigroup reached an agreement to buy struggling regional bank Wachovia Corp. as it neared collapse. That deal was torpedoed by Wells Fargo & Co., and Citigroup was forced by year end to get two taxpayer-funded bailouts that left the U.S. government with a 27% stake in the company.

The government now is working to sell off its Citigroup stake over roughly a six-month period.

Dan Fitzpatrick in dan.fitzpatrick @ wsj.com und Randall Smith in randall.smith @ wsj.com
online.wsj.com/article/...3450.html?mod=WSJ_business_whatsNews
--------------------------------------------------

moin,

dachte der killinger hätte mehrere gebote gehabt, außer den beiden. angeblich war das angebot lt. obigem text von jpm so, dass die fdic sich nicht an verlusten beteiligen brauchte. das ist nicht lache. darum bekommen die auch nun steuergeschenke, einen ehemals super kaufpreis.  in den ami boards wurde gestern auch viel rumgesponnen, angeblich, ist solomon noch nicht enmal angefangen. so ein quatsch...und angeblich ist einer vom ec krank....angeblich , angeblich angeblich....wird zeit das die spekulationen hier aufhören.

evtl. bin ich nicht der große taktiker, aber in meinen augen koennte sich das ec nach außen hin auch mal zucken. uns wenns nur ne verbalklatsche ist.....kommt mir vor wie nen boxer der die ganze zeit nicht schlägt, nur umin der 12. runde kräftig loszuprügeln. hoffentlich erreichen wir auch die 12.

oli

  

Citigroup made lowball bid for WaMu — WSJ

Citigroup made a bid for Washington Mutual's struggling banking operations that proposed the federal government absorb billions in expected losses from the Seattle thrift's bad mortgage loans, according to The Wall Street Journal.

By Seattle Times business staff

Citigroup made a bid for Washington Mutual's struggling banking operations but wanted the federal government to absorb most of the expected losses from the Seattle thrift's billions in bad mortgage loans, The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday evening on its website.

Citigroup offered no upfront cash and proposed that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) shoulder 80 percent of initial losses on WaMu's deteriorating loan portfolio , the Journal said, citing documents obtained under a Freedom of Information Act request. The bid, whose terms were not previously disclosed, would have limited Citigroup's total exposure to $10 billion.

The FDIC, which seized WaMu's banking operations on Sept. 25, 2008, sold them to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion. That deal has been criticized by WaMu shareholders who suggested the FDIC favored JPMorgan.

The FDIC is required by law to take the bid that imposes the lowest cost on its deposit-insurance fund.

"In hindsight, Citi's bid was too conservative," CRT Capital Group Kevin Starke told the Journal.

q:seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/201…

darf ich das so verstehen, dass citi 10 mrd. geboten hat, das gebot aber "schlechter" war als das von jpm, weil citi die risiken nicht übernehmen wollte.

Ist der beitrag jetzt informativ gestalltet, also das die risiken ungefähr 8 mrd. differenz rechtfertigen oder ist das eine öffentliche kritik ?

bezüglich die "Bidding" für WaMu. Gutes timing, es drängt unsere PR von den HV nach hinten.

Das CITI bid könnte das FDIC nicht als seriös betrachten, als CITI nicht Finanzell stabil bzw. stark genug war, genau während das "Auktions- Fenster". Hat nicht CITI kurz danach TARP erhalten?

IMHO hatte das FDIC mehr schiss gehabt dass Ausländisches Kapital könnte WaMu wegschnappen...nicht das Banco Santander, aber die Chinesen bzw. TPG. TPGs hunger für high risk Junk Papiere hat WaMu zu teils in den Schieflage gebracht zwischen 2005-2007, und ein weiters Kapital infusion in verbund mit die existierende Liabilities gegenüber WaMu, hätte TPG gewaltiges einfluss erschaffen. Die FDIC musste verhindern das TPG weiters Kapital einspritzt, dafür musste alles schnell gehen.

So, mit die Spanier abgewürgt, CITI noch allzu bedürftig, und die Chinesen am Horizont...hat die FDIC alles schnell geregelt mit diejenigen wer vom vorne an mit WaMu in verhandlung war, JPM.

Alles fine und gut, ein bissen hinterhältig, aber akzeptabel. Nur es gibt einen hacken dabei...das FDI Act.

Das FDI Act verpflichtet der FDIC in sollche fälle, wann das FDIC einem Bank beschlagnahmen mussen, beim weiterverkauf den "Fair Market Price" zum erlangen...und zu erzielen. Logischerweise einen höheres Verkaufspreis belastet die Steuerzahler entspechend weniger. Das FDI Act ist gesetz.

War WaMu wirklich nur $1.8 B wert? Moving forward.

I got 2 stars...just for thinking!

online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704830404575200413908733450.html

Citigroup Inc.'s unsuccessful bid for the teetering banking operations of Washington Mutual Inc. proposed that the U.S. government absorb a majority of the thrift's loan losses and limited Citigroup's financial exposure to $10 billion, according to a document released by regulators.  Terms of the offer by the New York bank previously were kept secret by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., which sold the failed banking units to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. for $1.88 billion in September 2008. The document was disclosed following a Freedom of Information Act request by The Wall Street Journal.  The document appears to weaken claims by Washington Mutual's now-bankrupt parent company that the FDIC bent over backward to give J.P. Morgan a sweetheart deal on Washington Mutual. Citigroup offered no upfront cash as part of its bid and didn't want to assume Washington Mutual's uninsured deposits.  Citigroup also wanted the FDIC to cover 80% of "first losses" on the thrift's loans, including mortgages battered by declining real-estate values. Losses by the New York bank on the remaining 20% would have been capped at $10 billion, the document shows, with the FDIC stuck with any additional loan losses.  In comparison, J.P. Morgan sought and received no loss-sharing agreement from the FDIC. It also took control of all deposits held by Washington Mutual, whose collapse was the largest bank failure in U.S. history. "It would appear from publicly available documents that J.P. Morgan was far and away the best bidder," said Kevin Starke, an analyst with CRT Capital Group LLC in Stamford, Conn. "In hindsight, Citi's bid was too conservative."   J.P. Morgan and Citigroup were the only banks to bid for Washington Mutual as part of the auction process that is customary when insured U.S. banks and savings institutions fail. Under federal law, the FDIC must accept the "least-cost" offer from potential acquirers.  "The FDIC was able to sell WaMu through an unassisted transaction that protected all depositors and resulted in zero exposure to the government," an FDIC spokesman said. "No other bid accomplished this." Citigroup, J.P. Morgan and the Washington Mutual holding company, now in bankruptcy proceedings, declined to comment.  Former Washington Mutual Chief Executive Kerry Killinger told a Senate subcommittee last week that the seizure was unnecessary, accusing regulators of helping only financial institutions deemed "too clubby to fail." The old parent company has contended the banking operations were worth more than the $1.88 billion paid by J.P. Morgan, while bondholders have accused J.P. Morgan of fostering the conditions that led to the seizure. The FDIC, Washington Mutual's old parent company and J.P. Morgan are battling in a federal court over billions of dollars in deposits, pension benefits and tax refunds. A tentative settlement would split the assets among the three parties.  Citigroup initially considered buying Washington Mutual after being approached by the beleaguered thrift, according to people familiar with the matter, but didn't make an offer. Shortly before Washington Mutual was seized, FDIC officials sought bids from potential buyers. The day before the failure, Citigroup submitted what it called an "indicative" bid.  In a letter, Edward Kelly III, now chairman of global banking in Citigroup's institutional-clients group, wrote that the offer did "not conform to the bidding instructions for Washington Mutual." Still, the letter added, "our suggested approach will in fact provide greater systemic stability and lower losses than would any conforming bid."  In October 2008, Citigroup reached an agreement to buy struggling regional bank Wachovia Corp. as it neared collapse. That deal was torpedoed by Wells Fargo & Co., and Citigroup was forced by year end to get two taxpayer-funded bailouts that left the U.S. government with a 27% stake in the company.  The government now is working to sell off its Citigroup stake over roughly a six-month period.

da stimme ich Dir vollkommen zu .Da EC könnte so allmählich mal das Maul aufmachen und tacheles reden,aber vieleicht sind die auch schon gekauft von JPM.Geld ist nunmal Macht und wir sind hier nur jämmerliche Statisten die hoffen ,das es noch Gerechtigkeit gibt.Ich glaube zwar definitiv auch noch da ran, aber wie gesagt Geld ist Macht

da möchte doch jemand etwas bezwecken wenn solche News jetzt rauskommen oder?

So von wegen....JPMC (WIR) waren doch nicht die einzigen Bieter...und es war keine Nacht und Nebel Aktion... oder denk ich falsch?

ist denn zur Zeit los ?

Ich verfolge das Forum nun schon ziemlich lange und habe alle Krimis hier miterlebt.

Aber zur Zeit wirkt das Forum auf mich irgendwie befremdend. Ich weiß auch nicht. Ein komisches

"Wamu" Gefühl beschleicht micht. Ich frage mich Wolle, ID.., Faster wo seid Ihr ?????

Werde die Sache aber auch komplett durchziehen, egal was ein  soothsayer daherlabert. Meiner Meinung nach nur ein gekaufter Basher. Nie vorher von Ihm gehört.

Wenn man länger dabei ist kann man solche Typen herausfiltern. Kennt noch jemand "WachtamRhein".

Leute ich sag nur dabei bleiben. Wir sind kurz vor dem Ziel !!!!!!!!!!!!

 

Jan. 17, 2008: WaMu posts its first annual loss since Ronald Reagan was president, due to fourth-quarter red ink of $1.87 billion.

Feb. 28: The Office of Thrift Supervision, WaMu's primary regulator, lowers the bank's risk rating from 2 (where it had been since at least 2003) to 3.

April 8: Investors led by David Bonderman's TPG pump $7.2 billion into WaMu, getting just over 50 percent of the company at $8.75 a share. WaMu reports a $1 billion quarterly loss and says it will close 186 remaining stand-alone mortgage offices, laying off 2,600 to 3,000 workers.

June 2: Kerry Killinger is removed as WaMu chairman after 17 years, replaced by board member Stephen Frank. Killinger remains CEO.

June 17: WaMu says it is cutting 1,200 more jobs, including 260 at its downtown Seattle headquarters.

July 14: Investors worried about the financial sector's weakness send WaMu shares down 35 percent to $3.23, a level not seen since February 1991. In wake of failure of IndyMac Bank, worried WaMu depositors begin pulling large sums from their accounts.

July 22: WaMu posts a $3.3 billion second-quarter loss.

July 31: FDIC suggests WaMu find a "strategic partner" to help address its capital needs.

Sept. 7: CEO Killinger is forced out, replaced by outside banking executive Alan Fishman. WaMu signs agreement with OTS, requiring it to correct deficiencies and devise a plan to raise new capital. U.S. government takes control of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Sept. 14-19: Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protection, Merrill Lynch is rescued by Bank of America and the federal government takes over insurer American International Group. WaMu's shares sink to $2.01.

Sept. 25: After depositors withdrew $16.7 billion in 8 days, regulators seize WaMu and arrange a sale to JP Morgan in the largest bank failure in U.S. history.

Source: Seattle Times archives


During two closely followed hearings earlier this month, a Senate investigative panel exhaustively documented Washington Mutual's slapdash lending practices and inadequate risk management, and took the defunct thrift's regulators to task for feeble oversight and petty infighting.

But the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations barely touched on two questions that are of intense interest to many people here, if not in the other Washington:

Did WaMu really need to be seized in September 2008, and was the sale of its banking operations to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion on the up and up?

Those questions — and they are two separate issues, though often linked — have consumed some WaMu shareholders and former employees, who vociferously argue that WaMu could have survived, or at least fetched more than what JPMorgan paid.

Longtime Chief Executive Kerry Killinger, who was ousted weeks before WaMu was shut down, told the panel the seizure was "unnecessary" and contended WaMu should have gotten a chance to work its way through the crisis.

But later testimony from the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. depicted a bank that was running critically low on cash and losing access to its backup funding sources.

"Critics may say it was overly harsh to close WaMu, but the reality is that mortgage losses were mounting, (credit) downgrades were occurring, and efforts to raise capital had been exhausted," the FDIC said in written testimony.

"The institution had already gone through one major deposit run and was in the midst of another. The franchise value of WaMu was dissipating rapidly. Action had to be taken."

Here's a rundown of the major questions surrounding WaMu's closure and what, if anything, was learned during the hearings.

Cash shortage

Unlike most of the banks that have failed since, WaMu was not undercapitalized at the time of its closure. In fact, by regulatory standards it was considered "well-capitalized," a fact often cited by critics as evidence the thrift was fundamentally sound.

Capitalization, though, isn't the same as overall financial strength. What sunk WaMu wasn't a shortage of capital but a lack of liquidity.

The distinction is critical. Capital — essentially shareholders' stake in the company plus reserves — is an accounting notion that allows a bank to get unexpected losses off its books; when such losses are written off, capital is reduced accordingly. Liquidity — basically ready access to cash — allows the bank to give depositors their money when they ask for it and generally carry on its day-to-day business.

In his testimony, Killinger said that when he left WaMu on Sept. 8, "deposits were stable, sources of liquidity appeared adequate, and (the OTS) had not directed us to seek additional outside capital."

But after Lehman Brothers went bankrupt Sept. 15, panic spread throughout the financial system. WaMu's depositors pulled out $16.7 billion, nearly 10 percent of total deposits, in the eight days after Lehman's failure.

As a consumer-oriented bank, WaMu relied on customers' deposits as its chief source of liquidity. But WaMu was particularly vulnerable to a deposit run: As of June 30, the last date for which WaMu filed full financial reports, 38 percent of its deposits, or $69.3 billion, was in easily moved nonretirement accounts with balances greater than $100,000 — the FDIC's insurance limit at the time. Such large, partially insured deposits were prone to leaving in times of uncertainty.

WaMu already had experienced a $9.1 billion run earlier that summer, which was reversed only after the bank began paying above-market interest rates on big deposits. This time, according to the FDIC, customers had begun requesting cash payouts rather than accepting official WaMu checks — a clear sign trust in the thrift was evaporating.

Bank runs are regulators' worst nightmare, because of the potential to create panic that can spread beyond troubled banks to healthy ones. Michael Ruggio, a former senior counsel at the FDIC, said in an interview that regulators generally want to act before a bank becomes insolvent and depositors can't get at their money.

One new piece of liquidity data that FDIC Chair Sheila Bair gave the Senate panel: By Sept. 24, WaMu had just $4.4 billion in cash on hand — what she called "a dangerously low amount for a $300 billion institution that had seen average daily deposit withdrawals exceeding $2 billion in the previous week." WaMu was taken over the next day.

Sources of liquidity

A person close to Killinger and familiar with his thinking said focusing on cash on hand could be misleading, because it ignored other sources of liquidity available to WaMu. Killinger, that person said, continues to believe that WaMu has ample sources of liquidity, at least up to the time he left the bank.

But while that may have been true in early September, a few weeks later those sources were drying up fast.

WaMu's main alternatives would have been borrowing from the Federal Home Loan Banks in Seattle and San Francisco and the Federal Reserve's discount window. But the FDIC said that by mid-September those sources combined were less than $10 billion, and that they were preparing to cut WaMu's borrowing capacity further because of the thrift's deteriorating asset quality — namely, the shaky mortgages on its books.

The OTS, in its testimony, added that "most WaMu assets that were not already pledged as collateral for borrowings at the FHLBs or the Federal Reserve Bank (of San Francisco) were of either insufficient quality to secure other borrowings or were not readily saleable."

An internal WaMu analysis from the summer of 2008, made public by the subcommittee, shows starkly what would happen in the event of "significant deposit runoff and loss of wholesale funding sources" — precisely the situation WaMu faced in late September 2008.

Under such a "break the bank" scenario (as the company itself labeled it), WaMu predicted that the $47.3 billion in excess liquidity it had in June 2008 — essentially its total emergency credit line — would be exhausted by the end of October.

The person close to Killinger said he was not familiar with either the "break the bank" analysis or the regulators' comments about narrowing access to the Federal Home Loan Bank and the Federal Reserve discount window, and could not comment on either.

Some also have speculated that had regulators held off seizing WaMu, the Troubled Asset Relief Program that was enacted Oct. 3 could have provided it with needed liquidity. However, the first batches of TARP money weren't given out until Oct. 28 — close to the time WaMu, under its own stress scenario, would have been completely out of cash.

Nor is it certain that WaMu would even have qualified for a TARP infusion. Consider Cleveland-based National City Bank, which faced many of the same issues.

Shortly after the TARP legislation was passed, National City asked its primary regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, whether it should apply for a cash infusion. According to published reports, Comptroller John Dugan told the bank not to bother, and instead urged it to sell itself. Within a week, National City agreed to be bought by Pittsburgh-based PNC Financial Services Group for less than its market value.

JPMorgan's role

Which raises a final question: Did the FDIC, deliberately or not, scupper WaMu's efforts to sell itself, and instead hand the thrift to JPMorgan Chase for a bargain price?

A long-awaited report on WaMu's failure by the inspectors general for the Treasury Department and the FDIC deferred comment on whether the FDIC's resolution process "complied with applicable laws, regulations, policies and procedures." That assessment won't be released until continuing litigation is completed.

Based on documents made public in the various lawsuits swirling around WaMu, there seems little doubt that the FDIC was in contact with JPMorgan well before the Sept. 25 closure. But that in itself would not be considered improper, former agency officials and banking attorneys say.

When regulators decide a bank has to be closed, the FDIC typically contacts a handful of potential acquirers who've been pre-screened to make sure they can handle a deal of that size. The agency asks if they're interested in bidding, and provides them with detailed financial data about the target — all out of sight of the troubled bank itself.

The FDIC had a strong incentive to find a buyer for WaMu quickly: It had estimated that liquidating the massive thrift would cost it anywhere from $25.3 billion to $57.8 billion; at the midpoint of that range, $41.5 billion, the agency's deposit insurance fund would have been completely emptied.

JPMorgan, whose offer to buy WaMu for the equivalent of $8 a share had been spurned earlier in 2008, was known to still be very interested. And in the end, though a few other banks kicked the tires, and Bank of America did make a "nonconforming" offer whose details have not been made public, JPMorgan was the only actual bidder.

William Isaac, who as chairman of the FDIC from 1978 to 1985 oversaw his fair share of bank closures, said WaMu was hardly unique: The banks and other financial institutions that ran aground in the chaotic days of September 2008 were all handled differently.

"We went from transaction to transaction hurtling along in a very inconsistent manner, and that spooked the market," Isaac, now head of consulting firm LECG's global financial-services practice, said in an interview before the hearings. "No one could tell who was going to fail next or how the failure would be handled."

Given that context, he said, the decision to sell WaMu to JPMorgan came down to a "judgment call."

"The FDIC had a buyer for WaMu that wasn't going to cost the FDIC any money, that would resolve the situation in an orderly way and take that problem off the table," he said. "The FDIC decided to take the bird in the hand and resolve it quickly rather than let it go on."

seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/..._wamu25.html?syndication=rss

geht wieder gegen Norden

Warum handelt L&S eigentlich Realtime bei 0,136 während der RT in Frankfurt nur 0,131 is?
Wer is denn dann so blöd über L&S zu handeln? :D

"The FDIC had a strong incentive to find a buyer for WaMu quickly: It had estimated that liquidating the massive thrift would cost it anywhere from $25.3 billion to $57.8 billion; at the midpoint of that range, $41.5 billion, the agency's deposit insurance fund would have been completely emptied".

Mein Gott, die FDIC hat in keinen Zeitpunkt gewusst was WaMu überhaupt wert war.

$25.3 bis $57.8 billion als Liquidations berechnung. Ein spanne vom $32.5B.

scheint ,die Rosen in meinem Garten sind vertrocknet (Gott sei Dank ich hasse die Dinger mittlerweile ).Selbst zu meinem Hochzeitstag gibt es demnächst nut noch Nelken.

Man soll heute der Tag der schlechten News werden? Nur ein Angebot der Citygroup hat vorgelegen ?                                                                                           Nun meine Frage an alle die ein wenig mehr Hintergrundwissen haben. Bei einer vermuteten Insolven wie bei WMB hätte FDIC doch auch erst eine Wertberechnung ala Solomon durchführen müssen um dann mit vorhanden Zahlen ein sagen wir mal öffentliches Bietverfahren einzuleiten ?                                                              Da dem m.E. nicht so ist hätte WMB nicht unter einer Insolvenzverwaltung stehen müssen bis eine Valutierung abgeschlossen ist um daraufhin einen reellen Kaufpreis zu erzielen ? Ich kann doch keine reellen Angebote erwarten oder Käufer finden ,wenn ich nicht mal weiß was die Sache wert ist die ich verkaufe .                JPM  weiß genau was er zusammen mit FDIC da veranstalltet hat ,nur muß man herausfinden wie er die FDIC dazu gebracht hat  WAMU zu so einem Spottpreis zu überlassen .Sonst hat FDIC die Sache am Hintern.Mich wundert nur daß diese Fragen bei Keiner Anhörung oder Verhandlung gestellt werden . Wie komme ich also in ein Capter 11 wenn noch nicht mal das erste Kapitel vernünftig abgeschlossen wurde .

Altes Sprichwort der Fisch stinkt vom Kopf .

 Selbst bei einer tatsächlichen Insolvenz wurden die Pflichten vernachlässigt die Insolvenzmasse ordnungsgemäß und bestmöglich zu vermarkten .

JPMC und FDIC wußten genau das durch die Übernahme Gewinnsteigerungen seitens JPMC zu erwarten waren ,und sie wußten auch wenn das erste POR durgegangen währe JPM Chase alleine durch die Steuererstattung nichts für WAMU gezahlt hätte .

Ich ärgere mich mittlerweile dermaßen über diese korrupte Mischpoke ,daß ich Drahtzieher diese Deals lieber im Knast sehen würde als xx$  für meine commons zu sehen .

Guten Morgen!

Mir gehen seit einigen Tagen Gedanken durch den Kopf, warum sich Rosen vielleicht so verhält, wie er sich gerade verhält!

Rosen hat in der Vergangenheit für JPM gearbeitet und würde sicher auch nach dem "WaMu-Fall" gerne wieder seine Taschen von JPM durch Aufträge füllen lassen...

Wäre es da nicht eine Überlegung wert, dass man - zwar von Wamu beauftragt - sich äußerlich so darstellt, als sehe man das Ganze objektiv!?

Wäre es da nicht fast "normal", wenn man auch seinen eigenen Auftraggeber (WaMu) ein bisschen anstichelt, damit man sein Gesicht gegenüber JPM nicht verliert?

Nur so ein Gedanke von mir! Vielleicht ist es ja - wie im Geschäftsleben halt üblich - nur das Spielchen "Böse Bulle - guter Bulle", um das bestmögliche Ergebnis zu erzielen???

Was denkt ihr - wäre das möglich?

Gruß

und rulaman....

von diesen bewusst platzierten artikeln ..... die komischerweise gleichzeitig in mehreren

zeitungen erscheinen  .... grins.... werden  noch viele folgen...

hier sagt starke von der fdic: ist alles von uns richtig gemacht worden.... ich lach mich kaputt.

hier noch mal meine warnung von gestern:

--------------------------

achtung freunde.....

es kann jetzt schmutzig werden !

warum ?

die mm´s und jpm werden VOR! unserer aktionärsversammlung versuchen ...so viele

registrierte aktionare raus zu drücken ......wie es möglich ist.


1. sie werden am kurs manipulieren....

2. sie werden gefakte schlechte nachrichten streuen...

3. sie drohen mit eigenen gutachten....

4. und sie versuchen vieles mehr....

!!!!  NUR UM UNSERE STIMMBERECHTIGTEN AKTIONÄRE ZU VERKAUF ZU BEWEGEN  !!!!

!!!! lasst euch nicht verarschen !!!

wir sind am zug!!!

bleibt geduldig .... auch wenn es nervt!!!

ihr habt so lange gewartet bis unser EC die " MUSIK " macht ............nun ist es soweit!

verliert nur jetzt nicht eure nerven! ;-)

gruss euer wolle aus bochum

Du hast RECHT!!

Aber müßte demzufolge, das EC oder Mitglieder oder jemand dann um die Aktionäre nicht zum Verkauf zu bewegen, genau das Gegenteil machen?Kurs in die höhe treiben...widerrum gute News bringen?

Kann doch auch sein, oder?

@Maxhans, man muss die armen Dinger nicht dafür strafen, dass der Rosen so ein Hirn ist, ausserdem sind Nelken Grabblumen, trauerst Du an jedem Hochzeitstag?

Meine Meinung zu der Meldung des Rücktritts eines EC-Mitglieds wäre, dass ich 1. nicht alles glaube, bevor es offiziell bestätigt ist, 2. könnte es sein, dass das evtl. ausscheidende EC-Mitglied für das BOD vorgesehen ist, ginge aber nicht, solange es im EC sitzt.